


THE
SĀṆKHYAKĀRIKĀ
OF
ĪŚVARA KRSNA

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY
S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI



UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS
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PREFACE

The issue of a third edition of this book gave me an opportunity to revise the whole matter with some care and make additions and alterations, especially in the light of two books published since 1935, Johnston's *Early Sāṃkhya*, and the *Yuktidīpikā*, a very suggestive and valuable commentary, though of uncertain date and unknown authorship. My obligations have been to many; but I may be permitted to make special mention of Dr. V. Raghavan of the Department of Sanskrit and Mr. S. Subrahmanya Sastri, Research Student in the same Department. I may be also permitted to recall with gratitude the help rendered by other friends in bringing out the earlier editions; notable among those are: Prof. P.P.S. Sastri, Presidency College, Madras, Prof. D. M. Datta, Patna College, Patna, Prof. S. K. Yegnanarayana Iyer, Pachaiyappa's College (Retired), and Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, Department of Sanskrit, Madras University. It is hoped that the present edition will be found both more accurate and more helpful.

Madras,
2nd March 1942.

S. S. S.

Note :—As copies have been exhausted and as there is demand for this book, it is now issued exactly in the form in which it was issued by the late S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri as his third edition of the work.

Madras, }
August 1948. }

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN,
Head of the Dept. of Indian Philosophy.

To
The Race of Pandits
Who despite the neglect and contumely
That have fallen to their lot
Have kept alight the
Lamp of Learning
In Our Land.

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INTRODUCTION

I

The Sāṅkhya is admitted to be one of the oldest of the schools (darśanas) of Indian Philosophy. It has been suggested¹ that while the seers of the Vedas both *knew* the truth and *saw* it, the sages who came later possessed the knowledge alone but not the vision; the search for the vision in its various stages is embodied in the darśanas; and the first of these stages is the discriminative wisdom (sāṅkhya) which distinguishes spirit from matter. This intellectual discrimination found its natural complement in the practical discipline (yoga) whereby the isolation of spirit from matter was accomplished. Such a view has the merit of being at least as satisfactory philosophically and etymologically as any other view of the origin of the name or the system known as the Sāṅkhya. It expresses the essential nature of the quest of the Sāṅkhya philosopher—the quest of discriminative knowledge (vyakta-avyaktajñā-vijñāna); and it accounts for this quest as a search for the Vedic vision rather than as a re-action against it. To say that the Sāṅkhya is a re-action against the idealistic monism of the Upaniṣads² is to ignore both the diversified character of the Upaniṣadic teaching³ and the history of the Sāṅkhya doctrine itself, which in its pre-classical stages seems to have had considerable affinities with Upaniṣadic doctrine.⁴ While it may be truly said that the Sāṅkhya is undoubtedly realistic, in that it starts

1. By A. B. Dhruva : see *PPC*, Benares, p. 9.

2. See Garbe, art. "Sāṅkhya," *ERE*, XI, p. 189.

3. See Radhakrishnan, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, and Ranade, *CSUP*, Ch. IV. The remark in the text proceeds on the assumption that Garbe identifies Upaniṣadic teaching with idealist monism. It is, however, just possible that by the phrase he uses he means no more than "such idealistic monism as is found (together with other philosophical doctrines) in the Upaniṣads." In such a case, the criticism loses much of its point.

4. The *Mahābhārata* contains accounts of the Sāṅkhya in the Bhagavad Gītā, the *Anu Gītā*, and the *Mokṣadharmā* section of the *Sānti Parvan*. The accounts given here do not do away with a single controlling sentient being (*puruṣa*).

with the two kinds of reality—spirits and matter—yet it concludes with a state when matter, as a mutable evolvent, does not exist for the released spirits; and this conclusion would seem to accord better with the hypothesis that the vision of oneness was being sought after than that it was rebelled against.

It is true, no doubt, that there are comparatively few traces, of the Sāṅkhya in the earlier Upaniṣads, like the Chāndogya and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka. The fullest references to the distinctive doctrines of the system are to be found in the Śvetāśvatara, an admittedly late⁵ Upaniṣad. We have in this the explicit use of the word “sāṅkhya”,⁶ a reference to Kapila⁷ and to the one unborn, red, white and black, from whom the universe proceeds⁸. The *Vedānta Sūtras* seek to make out that even the last reference, which seems to be explicitly to Prakṛti with its three guṇas, is indefinite and cannot be invoked as scriptural support for the Sāṅkhya.⁹ Words like

See particularly, XII, Ch. 311, where Vasiṣṭha says, “Prakṛti is one at the time of the deluge and manifold in creation. The controlling puruṣa (adhiṣṭhātā) is also one at the time of the deluge and manifold in creation.” It is interesting to note that the *Maṇimēkalai*, a Tamil classic (possibly of the early centuries of the Christian Era) views the puruṣa as one, in its account of the Sāṅkhya system. Its general account of the twenty-five categories is also more in accord with the epic account. In the light of these, one has to hesitate before subscribing to the view that Kapila sought to find not unity in everything, but variety (Garbe, article in *ERE*, XI, 190). The suggestion has been made and developed with a great deal of plausibility that early Sāṅkhya was concerned more with the religious fate of man than with the metaphysical nature of the universe; its affiliations are with the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* which distinguishes, not Spirit from Matter, but the mortal from the immortal parts of the individual; questions of monism and pluralism, idealism and realism were irrelevant to such a quest. On this as well as the affinities to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya*, see Johnston, 18-24.

5. See the analysis of the Upaniṣads in Belvalkar and Ranade's *History of the Indian Philosophy*, II, esp. pp. 135, 300-310.

6. *Śvet.*, VI, 13.

7. *Ibid.*, V, 2; 46, Kapila, here seems to mean Hiraṇyagarbha, not the originator of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy. See Ranade, *CSUP*, 186-187.

8. *Śvet.*, IV, 5.

9. *Ved. Su.*, I. iv. 8, et seq.

"Kapila" need not refer to [the founder of the Sāṅkhya alone; the word "sāṅkhya" need mean nothing more than wisdom. It is contended by Śaṅkara¹⁰ that the reference to the she-goat (ajā) is made only to illustrate the difference between the bound soul that continues to enjoy, and the released one that cares no more for enjoyment, and that the three colours refer to the colours of fire, water and earth which are mentioned in the Chāndogya.¹¹ The system is frankly treated as rationalistic in the *Vedānta Sūtras*, and criticised *in extenso* on rational grounds, in the second quarter of the second chapter. For the rest, it is said to be a smṛti; and its fundamental concept, Prakṛti, is said to be smārta or ānumānika (what is inferred). But all the criticism, it is clear, applies to the classical Sāṅkhya, which had possibly developed out of an earlier epic Sāṅkhya and had in the development accumulated the aspects of atheism, pluralism, and materialism, though seeking in vain to harmonise these aspects with the bondage or release of the ever pure Intelligence (Puruṣa). In any case, it is not safe to assume that the antagonism of the Vedānta (of the *Vedānta Sūtras*) to the Sāṅkhya is a proof of the latter having arisen in antagonism to the former. And it may well be that Bādarāyaṇa's evidence is that of a partisan.¹²

10. Commentary on *Ved. Su.*, I, iv, 9 and 10.

11. In the face of this, it seems rather difficult to support the position of Prof. Ranade who holds that the reference to the colours in the Chāndogya, VI, iv, 1 represents the rudiments of the theory of the guṇas (*CSUP*, 182). The same writer maintains that the Kāṭha passage (I, iii, 10 and 11) (about manas, buddhi, mahat, avyakta), refers to the Sāṅkhya categories (*Ib.*, 183). This possibility, again, seems to be ruled out by the discussion of the identical passage in *Ved. Su.*, I, iv, 1-7. The position of the *Vedānta Sūtras* may not be final, but it has to be reckoned with. It is possible, however, that they were interested in the refutation not of early Sāṅkhya speculation, which had close affinities with the Upaniṣads, but only of later developments; this hypothesis would raise difficult questions of chronology and tend to push the compilation of the *Vedānta Sūtras* down to a very late date. It is, of course, possible that these *Sūtras* underwent several revisions and that the critical portions belong to a later date; see *Belvalkar*, pp. 142-146.

12. Vijñāna Bhikṣu's attempt to reconcile the Vedānta with the Sāṅkhya is well known. The author of *STV*, following Bhikṣu's lead, says at the

The view that knowledge is the means to final release (or rather is final release) seems certainly to be a heritage from the Upaniṣads, a heritage the acceptance of which seems difficult to explain consistently with the starting point of the Sāṅkhya. Given an eternal dualism of matter and spirits, one fails to see how knowledge of itself can be or bring about release; that which caused bondage, *viz.*, matter, continues to exist and however much the recurrence of bondage may be denied, the ghost of its possibility continues to haunt the mind and refuses to be laid. Not so, however, with the teaching of the Upaniṣads (at least in its monistic aspect); for, matter and bondage, being both partial appearances, disappear with the onset of perfect wisdom and cease once for all to trouble the soul. Hence even on the assumption that the Sāṅkhya arose in reaction against the Vedānta, it seems to have had little success with it.¹³

II

The question of the relative priority of Buddhism and the Sāṅkhya is of some interest, though difficult to settle. In the general pessimistic outlook on life and in the denial of the absolute, there seems to be much in common between the classical Sāṅkhya and the teachings of the Buddha. The lack of positive teaching about the state of release may be another common point. But in respect of the metaphysical starting point of the two systems there would seem to be considerable difference. Buddhism insists on absolute momentariness and discontinuity, logically developing into the doctrine of the void (*śūnya-vāda*). The Sāṅkhya, on the contrary, holds to the eternal reality both of matter and spirits, and explains causation not as a collocation of the momentary and the discrete, but as the manifestation of what is already existent in the cause (it is, in other words, *sat-kārya-vāda*, not *saṃhati-vāda*). Because of these and other differences, it has been thought, Buddhism is a stage further

close of the commentary on verse III, "ato vedāntā-rthasya niṣkarṣakam kapila-matam, na tu kiñcid api virodhi."

13. Prof. Keith notes (*The Sāṅkhya System*, pp. 15-16) that the doctrine of transmigration, the doctrine of knowledge as the means of release, and the general pessimism were inherited by the Sāṅkhya and indicate the derivative character of the system.

INTRODUCTION

removed from Upaniṣadic teaching and belongs possibly to a later period.¹⁴

14. See *The Sāṅkhya System*, p. 20. Garbe holds that the Sāṅkhya took its rise in probably the same district of India as Buddhism and that it is older than the Buddha. The first of these statements rests on little more than the name of the Buddha's birth-place (Kapilavastu) and is rather fanciful. The latter statement is probable, but not proved (see *ERE*, XI, 189). Keith discusses the alleged dependence of the Buddhist chain of causation (Pratitya-samutpāda) on the recognition of the Sāṅkhya categories. He says that "the evidence of dependence is clearly somewhat lacking in cogency" (ib., p. 24). The notion of causation is of itself a point of fundamental difference between the two systems; and it is difficult to decide whether the sat-kārya-vāda was or was not a re-action against the samphati-vāda. Medieval writers like Mādhava expound the Sāṅkhya doctrine as re-acting against and criticising other views—the Vedānta and the Buddhist views among them. But their treatment may have paid little heed to considerations of chronology. Another point of interest is that in respect of sat-kārya-vāda, there does not seem to be any difference between classical and epic Sāṅkhya. One of the accounts in the *Mahābhārata* (XII, Ch. 253) compares the processes of evolution and involution to the putting forth and retraction of its limbs by a tortoise. The epic mention of the system may be taken as some evidence of its having been formulated earlier than Buddhism. An interesting and valuable contribution in recent years is an article by Prof. Stcherbatsky on *The Dharmas of the Buddhists and the Guṇas of the Sāṅkhyas*, (*IHQ.*, X, iv, 737-760). The writer holds the Sāṅkhya to be the predecessor and the philosophical basis of Buddhism; the dharma-vāda of the latter, denying the reality of a dharmin, was the logical descendant of the guṇa doctrine of the Sāṅkhya, in which guṇas are not qualities, but constituents. On Prof. Stcherbatsky's exposition, Buddhist relativism would stand to Sāṅkhya realism in almost the same relation as Hume's scepticism to Berkeley's idealism. Schrader holds that the pratitya-samut-pāda is an answer to the sat-kārya-vāda; see art. Vedānta and Sāṅkhya in *Primitive Buddhism*, *Indian Culture*, I, iv, 543ff. One must remember, however, that it may be a serious error to ascribe to the Buddha himself all the teachings of canonical Buddhism. This general consideration is re-inforced by some others: the doctrine of nāma-rūpa and the psychological classification into *dr̥ṣṭa*, *śruta*, *mata* and *viññāta* seems to show closer affinities to the time honoured and antiquated Upaniṣadic formulæ than to the Sāṅkhya categories; perhaps sat-kārya-vāda was a late development in the Sāṅkhya itself, having been preceded by the Vārṣaganya view that 'what is, is, what is not, is not;' the Buddha's denial of ātman may have related to the empirical jīva, not to the *puruṣa*; the word *guṇa* is not consistently used in early Sāṅkhya to mean only

III

The founder of the system is said to be the sage Kapila. Who he was and when he flourished are questions yet unsettled. He seems have been held in high esteem even by advocates of other systems. His knowledge and integrity are praised even where his system is condemned. The *Vedānta Sūtras* devote two aphorisms¹⁵ to the task of meeting the contention that a system specially evolved as metaphysics by such a distinguished sage cannot be invalid. Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā*¹⁶ says in recounting his glorious manifestations that, among those who have attained perfection, he is the sage Kapila. The name Kapila is applied to the Supreme Deity in the *Viṣṇu-Sahasranāma*; Śiva in the *Śiva-Sahasranāma* is addressed as “Sāṅkhya-parada, bestower of Knowledge”. It is clear that Kapila was a sage of distinction. The *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* that have come down to us (and are otherwise known as the *Sāṅkhya Pravacana*) seem, however, to be a very late production, though usually ascribed to Kapila. Writers on other systems invariably refer to the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, the earliest reference to the *Sūtras* being not earlier than the 15th century A.D.¹⁷

The devolution of the teaching is said to have been from Kapila to Āsuri and from him to Pañcaśikha. It is not known if this Pañcaśikha is identical with a namesake of his who propagated the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy.¹⁸ The *Kārikā*¹⁹ says that he considerably elaborated the Sāṅkhya teaching. This teaching handed down from

“constituent (of Prakṛti).” In view of such considerations, the question of relative priority hardly admits of settlement. See further *Johnston*, on the various topics.

15. *Ved. Su.*, II, i, 1 and 2.

16. *Bh. G.*, X, 26; see also *Bhāgavata*, I, iii, 10: pañcamah kapilo nāma siddheśaḥ kāla-viplutam |

provācā 'suraye sāṅkhyam tattvagrāma vinirṇayam ||

17. See *The Sāṅkhya System*, p. 92. There are, however, attempts to show that the *Sūtras* were of an earlier date and probably composed by the original Kapila; see a paper on the subject in *POC*, Lahore; also *JORM*, II, 148.

18. *Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 8.

19. Verse LXX.

generation to generation of pupils is condensed in the *Kārikā* by Iṣvara Kṛṣṇa. A story told of the initiation of Asuri may not be without interest. It is said that the great sage Kapila moved by compassion for suffering humanity wanted to impart to them the saving knowledge and chose as his pupil Asuri, a brāhmin of the same gotra as himself, who had been a house-holder for 1,000 years. Desiring to test him, Kapila asked him if he delighted in the world. On receiving an answer in the affirmative, he sent the pupil back to live in the world and taste of its experiences for another 1,000 years. Returning at the end of this period, the pupil said that he continued to delight in saṃsāra, whereupon he was promptly sent back for another 1,000 years. At the end of his third period the pupil showed himself to have acquired sufficient distaste and detachment to fit him for instruction in the Sāṅkhya.²⁰ The promulgator of the system would seem to have had as much difficulty in instilling the pessimistic outlook as in releasing humanity from the misery thus taught to exist!

IV

The significance of the name Sāṅkhya has been the subject of considerable speculation. It has been said to be a variant of 'Sāṅkhyā' meaning either wisdom in general or that knowledge which consists in enumerating the categories. There seems to be no means of deciding finally between the two suggestions. A third suggestion, however, which comes from the *Mahābhārata*²¹ is both interesting and plausible. It is there said that the aim of the system is to grasp the twenty-fifth principle (the spirit) as discriminated from the twenty-four, which are material. The discrimination consists in the recognition of the fact that that world forms no part of the true nature of the self who is pure spirit.

20. The story appears in the *Māṭhara Vṛtti*. An interesting variant is found in *Jaya*, according to which the pupil says from the first that he delights not in the world; he is sent back twice, none the less. This is difficult to account for except on the view that the sage was not satisfied with a mere profession of non-attachment and wanted to confirm the pupil in that attitude. Yet another variant is found in *Paramārtha*; see *Tak. Tr.*, 1.

21. XII, Ch. 311.

The Sāṅkhya teaching seems to lead thus to discrimination of matter from spirit and the abandonment of the former. It is not unlikely that this discrimination and final abandonment (*parisaṅkhyāna*) gave its name to the system.²²

It is not without significance that there is a common word, for "thinking" and "enumeration," in more than one language. Besides "sāṅkhyā" meaning both wisdom and number, there are "gaṇana" which means counting as well as consideration, the English word "count," as also the word "reckon" (especially in the Americanism

22. Dr. Barnett, reviewing the first edition of this book in the *JRAS*, 1931, says. "the suggested etymology of the name (*parisaṅkhyāna*, with the impossible meaning of abandonment, p. xviii f.) is not at all convincing." The relevant portion of the *Mahābhārata* text is appended here; chapter 311 gives a brief account of the Yoga, passes on to the Sāṅkhya with the words "sāṅkhyajñānam pravakṣyāmi parisaṅkhyānadarśanam," enumerates the eight prakṛtis and the sixteen vikāras, and then goes on thus :

tac ca kṣetram mahān ātmā pañcavimśo 'dhiṣṭhāti	36
adhiṣṭhāte 'ti rājendra procyate munisattamaiḥ	
adhiṣṭhānād adhiṣṭhātā kṣetrāṇām iti naḥ śrutam	37
kṣetram jānāti cā 'vyāktam kṣetrajñaḥ iti co 'cyate	
avyaktake pure śete puruṣaś ce 'ti kathyate	38
anyad eva ca kṣetram syād anyañ kṣetrajña ucyate	
kṣetram avyaktam ity uktam jñātā vai pañcaviṃśakaḥ	39
anyad eva vaco jñānam syād anyaj jñeyam ucyate	
jñānam avyaktam ity uktam jñeyo vai pañcaviṃśakam	40
avyaktam kṣetram ity uktam yathā sattvam tatthe 'śvaram	
anīśvaram atattvam ca tattvam tat pañcaviṃśakam	41
sāṅkhya-darśanam etāvat parisaṅkhyāna-darśanam	
sāṅkhyāḥ prakurvate cai 'va prakṛtim ca pracakṣate	42
tattvāni ca caturviṃśat parisaṅkhyāya tattvataḥ	
sāṅkhyāḥ saha prakṛtyā tu nistattvaḥ pañcaviṃśakaḥ	43
pañcaviṃśo 'prabuddhātmā buddhyamāna iti smṛtaḥ	
yadā tu buddhyate 'tmānam tadā bhavati kevalaḥ	44

The purport of the whole passage seems to be not the enumeration of categories (which *parisaṅkhyāna* is usually taken to mean), but the knowledge of the self as other than the twenty-four tattvas and different in nature from them; that is to say, those tattvas are to be known, in order that they may be excluded from the self. It is also to be noted that, in commenting on v. 36, Nilakaṇṭha explains "*parisaṅkhyānam*" as "*parivarjanam rajjūragavat.*"

"I reckon so," and the German "Zahlen"; Tamil has the same "word" "eṇ" for thinking as well as counting. It is also worth remembering that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, enumerative cognition is relative and reflective (apekṣā-buddhi). In the Sāṅkhya system itself, as presented by Vācaspati, analysis is a function of the manas, which supervenes on the presentations of the senses. There can be no wisdom without discrimination, which involves analysis; and analysis means reckoning more or less explicit. It seems, therefore, plausible and legitimate to contend that counting, while it has as such no philosophical value, is yet significant as a phase, more or less prominent, of the analytic aspect of the wisdom which is, or is the cause of, release. And with this may be linked "pari-sāṅkhyāna" with its dual sense of counting and rejection. Counting was no end in itself to any Indian philosopher; but in the effort to realise the permanent and the non-suffering, one had to discriminate the self by *counting out* everything that is not-self; the enumeration and rejection were phases of the single process of parisāṅkhyāna-darśana.

In the Śvetāśvatara we have the use of numbers to refer cryptically to certain tattvas (see I, 4). To reckon a larger number of tattvas seems at one stage to have counted for greater wisdom, in Upaniṣadic debates. And to enunciate truths or entities corresponding to certain numbers seems to have been looked on as a mark of dialectic skill (see the discussion between Aṣṭāvakra, Janaka and Vandi, *Mahābhārata*, V, ch. 133, 134). But these developments, though suggestive, have little direct bearing on the meaning of "sāṅkhya" or "sāṅkhyā."^{22a}

V

The central teaching of the system may be briefly stated thus: reality comprises Puruṣa and Prakṛti, spirit and matter. The former is manifold, pure, changeless; the latter is primarily one, but is ever mutable, it evolves the material world out of itself and re-absorbs it at the time of the deluge. The individual spirit is

^{22a}. For many of the suggestions in the last two paragraphs I am greatly indebted to Dr. V. Raghavan, Madras University.

responsible for the process of evolution, since it is undertaken for the benefit of the spirit. The spirit does not control the process by any actual contact, the bare presence of spirit being sufficient to disturb the equipoise of the constituents of Prakṛti and induce change and evolution.

The spirit erroneously identifies itself with the world of matter presented to it through the psychical organs—the intellect, individuation and the mind; and because of this identification, it suffers all the miseries that the flesh is heir to. Though some joys can be and are produced by various means, this does not take away from the fact that the world is essentially a vale of misery; for, the joys are evanescent; being of impure origin they bring evil consequences in their train; or being surpassed by the greater joys of others, they lead to envy and consequent suffering. The only way of release is to know the nature of the evolved and the unevolved and their essential difference from the subject that knows them both. This discriminative wisdom brings release or rather is release, for, there is no explicit description of any state to be reached after the attainment of wisdom. The physical frame continues to exist, no doubt, but this is as the result of past karma which has begun to fructify and has not yet been exhausted. Continuance of the body does not lead to the accumulation of fresh karma, for the acts performed after the attainment of wisdom are like parched seeds sown in soil deprived of its moisture. The desiccation is the result of discriminative wisdom.

VI

The principal objections to the Sāṅkhya are directed against the possibility of the evolution of Prakṛti and the purpose which the evolution is said to serve. On the first of these points it is said that the process could not have been started and even if started could not be maintained without the intervention and control of Intelligence. Prakṛti in the unevolved state is the equipoise of its constituents—the three guṇas. Evolution proceeds from a disturbance of the equilibrium which leads to the predominance of each of the constituents, in turn, over the rest in varying degrees. What is it that causes the initial disturbance

of equilibrium? It cannot be matter, for there is no matter outside the unevolved, and the unevolved is itself in the state of equipoise. Nor can Puruṣa account for the disturbance, for he is pure spirit with no point of contact with matter; he cannot actively influence matter. If it be said that the bare presence of the Puruṣa suffices, then this presence obtains even in the so-called condition of release (Prakṛti not being destroyed with release) and the possibility of fresh bondage is ever present. The Sāṅkhya cannot claim for its means of freedom from misery, that it is certain or final. The scheme of evolution propounded by the doctrine may appear attractive once its inception is made possible; but the inception of the process seems unintelligible on the Sāṅkhya hypothesis of two substances eternally diverse in nature, each having no point of active contact with the other.

Nor is the process intelligible in itself granting that it has started somehow. It is said to be guided by a purpose—that of the liberation of spirit. This cannot be said to be its own purpose, for being non-intelligent, there is no meaning in ascribing a purpose to it. To say that it is guided by the goal of the spirit is again unmeaning since the purpose of one being cannot guide another, except in so far as the former controls and uses the latter or the latter intelligently enters into and assimilates the purpose of the former. Neither possibility is granted since Prakṛti is neither intelligent nor controlled by Intelligence²³ The mutability of Prakṛti can, in the circumstances, account at best for some kind of a changing world, not for an ordered universe of the kind we perceive and reason about. We should, indeed, expect a chaos and not a cosmos. What order there is should be accidental and it is not reasonable to hope that such evolution will subserve any purpose, least of all, the release of the spirit.

The possibility of the orderly evolution of the non-intelligent is sought to be established on the ground of various analogies, not one of which is satisfactory. The flow of milk in the cow for the nourishment of the calf, a process which goes on only so long as there is a need for it (in the calf), is hardly a sufficient analogy

23. There is also the more fundamental difficulty as to how spirit, which is pure, unchanging, non-active, can have any purposes at all.

since it is matter for proof that the cow is a non-intelligent being. Nor is it of much use to appeal to the transformation of grass into milk in the body of the cow, for, the transformation does not take place in the body of a dead cow or where grass is eaten by a bull. This would seem to indicate the necessity for some entity other than the material conditions of the transformation, an entity that starts, directs and controls the process. To say that the lode-stone affects iron by its mere presence does not help, for, the lode-stone acts, not wherever it may be, but only in the presence of iron, and the proximity is, more often than not, intentionally brought about by an intelligent being. That the analogy of the lame man and blind one is wholly inappropriate goes without saying, for each of these has a definite purpose of his own (though the purposes may happen to be indentical), while one of them definitely controls the other.²⁴ The initiation and direction of evolution by a purely nonintelligent material principle would thus seem to be unacceptable in theory and without any legitimate analogues in practice.

Even if evolution could somehow start and maintain itself, it would serve no purpose. If it serves to release the bound spirit, one wonders how the spirit came to be bound at all. Spirit and matter would seem to have nothing in common except in respect of being unoriginated. How then is it possible for the one to identify itself with the other? If it is the spirit's essential nature so to identify itself, it can find no release except through its own destruction. If the identification is adventitious, the cause of the super-imposition should be sought; if either Prakṛti or the presence of the spirit to Prakṛti be the cause, then, since these conditions persist at all times, even in release, there can be no assurance of its finality. The statement that Puruṣa having seen Prakṛti and Prakṛti having been seen by Puruṣa they happen to live together, if at all, without mutual intercourse, like a *blasé* couple, is of no use except as a charming literary fancy. The essential nature of Puruṣa is not such as to call for a necessary completion by the sight or enjoyment of Prakṛti; the enjoyment when it comes is, for aught we know, accidental. And

24. It is never wholly clear in Sāṅkhya teaching whether Prakṛti has any purpose of her own. See further footnote No. 35, and a note under verse XXI.

there is no knowing when such accidents will recur; one may predict on the basis of knowledge, not of ignorance. Bondage is inexplicable. Assuming that it has come about somehow (since we know that it is actual), release is still more inexplicable. What is, perhaps, equally important from the point of view of the Hindu dogma of pralaya is that once non-intelligent matter is set evolving there is no reason why it should stop anywhere or at any time; hence there can be no involution, no pralaya.

The enjoyment of the spirit is as little intelligible as its bondage or release; for, enjoyment implies change, a realization of what was not before realised, a movement from desire to the satisfaction of desire. For the spirit who never changes, how can there be any talk of enjoyment?²⁵

If the individual spirit is really unchanging, the only course is to take all the changes that apparently take place in it to be phenomenal, along with whatever causes the changes. Immutability would thus supervene on change, instead of merely standing over against it. And since there is no warrant or need for a plurality of immutable spirits²⁶, the individual spirit, which in essence is changeless, would be identified with the Supreme Spirit, the one reality without a second. This is the path chosen by the advaitin.^{26a}

25. Most of the criticism urged here is based on the *Ved. Su.*, II, ii, 1-9.

26. The Sāṅkhya demonstration of a plurality of spirits applies properly to the materially constituted empirical selves, not to the pure unchanging Puruṣa. The Sāṅkhya arguments proceed on the varying incidence of birth and death, and the varying endowment of sense-organs, etc. But birth and death do not happen to the Puruṣa nor does the Puruṣa have sense-organs. The varying occurrences belong to different material collocations with which the Puruṣa identifies himself, because he is reflected in the buddhi in each of these collocations. Each reflection constitutes a different empirical self; and the plurality of empirical selves (which is consistent with the existence of but one Puruṣa) is all that the Sāṅkhya arguments require.

26a. For an ancient exposition of Advaita using Sāṅkhya terminology, see Śeṣa's *Paramārthasāra* (Karnatak Publishing House, Bombay; edition with an English translation).

Or one may distinguish the individual from the Supreme Spirit and hold that mutability applies to the former, but not to the latter. God, the Supreme Spirit, is and remains immutable, His dealings with the world being in the capacity of the operative and not the material cause. The material cause is Prakṛti which is subject to change and evolves under the control of God. Through the evolution, the individual spirit enjoys and gets rid of its karma, which is being accumulated and eaten up from time immemorial. When the finite spirit gains wisdom through the gradual working out of karma and the on-set of grace, and meditates fixedly on the Supreme Spirit, it gains release. Such is the view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, Śaiva or Vaiṣṇava.

The Śaiva Siddhāntin goes a step further and explains the finite spirit's beginningless accumulation of karma on the ground of beginningless association with a veiling principle which is known as āvaraṇa, which envelopes and obscures the spirit's natural properties of omniscience, pervasiveness, etc. One engages in action in order to get rid of āvaraṇa, and it is in this process that merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa) accumulate, necessitating innumerable births for their working out. The Siddhāntin introduces a refinement in the account of the finite spirit too. It is capable of identifying itself and becoming one with that with which it may be associated. Beginninglessly associated with matter, it becomes matter, as it were; it is subject to change, enjoyment, sorrow, etc. When by the influx of Divine Grace, at the appointed time, spirituality is fully awakened, the finite spirit no longer looks at the world of matter. It is associated with God and becomes like God, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, eternally wise and contented, and so on.

This is not the place for a detailed consideration of any of these ways of supplementing the Sāṅkhya doctrine. It will suffice to note that there exist such modes of supplementation. The principal feature of all such doctrines is the insistence on intelligent control. The non-advaitic systems address themselves to the further task of explaining bondage and release on some basis other than māyā; for the doctrine of māyā seems to make out that both bondage and release are illusory, a conclusion that *prima facie* fails to square with common-sense. These systems recognise a material principle, though under the control of God, and hence

to that extent have great sympathies with the realism of the Sāṅkhya.

This realism goes hand-in-hand with the view of causation known as *sat-kārya-vāda*, a view shared by the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Śaiva Siddhānta.^{26b} The effect is pre-existent in the cause, according to this view; it is not brought into existence by the cause; for what does not exist cannot be brought into existence. The distinction between the causal and the effected condition is one of non-manifestation and manifestation of the effect, not of its non-existence and subsequent existence. The relation between cause and effect is one of identity and there can obviously be no identity between the existent and the non-existent. Such a view derives its plausibility from the confusion of the real with the existent. What is real need not necessarily exist in space and time, space and time being considered partial aspects of it through which it manifests itself. Reality may be known through its manifestations, but manifestations do not exhaust reality. It may now manifest itself as cause and later as effect. The fact that the effect did not exist earlier *as effect* would not make it unreal. And so long as cause and effect are admitted to be both real we have all that is requisite for their identity. To insist further that they should be identical in all respects is to strain after a notion of causality which defeats its own purpose. For, if cause and effect are to be wholly identical, then, there being no difference between the two, there is no change from the one to the other; and the phenomenon of becoming which had to be explained itself vanishes. To press for identity and to stop short of complete identity seems an unintelligible procedure. How does the advocate of the Sāṅkhya himself conceive of the identity? He holds that the world is born out of what is itself unborn, that the cause of the evolved is the unevolved. What is the identity between the alleged cause and effect? The *pradhāna* should itself be conceded to be born, or the world must be said to be unborn; the former conflicts with the Sāṅkhya, while the latter is palpably absurd. Nor is it possible to adopt a middle position, stressing

26b. The Advaitin too upholds *sat-kārya-vāda* up to a limit, in so far as empirical considerations force on him a distinction between *kāraṇa* and *kārya*. ■

each in turn, any more than it is possible to cook one half of a hen and to keep the other half for laying eggs.²⁷

The conception of cause is indeed fundamentally unintelligible. Invoked as it is to explain the phenomenon of becoming, it either leaves the problem untouched or explains it away altogether. The problem is how *A* becomes *B*. In so far as the causal notion implies identity, there is no becoming. If cause and effect are really different, we are no better off than before in understanding the becoming. To say that *A* and *B* are partially identical does not help; for in so far as they are identical, there is no becoming and in so far as they are different there is no explanation of becoming. The advaitin's view that cause and effect are really identical, now appearing as cause as it were and now, again, as effect as it were, is, perhaps, the only intelligible position.²⁸

VIII

The atheism of the Sāṅkhya is one of its outstanding features. The recognition of one single absolute controlling Puruṣa is not uncommon in the Sāṅkhya of the *Mahābhārata*,²⁹ but in the classical Sāṅkhya of which the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is an exposition, we have but Prakṛti on the one hand and a multitude of Puruṣas on the other. The functions assigned to God—creation, sustentation, etc., are discharged by Prakṛti aided by the presence of the Puruṣas. Release is brought about as the very consummation of the evolution of Prakṛti, without the need of any divine intervention. The various evolutes are said to be active by mutual impulsion and not as actuated by any outside entity.³⁰ The hypothesis of a divine

27. On the whole topic of sat-kārya-vāda, see Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, together with Śaṅkara's commentary esp., Ch. IV, vv. 11, 12 and 13.

28. See Śaṅkara's criticism of the notion of the cause in *Ved. Su.*, II. ii, 1-9; also Bradley's treatment of the causal category in *Appearance and Reality*; see further the present writer's paper on *Advaita, Causality, and Human Freedom*, *IHQ*, XVI, 113-151.

29. See XII, Ch. 311: compare the account in the *Maṇimēkalai*, Ch. XXVII.

30. *Kārikā* XXXI.

creation of the world leads to many difficulties. These are not set out anywhere in the *Kārikā*, though Vācaspati has set forth the argument in commenting on *kārikā* LXII. It is not possible to say whether these arguments were present to the minds of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa and other early expositors of the Sāṅkhya. It is quite possible that they were thought of, but were omitted from the *Kārikā*, which is a condensed exposition omitting all discussion of rival views.³¹ But taking the work as it stands, it is possible to contend that the author was interested not in denying God so much as in trying to do without Him. The difference between the two positions will be found to be of some significance if we adopt the view that the Sāṅkhya represents an attempt, perhaps the earliest attempt to regain the vision of the Upaniṣadic seers. It is conceivable that any one setting out on such a quest would seek to conform to the law of parsimony and try to work with the least possible number of concepts. Permanence and change, subject and object, unity and multiplicity might well appear to be such fundamental concepts whereon to erect an adequate scheme of the universe. By sticking to these concepts and hypostatizing their opposed aspects, we get the two notions of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. It is a scientifically justifiable and intellectually honest method to seek to explain the universe with the help of these two notions. It is open to others with a higher and clearer vision to point out where or how it failed; and if the followers of the Sāṅkhya failed, in spite of criticism, to recognise their limitations, they are in no worse position than many scientists of the present day. The failure to recognise God may well have been due to the operation of Occam's razor³² and not to the insurgence of a rebellion against God.

31. See *kārikā* LXXII.

32. *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*. The entire argument applies to the attitude of *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, not to that of the *Sūtras*, which expressly discuss and reject the God-concept (I, 92-95). Vijñāna Bhikṣu, commenting on the *Sūtras*, is hard put to it to explain away their atheism. The language of *Sūtra* 92 does not warrant any conclusion other than that the existence of God is not proved; nor is there room to hold that the difficulties raised in the subsequent *Sūtras* amount to disproving the existence of God. Vijñāna Bhikṣu, however, is not content with pointing this out, but goes on to contend that the atheism is "an unnecessarily extravagant claim (*prauḍhivāda*)," that it is a regulative

To say this, however, is not to maintain that the Sāṅkhya deliberately stopped short with the intention of being fulfilled by other systems. That such a fulfilment is possible, that the six systems constitute not warring, but supplementary elements of one whole is a truth pressed by many Indian philosophers.³³ But the possibility of completion does not prove that that possibility was realised or desired by the elements themselves. The

principle intended "to induce men to withdraw themselves from the excessive contemplation of an eternal God" that it is "a concession to popular views", and that "it is propounded with the set object of misleading evil men." The number of defences is so extravagant that the soundness of the defence becomes highly questionable. See *IP*, II, 319. Bhikṣu's own interpretation of the Vedānta in the light of the Sāṅkhya deserves to be much better known than it is. See an interesting article by U. C. Bhattacharya *PQ*, VI, pp. 101, 219. The *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, too, should be considered atheistic; if Tilak's conjectural verse be taken to be correct. See Belvalkar, art. *Māthara Vṛtti*, *BCV*, 181.

33. See *The Sāṅkhya System*, pp. 101-102. From the fact that many Vaiṣṇava schools accept the Sāṅkhya cosmology, Prof. Das Gupta conjectures that Kapila's own doctrine was probably theistic (*HIP*, I, 221). Sāṅkhya cosmology is common not merely to Vaiṣṇava but also to Śaiva theism; but this hardly seems a safe ground for any conjecture about the theistic nature of the Sāṅkhya. Prof. Das Gupta ventures the further supposition that "Paiṇśika probably modified Kapila's work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work." The supposition rests on no ground other than a conjectural interpretation of the words "tena ca bahudhā kṛtam tantram" of *Kārikā* LXX. There is no reason to hold that these words imply anything but elaboration, especially in view of the condensation mentioned in the next verse (*sāṅkṣiptam āryamatinā*). Prof. Das Gupta's hypothesis of three strata of Sāṅkhya—"first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but which is kept in a modified form by the Pātāñjala School of Sāṅkhya, second an atheistic one as represented by Paiṇśika, and a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sāṅkhya system"—has yet to be proved. It may be that the original Sāṅkhya-Yoga system was concerned with the transmutation of the individual and his vision, that the "tattvas" were conceived as the psychologically distinguishable stages of that process, that the postulation of a perfect seer would have been a necessity in such a system, that later Sāṅkhya became metaphysical, hypostatizing the "tattvas" into ontological entities, and that from this new point of view the law of parsimony operated, keeping entities down to a minimum. These suggestions (of Dr. Maryla Falk among others) are plausible and will admit of fruitful development.

advocate of the Yoga School might have considered the physics and psychology of the Sāṅkhya useful stepping stones, but this cannot prove that the Sāṅkhya philosopher ever considered his system to be but a stepping stone.

IX

The pessimism of the Sāṅkhya like that of Buddhism is initial and not final. Both systems realise that life has little to offer of satisfaction that is lasting or certain. For neither did the mere continuance of life in a hereafter offer any attractions. The Buddha who attributed all evil to ignorance and desire could see nothing but the continuance of these in another life. The Sāṅkhya philosopher was, perhaps, more naive and pointed out that heavenly joys are no better than earthly pleasures, tainted as they are by impurity in the means of attainment and by sorrow at their decrease by consumption and their being surpassed by others with greater merit. The Sāṅkhya is less thorough-going than Buddhism in its condemnation of ritual; while the latter was against sacrifice, the former only bewailed its futility in respect of securing ultimate release from misery.³⁴ In either case, the fundamental starting point is misery; but it is not the last word of either system. The Buddha gave no positive description of Nirvāṇa any more than the Sāṅkhya did of the state of release. But for neither was release a merely negative concept. It was something to be eagerly looked for, to be striven for by the empirical self according to Buddhism, and by Prakṛti according to the Sāṅkhya.³⁵ When discriminative knowledge

34. There is little in the Sāṅkhya treatment of ritual to justify Garbe's reference to its "Polemic against ritual" (art. "Sāṅkhya" *ERE*). The follower, even of the Veda tradition, realised that the accumulated result of works in the next world diminishes and is consumed, as surely as it is in this world. The Sāṅkhya introduces but one more channel of consumption, one more item on the debit side to be reckoned in calculating the bliss to accrue in the next life. The difference between the two attitudes is at best one of degree alone and hardly warrants the inference of antagonism. Max Müller's inference of Sāṅkhya anti-brāhmanism because of the reference to dakṣiṇā as a bondage is extremely fanciful and hardly needs refutation.

35. This statement has been criticised as unintelligible by Dr. Barnett, in view of Prakṛti being *ex hypothesi* unconscious. But it is worth remem-

comes about, says the latter, release is both certain and final. A conception that has little positive about it may not succeed in inspiring faith or fervour; and it may even be found to be metaphysically unsound in the light of its own starting-point. It must none the less be recognised that the cry "all is misery, misery" is not the last word of the Sāṅkhya.³⁶

X

The use of the term "evolution" in connection with the derivation of the material world from Prakṛti is attempted to be justified by some not merely in a general way, but even with reference to

bering that the *Kārikā* in several places and the *Sūtra* "svārtham vā" speak of Prakṛti as having a purpose, though it may be nothing other than the isolation of spirit. Further, consciousness is not to be identified with intelligence; Prakṛti is non-intelligent, but many psychoses, such as purposing and resolving, do undoubtedly belong to nature and not to spirit. In the light of these considerations it is hoped that the statement in the text will not sound so absurd as it otherwise may.

36. It is matter for legitimate doubt if any sound metaphysics can avoid initial pessimism. The imperfections of our experience constitute the starting point of all our thought. Perfection may be sought in an extension in space or time or both of what was realized to be inadequate. Optimism of a cheap variety is possible, so long as that quest is kept up. But when even that is recognised to be elusive, one seeks to complete experience by transcending it, instead of merely extending it. A depreciation of finite experience as such is a necessary part of such an attitude and is called pessimism. Such pessimism is not final so long as the possibility of transcending finite experience is affirmed, even though this may be only by a futile process of abstraction. The *Sūtras* are definitely more pessimistic. Cp. *SPB*, VI, 5, 7, and 8; yathā duḥkhāt kleśaḥ puruṣasya na tathā sukhād abhilāṣaḥ kutrāpi ko'pi sukṛti tadapi duḥkha-śābalaṃ iti duḥkha-pakṣe nikṣipante vivecakāḥ. Cp. *YS* II, 16; Parīṇāmatāpa - saṃskāraduḥkhair guṇavṛtty-avirodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ. Where, however, the finite is decried not *per se*, but only from the stand-point of the transcendental, is it right to characterise the attitude as pessimistic? Some would think not. A conception of the real as the plenitude of bliss (bhūman) should surely be called optimistic. But when the same view declares all else to be petty and worthless (alpaṃ, ārtam), is it from the view-point of the realised or of the unrealised? Not the first, since to such a one there is nothing else. If the second, where is the difference between this and the radically pessimist attitude?

what is distinctive of evolution as a scientific concept to-day. Evolution as used in modern science signifies not the derivation of anything from anything else but the growth of an indefinite incoherent homogeneity into a definite coherent heterogeneity.³⁷ The amoeba, for instance, at one end of the scale, evolves into the human organism (very far up the scale, if not at the other end of it). As protoplasmic substance the two are fundamentally identical. But the amoeba is an undifferentiated mass, any part of which can perform the life-functions which are of a limited character; while the human organism comprises a variety of parts, each adapted to a particular function and all co-operating to the fulfilment of one biological purpose. It is contended³⁸ that the difference between Prakṛti and its evolutes is similarly one between an indefinite incoherent homogeneity and a definite coherent heterogeneity. There is, on the face of it, a good deal to be said for this view. In so far as Prakṛti has any purpose at all, it is to subserve the release of the spirit. The evolutes of Prakṛti serve the same purpose with this difference—that the evolutes being manifold contribute to the one purpose in different ways. The process of evolution is marked, then, by differentiation as well as integration. Just as the varieties of biological evolution are explained solely by the life-urge and not by determination from without, the diversity among the evolutes of Prakṛti is explicable solely by differences of stress among the three constituents of Prakṛti. And lastly, as the life-force is present in all its evolutes, undiminished by the putting forth of one or more forms, even so the energy of Prakṛti is present in all its evolutes. It is not as if it diminishes stage by stage, with the evolution of mahat, ahaṅkāra and so on, till finally it is exhausted with the manifestation of the gross-elements.

With all this, it has to be admitted that there are important points of difference between the "evolution" of the biologists and the "evolution" of the Sāṅkhya. The most rudimentary form of life, *e.g.*, the amoeba, still fulfils its purpose albeit very inadequately. Prakṛti, which as the indefinite incoherent homogeneous matrix should take the place of the amoeba, can, as such, fulfil

37. See further, Creighton, *An Introductory Logic*, Part III, Ch. 1.

38. See Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, Das Gupta, *HIP*, I, 242-258.

no purpose at all. It is only after it has begun to evolve, after the initial equipoise of the guṇas has been disturbed, that we may speak of bondage or release for the Puruṣa. Prakṛti, then, can be compared not to the lowest stage of biological evolution, but to a life-urge that expresses itself through evolution from the lowest to the highest. Even with this modification, the biological concept seems hardly to apply. For, though the numerous biological variations come from an inner life-force, they arise in order to meet an external varying environment which impinges directly on the evolutes. The influence of the environment and the need to adapt oneself thereto are fundamental factors of biological evolution. There is nothing corresponding to these in the evolution of Prakṛti. There is no matter which lies outside of it and can impinge on it. What is outside of it is Puruṣa, who can have no contact with it. Even if the bare presence of Puruṣa be admitted to be effective, the presence of an immutable Spirit cannot be subject to variations, like the variations of the environment. And the constant presence of an unvarying Puruṣa accords with a static, not an evolving Prakṛti.

Nor is it by any means certain that the relation between the earlier and later evolutes of Prakṛti is the same as that between earlier and later biological evolutes. Let us take the psychological evolutes buddhi, manas and the jñānendriyas. The last-named should be distinguished by their definiteness, coherence and heterogeneity as contrasted with the relative indefiniteness, incoherence and homogeneity of buddhi and manas. It is true that the senses are differentiated and specific, each apprehending only one object, as compared with buddhi and manas which direct themselves to all objects of cognition. But can it be said that the buddhi and manas are relatively less coherent than the senses? With what justification, then, do we speak of buddhi as the determinative faculty (adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ) and manas as that which explicates (saṅkalpakam)? Do not the functions of explication and determination imply a relatively greater instead of a smaller degree of coherence than in the materials presented or the senses which present them? Would it not be more correct to view the unity of the buddhi and the manas as the systematic unity of what are relatively wholes, as compared with the manifold of the senses, than as the undifferentiated unity of relatively lower stages of

evolution? Viewed thus, we seem to have in the evolution of manas and the indriyas, a falling away from instead of an approach to coherence. Nor is the objection met by refusing to understand the saṅkalpa of manas as an explicating function; for the objection about the determinative faculty still holds. Further, there is no dispute about manas being of a dual nature (ubhayātmakam), both a jñānendriya and a karmendriya. Do the advocates of the biological parallel admit that, therefore, manas occupies a lower place in the scale of evolution? Interesting as are some of the points of resemblance between the two concepts, one has yet to confess that the parallelism is not even close and that there can be no question of identity.³⁹

XI

The *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is the earliest available manual of the system.⁴⁰ It professes to be a condensation of earlier teaching and to contain all that is in the *Śaṣṭitantra* except the parables and the refutation of rival systems. We have at present no knowledge of the *Śaṣṭitantra*. Vācaspati takes even his account of the sixty topics from the *Rājavārtika*, and not from the original work, which was possibly composed by Pañcaṅkha. The author of the *Jaya-maṅgalā* refers often to the *Śaṣṭitantra*, as, for instance when he says that the three kinds of inference are explained in that work (*Śaṣṭitantra vyākhyātam pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānyato dṛṣṭam iti*). But it is not certain whether he speaks from actual knowledge of the work or gives expression to what was even in his time but a

39. Adverting to this doctrine and the notions of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas as representing intelligence, energy and mass, Prof. Radhakrishnan says, "To some Dr Seal's clever attempt would seem not so much interpreting the Sāṅkhya as re-writing it." *IP*, II, 264 *fn.*

40. There is little justification for treating as earlier the *Tattvasamāsa*, a compendious enumeration of the Sāṅkhya categories. On the subject, see Keith, *The Sāṅkhya System*, pp. 89-91; contra Dr. T.R. Chintamani on the *Tattvasamāsa JORM*, II, pp. 145-147; the list cited in the *Bhagavadajjukam* does not tally completely with the *Tattvasamāsa* list (which is itself uncertain, because of variations among different Mss.); hence, it cannot afford conclusive evidence of deriving from the *Tattvasamāsa*. The learned doctor's note on the date of the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* (*JORM*, II, 148) is hardly more convincing.

tradition. It is seen from a comparison of the *Jayamaṅgalā* with the *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī* (esp. the commentaries on verse LI) that the former was the earlier commentary. The two best known commentaries are those of Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra. There is also a gloss called the *Candrikā* by Narayana. A commentary of early, though uncertain, date and authorship, called the *Yuktidīpikā* has been brought out at Calcutta in recent years. Though the ascription in the colophon to Vācaspati seems erroneous, there are several indications of influence by the same type of interpretation as Vācaspati's. The commentary of Gauḍapāda is generally believed to have come after and drawn upon the *Māṭhara Vṛtti*.⁴¹ It is not certain if this Gauḍapāda is identical with the advaita teacher on whose Kārikās on the Māṇḍūkya, Śāṅkara is reputed to have written a gloss. The identity would appear to be extremely unlikely on the supposition that Gauḍapāda, the commentator on the Sāṅkhya, made but a paltry abstract of the *Māṭhara Vṛtti*, with an addition here and there. It is not likely, as Dr. Belvalkar remarks, that the great Gauḍapāda would have lent his name to such a production. A very recent commentary is the *Sāṅkhyataruvasantaḥ* by Muḍumba Narasiṃhasvāmin. The author has done by the *Kārikās* what Bhikṣu did in respect of the *Sūtras*. He believes that there is no radical divergence between the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta. His exact time is not known, nor the place he hailed from; but from the reference to Varāhanarasimha, it is likely that he belonged to the neighbourhood of Siṃhācalam in the Vizagapatam District. The *Sāṅkhyakārikā* was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha,⁴² a Buddhist monk of the sixth century A.D. It is believed that the translation included the *Māṭhara Vṛtti* as well. Those, however, who detect unmistakable signs of advaita doctrine in the latter assign it to the 8th century

41. For the opposite view, see Radhakrishnan, *IP*, II. 245, *fn. 2*; for the view adopted here see Introduction to *Maṭhara Vṛtti*. Chowkhambha Series; *IHQ*; V, iii, 421, and Belvalkar, article *Māṭhara Vṛtti*, *BCV*, 172.

42. This was translated into French by Mon. J. Takakusu in the *BFEO*, Vol. IV. An English version of the French rendering has been brought out by the University of Madras.

A.D.; if this conjecture is correct, Paramārtha probably translated some commentary other than Māṭhara's.⁴³ In any case, the lower limit for Īśvara Kṛṣṇa is the 5th century A. D.; while it is the view of some that he belonged to the 3rd Century A. D.,⁴⁴ and of some others that he was of the first or the first half of the second century A.D.⁴⁵ The last suggestion has been ably championed and is very plausible though not fully proved.

43. Keith mentions the probability of the *Māṭhara Vṛtti* and the original of the Chinese version having been derived from a common source (*The Sāṃkhya System*, p. 70 fn.). A detailed comparison of the *Māṭhara Vṛtti* with M. Takakusu's translation of the Chinese *Saptatī* goes to confirm the probability; for, there are many differences between the two, differences which are doctrinal and not merely verbal. For a full study of these differences see "Māṭhara and Paramārtha," *JRAS*, July 1931. One point of interest may be noted. In commenting on *kārikā* III, Paramārtha makes out that each subtle element gives rise on the one hand to a gross element, and on the other hand to the corresponding sense-organ. There is in this a faint echo of the *Maṇimekalai* view, but it is opposed to the view of the generality of commentators, while it seems to be expressly negated by the *Sūtras* (see *SPB*, II. 20). M. Takakusu believes it probable that Īśvara Kṛṣṇa himself wrote a commentary which was the original of the Chinese translation: *BFEO*, IV, 58, 60.

44. See *IP*, II, 255 fn. 1.

45. Belvalkar, art. *Māṭhara Vṛtti*, *BOV*, 171-184.

TABLE I

Evolution of Prakṛti according to the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*




TABLE II

Evolution of Prakṛti, according to the Śaiva Siddhānta




TABLE III

Evolution of Prakṛti, according to Paramārtha's version of the *Sāṃkhyaakārikā*

(See *Tak. Tr.*, 5, 6, 34, 35).





TABLE IV

TABLE IV

PRATYAYASARGAḤ—CREATION OF THE INTELLECT

BUDDHI



ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Ah. Sam.,</i>	Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā.
<i>BCV.</i>	Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume.
<i>Belvalkar,</i>	Vedānta Philosophy by S. K. Belvalkar. Part I
<i>BFEO,</i>	Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extreme Orient.
<i>Bh. G.,</i>	Bhagavad Gītā.
<i>CSUP,</i>	A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy: R. D. Ranade.
<i>ERE,</i>	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
<i>HDS,</i>	The Sāṃkhya-kārikā, with the Commen- tary of Gauḍapāda, edited by Dr. Har Dutt Sharma.
<i>HIP,</i>	History of Indian Philosophy: Das Gupta.
<i>IHQ,</i>	Indian Historical Quarterly.
<i>Int. Ah. Sam.,</i>	Introduction to the Ahīrbudhnya Saṃ- hitā: Schrader.
<i>IP,</i>	Indian Philosophy: S. Radhakrishnan.
<i>Jaya,</i>	Jayamaṅgalā.
<i>Johnston,</i>	Early Sāṃkhya by E. H. Johnston.
<i>JORM,</i>	Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
<i>JRAS,</i>	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London.
<i>POC,</i>	Proceedings of the Oriental Conference.
<i>PPC,</i>	Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

ABBREVIATIONS—(Contd.)

<i>PQ,</i>	Philosophical Quarterly, Amalner.
<i>SKG,</i>	Sāṅkhyakārikā, Gauḍapāda's commentary (the translation quoted is H. H. Wilson's)
<i>SPB,</i>	Sāṅkhyā-Pravacana-Bhāṣya.
<i>STK,</i>	Sāṅkhyā-Tattva-Kaumudī.
<i>STV,</i>	Sāṅkhyā-taru-vasantah by Muḍumba Narasiṃhasvāmin, Adyar Ms. No. VIII E7.
<i>Śvet.,</i>	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
<i>Tak. Tr.,</i>	The Sāṅkhyā Kārikā studied in the light of the Chinese Version by Mons. Takakusu, translated into English by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri.
<i>Ved. Su.,</i>	Vedānta Sūtras.
<i>YD,</i>	Yuktidīpikā (Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, Calcutta).
<i>YS,</i>	Yoga Sūtras.

THE
SĀṆKHYAKĀRIKĀ

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदभिघातके हेतौ ।

दृष्टे सापार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

1. *duḥkha-trayā-'bhighātāj*
jijñāsā tadabhighātake¹ hetau ।
dr̥ṣṭe sā 'pārthā cen
nai 'kāntā-'tyantato 'bhāvāt ॥

From torment by three-fold misery (arises) the inquiry into the means of terminating it; if it be said that it is fruitless, (the means) being known by preception, no (we reply), since (in them) there is not certainty or finality.

NOTES

No inquiry is ever commenced without a purpose. That purpose may be more or less narrow, but in the end, directly or indirectly, it will be found to be related to what the inquirer considers to be the supreme good. The good may be conceived as knowledge itself in which case the inquiry will be directly connected with the realisation of that good. Or, the knowledge gained by inquiry may serve as a means to the realisation of happiness in this world or release from misery. What is essential is the recognition that knowledge is not sought after idly; even where it is said to be its own end it is so because it has been set up consciously as the ideal to be striven for, in preference to all

1. Some read "tadapaghātake, " notably Vācaspati. Both phrases have nearly the same sense.

other ends. In the present inquiry, therefore, we have to seek the object intended to be subserved. Nor will the mere presence of a purpose of itself justify an inquiry, if what is sought after may be known or gained by other means. It must be shown that there is a purpose to be realised, and that it can be realised in no other way. The first and the second verses of the *Kārikā* address themselves to this task.

What is sought here is the knowledge of the means of terminating misery. If there were no misery or if misery did not affect us, there would be no such inquiry at all. If, further, such misery could not be removed, the inquiry though possible would be fruitless. It is undisputed that misery does exist. It is three fold, as caused by intrinsic influences, bodily or mental, such as the predominance of bile or phlegm or desire or anger and so on (*ādhyātmika*), by extrinsic natural influences, such as other men, beasts and birds or inanimate objects (*ādhibhautika*) and by extrinsic super-natural influences such as spirits and so on (*ādhidai- vika*).¹ That the misery is taken to heart and constitutes a real torment is also undisputed. It will also be shown in the course of the inquiry that it is possible to surmount this misery.

All this, however, does not establish fully the need for the present science. For, if misery is patent, the means of surmounting it are patent too. Physical disease can be cured by medicine and mental distress by indulgence in pleasure. Enemies may be circumvented by diplomacy and spirits may be won over by charms. Such means are not merely patent but also easy. Why then this laborious pursuit of a science, the study of which requires prior preparation even for generations? The objection would be valid, if any of the means so patent in experience were either

1. Miseries due to heat and cold, wind and rain etc., are also *ādhi- daivika*, according to Gauḍapāda, these in their origination being presided over by deities (*SKG*, 2). The *taddhita* in "*ādhyātmika*" etc., implies a locative sense; but since all three forms of misery exist in the embodied, and there is no difference in their location, the locative is taken in the secondary sense of "caused by that"; hence it is that "*ādhidaivika*" means "caused by devas"; *STV*, while noticing this, prefers the principal sense of the locative.

certain or final in its results. None of them, however, passes the test. Medicines fail to cure, as fortifications fall and let in the enemy. Diplomacy is a double-edged weapon, and so are spirit-charms. And even where they act as desired, they cannot prevent a recurrence of the trouble. He that is cured once is not free from disease ever after. And the pleasures of life are so few and fragmentary that life has to be characterised by its dominant feature, misery. Hence the need for a science to teach us the means of vanquishing suffering once and for all.¹

But, it may be said, experience does not exhaust the known means of surmounting suffering. Scripture teaches us other means—sacrifices and so on—which surely are infallible. That being so, where is the need of a further inquiry? This is the question considered in the second verse :

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः सद्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।

तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

II. *dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikah,*

sa hy aviśuddhi-kṣayā-'tiśaya-yuktah ।

tadviparītaḥ śreyān

vyaktā-'vyakta-jñā-vijñānāt ॥

The Scriptural (means of terminating misery) is (also) like the perceptible; for it is linked with impurity, destruction and surpassability; different therefrom and superior (thereto) is that (means derived) from the discriminative knowledge of the evolved, the unevolved and the knower.

1. If misery is patent and the need to surmount it imperative, why does not everyone engage in the inquiry? It is because the affliction is not realised as such by most, who cling to what they fancy is happiness; *YD*, p. 10.

NOTES

True, the revealed texts instruct us in sacrifices, whereby heaven (svarga) may be attained; and heaven would seem to mean nothing short of unalloyed unending happiness. We have the authority of revelation for holding that by the performance of sacrifice (say, the jyotiṣṭoma), heaven may be attained, that those who drink the sacrificial soma juice become immortal. But lack of certainty and finality are found to be characteristic even of such means. To start with, they are in part at least impure. Many sacrifices demand the killing of animals, thus offending against the rule not to injure any living being.¹ The tendency of the sinful act to produce suffering will have to be counter-acted by other means; if not so counter-acted, it will contribute its quota of

1. The reconciliation of the injunction as to sacrificial killing with the general prohibition of injury to living beings is a knotty problem, which has taxed the ingenuity of all schools of Indian Philosophy. The Sāṅkhya philosophy holds that the injury caused in sacrifice brings about demerit and its due consequences; but people do engage in sacrifices since the material advantages, here and hereafter, more than counter-balance the disadvantages. The Scripture which enjoins the killing of the animal shows that the killing is subsidiary to the sacrifice; it does not go further and declare that the killing does not cause evil. Of the various other modes of reconciliation suggested, only one need be noted here—that suggested by Rāmānuja (and apparently by Śrīkaṇṭha). Scripture itself says that the animal sacrificed does not die, but goes to heaven. He who helps the animal to go to heaven is thus conferring a benefit on it, though the process may be painful, as in a surgical operation. The only defect of such a solution is that, unlike the operation, the sacrifice is not *intended* for the benefit of the animal. If the consequences, though unintended, may exonerate, we have a variety of the consequence-theory of moral action. See the *Śrī Bhāṣya* and the *Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya* on *Vedānta Sūtra*, III, 1, 25; also Chapter II of Appayya Dikṣita's *Vāda-Nakṣatra-Mālā* for a full-dress discussion of the topic. Appayya's position is that of the Bhāṭṭa—that there can be no *himsā* in the performance of what is ordained by the Veda. Though it may be true that sin, which has to be known only from Scripture, cannot be incurred by the performance of what is Scripturally enjoined, the fact of mental discomfort or remorse cannot be disputed; and this, says YD, is sufficient to detract from the value of any enjoyment achieved through Scriptural means; which rational being would seek its own welfare at the cost of injury to another creature? It is the pity evoked in us that is called *aviśuddhi*; DY, p. 18.

suffering to the final experience gained by the sacrifice, though that suffering may be negligible as compared with the volume of happiness gained. It is thus by no means certain that sacrifices bring unalloyed happiness. And the result so secured is not permanent either; the means being finite, the result too must be finite. When it is said to be everlasting, what is meant is but that it lasts for a very long while; for, anything which exists and is produced cannot but be impermanent. What is brought into being will necessarily also cease to be. Thus there is lack of finality. A third defect is that the results vary in degree and each may be surpassed by a higher one, thus giving rise to envy and suffering. One sacrifice leads to heaven, another to lordship in heaven; and he who has attained the lesser good will find his bliss changed into misery, at sight of the higher good.¹ The knowledge and performance of sacrificial rites cannot, therefore, lead to the final termination of misery, though it may have a limited value in securing a certain measure of happiness.

What is it then that is to be sought after? Knowledge of the evolved, the unevolved and the knower. In experience we first have the diversified world of phenomena; these are the evolved. They are realised to be effects and are traced back to their causes and thence to the ultimate single cause which, though evolving, is itself not evolved. It will be found that both phenomena and their causes are non-intelligent, that the process must have a purpose, and that that purpose must necessarily relate to an intelligent being that is neither cause nor effect, but knows both. Thus comes the knowledge of the knower. When all these three are understood, it is also realised that the knowing experiencing subject is other than and different in nature from the objects of experience, which occasion pleasure and pain, happiness and misery; this is the discrimination, the knowledge that suffering is not of the subject, thence comes the cessation of suffering.

1. The word 'atīśaya' has been generally rendered as excess. This is doubly defective. (1) as not bringing out the sense here conveyed, and (2) as tending to suggest that the means revealed by Scripture are unsatisfactory in that they bring about what is in excess of requirements. This latter suggestion is plainly present in Colebrooke's translation "and excessive in others". It is also the interpretation preferred by Prof. A. B. Keith, following Deussen, though it seems to have little justification (see *The Sāṅkhya System*, p. 71.)

All this will be set out in the course of the work. What is here indicated is that discriminative knowledge differs in nature from and is superior to the modes obvious in experience or revealed by Scripture.¹ It will, of course be remembered, that when Scripture is condemned, a reference is intended only to that part of it which is concerned with sacrifices and other rites; for, necessity for and the value of discriminative knowledge are also taught by Scripture.

It may be objected that if what is created is liable to destruction, then what is due to discriminative knowledge may also be similarly destroyed. The objection does not hold, for what such knowledge brings about is not positive, but negative. It does not create a result or a state but reveals the nature of the subject as incapable of being affected by change and sorrow. And the rule as to what is created being destructible certainly does not hold of destruction itself.²

The need for the enquiry being thus established, the central categories of the system are next briefly expounded.

Nor is there a fear of the discriminative knowledge itself perishing; for, the intellect has a natural leaning to truth, which, when apprehended it will not let go.³

1. The difficulty in any such interpretation of the text is that *jñāna* is used in the ablative case; what is intended is evidently the superiority not of knowledge, but of what results from knowledge; and this cannot be the means to a further result, knowledge itself being the supreme means; what is praised then must be *kaivalya* resulting from such knowledge. In this case, the contrast is not with other means, revealed in ordinary experience or Scripture, but with the ends so revealed. The first verse would deal with the objection that the inquiry would be fulfilled with the adoption and pursuit of seen human ends, the second verse would dispose of the human ends mentioned in Scripture. This is how *STV* interprets the two verses: *dr̥ṣṭe sâ 'pāṭhā, dr̥ṣṭe eva viśaye sâ samāpyatām, prayojana-samāpti-matī jāyatām..... ānuśravikaḥ, vedo-'kta svargādi-puruṣārthaḥ, dr̥ṣṭavat, paśu-putra-dhanai-'ēvaryādinaḥ tulya eva bhavati*. For *YD* also the contrast, in the 2nd verse is between *svarga*, the result of pursuing Scriptural ordinances, and release, which too is mentioned and eulogised in Scripture: p. 24.

2. Else by the destruction of destruction, we should get back the original substance intact, which is contrary to experience.

3. *Tattvapakṣarāto hi dhiyām svabhāvaḥ*

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयस्सप्त ।

षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

III. *mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir*

mahadādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ sapta ।

ṣoḍaśakas tu vikāro

na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ ॥

Primal Nature is not an evolute; the seven, beginning with the Great One (the intellect) are both evolvents and evolutes, the sixteen (the five organs of sense, the five of action, the mind and the five gross elements) are only evolutes; the spirit is neither evolvent nor evolute.

NOTES

What is attempted here is only a compendious statement of the main categories of the system, with a view to fix the inquirer's attention. More detailed exposition follows after the examination of the means of knowledge in the immediately succeeding verses.

There are four classes of beings—those which, though themselves not produced, yet bring others into existence,^a those which produce and are themselves produced, those which are products alone and cannot produce anything different from themselves, and those beings which, neither producing nor produced, are totally different in nature from the first three. The first of these is called Prakṛti or Primal Nature. The diversity of effects leads us to look for their explanation in the causes that produce them. The manifold causes eventually lead us to a single cause, which is called Prakṛti. Prakṛti is itself not caused, if a cause were assumed, a further cause of that cause would also have to be postulated and we shall thus have an infinite regress, a process that is not consistent with a rational solution. Prakṛti is thus the uncaused cause, the evolvent that is not an evolute. It is the seed

a. Under this head there is only one being, viz. Prakṛti, which, therefore, is a class by itself,

from which creation springs, but it has not begun to sprout nor even to swell prior to sprouting.

The swollen state that precedes sprouting is known as mahat, the Great One, otherwise known as the intellect. From that comes the sprout, ahaṅkāra, individuation, which in turn produces in one aspect the subtle elements and in the other the organs of cognition and action. These organs do not themselves produce any further mode of being. Hence those eleven (the five organs of sense, the five of action and the mind) are only evolutes. Of the subtle elements, on the contrary, each produces its appropriate gross element. The gross elements themselves do not produce anything in their turn. These five, therefore, together with the eleven organs constitute the sixteen bare evolutes. Mahat, ahaṅkāra, and the tanmātras (the subtle elements) are the seven categories which are both evolvent and evolute. The spirit is unchanged and causes nothing.

We cannot, in looking for a cause, go beyond Prakṛti, it was said, because of the *regressus ad infinitum*. But in the classification of effects, why should we stop with the gross elements and the indriyas? Various modifications of the elements are known and with reference to these they may well claim to be evolvents. Thus animal bodies and insentient objects are different modifications of the earth; in relation to them earth is the cause, and yet it is said to be a bare evolute. The reason is that to be an evolvent is not to be any kind of cause, but the cause of a different mode of being. A pitcher or a cow is not a mode of reality different from the earth of which they are modifications.¹ They are just as gross as their cause, they are perceptible by the same senses as their cause. What we have, in short, is not evolution, but a modification. This may be contrasted with the production of gross elements from subtle elements. The two sets of

1. "Tattvāntara-upādānatvam ca prakṛtitvam iha abhipreāt. Sarveṣāṃ go-ghaṭādinām sthūlatā indriyagrāhyaṭā ca same 'ti na tattvāntaratvam. And it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term 'Prakṛti' stands; and further, cows, trees, etc., do not differ from each other in their essence, since they have in common, the properties, grossness and perceptibility." (STK, Kārikā 3; the translation is Dr. Jha's); see also YD, p. 33.

elements are different in that the former are perceptible by the senses while the latter are not. Among themselves too, the gross elements represent different modes of being, in that each of them is known by a different organ of cognition, as ether by the ear, fire by the eye and so on. If, then, the process of the division of the categories stops with the gross elements and the organs, it is for sufficient reason.

The modes of being thus set out are objects of knowledge; but in an inquiry into them, one should first settle the means of correct knowledge. These are defined in the two succeeding verses:

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।

त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥

IV *dr̥ṣṭam anumānam āptavacanam ca*
sarvapramāṇa-siddhatvāt ।
trividham pramāṇam iṣṭam,
prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇād dhi¹ ॥

Three varieties are recognised of the means of correct knowledge—perception, inference, and valid testimony, all means of correct knowledge being comprehended (in these); for, the establishment of what is to be known depends on the means of correct knowledge.

NOTES

The present verse states only the number and the general characteristics of the means of correct knowledge, a fuller definition being left to the next verse. Pramāṇa is that mental function which leads to correct knowledge; to achieve this object, it should be free from doubt and error and should relate to what is not

1. *DY* understands 'hi' in the sense of 'certainly' or 'exclusively':
 p. 35.

already known. The last qualification is of considerable importance in Indian Philosophy, especially in determining the authority of Revelation. Revelation can possess no authority in respect of what is otherwise known, one essential feature of a *pramāṇa* being that it should not relate to what is already known by other means.

As many as six *pramāṇas* are generally enumerated. Of these, the *Cārvākas* recognise perception alone, the *Vaiśeṣikas* two only—perception and inference, the *Sāṅkhyas* three only—perception, inference, and valid testimony, the *Naiyāyikas* four only—perception inference, valid testimony and analogy; while the *Bhāṭṭas* and some *Vedāntins* recognise all the six—perception, inference, valid testimony, analogy, presumption and privation.

Three and only three *pramāṇas* are recognised by the *Sāṅkhya*, as other so-called means of knowledge may be shown to fall under one of the three heads. This will be shown in considering the next verse.

The last quarter of the present verse makes clear the reason for introducing the topic of *pramāṇas*, instead of proceeding with the exposition of the subject commenced in verse III. The subject, *prameya*, is what is to be known, and it cannot be adequately grasped while in ignorance of the means of correct knowledge.

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।

तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकं आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु ॥ ५ ॥

- V. *prati-viṣayā'-dhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam,*
trividham anumānam ākhyātam 1
tal līṅga-līṅgi-pūrvakam,
*āpta-śrutir āptavacanam tu*¹ ॥

1. The *Jaya* reads "ca" instead of "tu," the particle being explained as signifying validity in past, present and future, as much as in the case of *anumāna*.

Perception is the ascertainment of objects (in sense-contact); inference, which follows on (the knowledge of) the characteristic mark (līṅga, the middle term) and that which bears the mark (the major and minor terms), is said to be of three kinds; as for valid testimony, it is incontrovertible (knowledge derived from) verbal statement.

NOTES

Inference is dependent on perception, and valid testimony on both; further, perception as a means of correct knowledge is admitted by all, while the existence and validity of either or both of the other means are not so universally recognised. Hence the order of their treatment here.

The definition of perception serves to distinguish it from other means of knowledge, like and unlike, that is to say, it gives the *genus* and the *differentia*. The knowledge it produces is definite, ascertained; thus it is distinct from the means of knowledge that lead to doubt and error. Definite knowledge constitutes the *genus*: contact of sense-organs with the object constitutes the *differentia*. Thereby perception is distinguished from other means of definite knowledge such as inference, memory and so on. 'This contact of sense-organ with the object is signified by the words "prati viṣayam."

Ascertainment, as will be stated later, is a function of the intellect. Where it supervenes on sense-contact with objects, there is perceptual knowledge. Being a function of the intellect which is itself an evolute of matter, this knowledge is in essence material, though by contact with the Intelligence of the spirit it appears to partake of the nature of Intelligence. This will be further elaborated in verse XX.

The *Kārikā* sets out no justification for its recognition of inference and valid testimony as means of correct knowledge. It is, however, interesting to note Vācaspati's justification. Practical life is impossible on the basis of perception alone. Living in a society of intelligent, purposeful individuals, a neighbour's

doubts and fears, beliefs and convictions necessarily enter into our calculations in guiding our conduct; and these are not objects of perception, which is directed either to external objects or to a limited portion of our own inner life. Another man's mind or the condition thereof can be to us only a matter of inference. The practical life of the man who denies such knowledge cannot be distinguished from that of a lunatic.¹

Inference is based on knowledge of the co-existence of a mark and that in which the mark inheres. The existence of either by itself will not suffice, nor their bare coexistence. The co-existence must be known. Even then, it cannot furnish a basis for correct knowledge unless the relationship is pure, not subject to any determining condition (upādhi). Any such condition, if ignored, will lead to a *secundum quid* fallacy. Over and above the co-presence of līṅga and līṅgi, there should also be known the presence of the līṅga in the subject of the conclusion (the pakṣa). The minor term too as bearing the characteristic mark may be called līṅgi. Hence in the definition the repetition of līṅgi should be understood, though not mentioned.²

1. The Cārvāka criticism of the validity of inference is in many respects similar to Mill's criticism of the syllogism. For a lucid treatment of the Cārvāka position and the Bauddha reply thereto, see M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 189, 190, 199, 200. *STV*, it may be noted here, enters a defence of the validity of anumāna and śabda; though they produce only mediate knowledge (parokṣa-jñāna), they lead to successful practical activity. In the case of a drinking vessel inferred or heard of, taken up and used, the cause of activity is the inference or the word, not the subsequent sight of the vessel at the time of the activity; for, the activity of taking up the vessel really dates back to the hearing or the inference; and the vessel is taken up even if it is in darkness and not perceptible, when pointed to by some one who says that it exists there. The knowledge resulting from them is of a general nature and causes inquiry as to the specific nature.

2. Gauḍapāda understands by "līṅgalīṅgipūrvakam" the inference either of the līṅgi from the līṅga or of the līṅga from the līṅgi; an instance of the former is the inference from the perception of the staff that the possessor is a mendicant; where from the sight of a mendicant, the peculiar staff is recognised to be characteristic of the order of mendicants, there is an instance of the latter kind of inference. The same interpretation is adopted by the author of the *Jaya*, who incidentally describes seven kinds

Inference is said by the logicians to be of three kinds—pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyato dṛṣṭa. The nearest equivalents to these in English would be constructive, eliminative and analogous. The commentator Vācaspati Miśra adopts a different classification. Inference is divided into Vīta and Avīta; the former is that which is based on observed positive concomitance of the major and middle terms; the latter is based on their negative concomitance, *i.e.*, co-absence, their co-presence not being observable anywhere else except in the subject of the conclusion. Viewing the process as a mixed hypothetical syllogism, one may say that inference which is Vīta proceeds by affirming the antecedent, while the Avīta form denies the consequent.

Vīta inference comprises two varieties—pūrvavat and sāmānyato dṛṣṭa. The former is based on observed concomitance of the specific major and middle terms, as of fire and smoke. The conjunction of the two is a matter of prior perception, as in the hearth. Such conjunction, however, may not be known through perception, what is desired to be established being super-sensible. In such a case, an inference would none the less be possible, through knowledge of the similarity of the relation to be established to another which is known through perception. An example of this is the inference that the perception of sound, colour etc., requires the functioning of sense-organs. Here, the sense-organ and its functioning are not themselves objects of perception. The conclusion is based only on the ground that the perception of colour etc., being an act, requires an instrumental cause, in the same way as other acts, such as cutting. The process has little to distinguish it from inference by analogy.


Avīta or śeṣavat inference is essentially negative in character, being based on co-absence of major and middle terms. Here is an example given by the commentator. The effect (cloth) is non-different from the cause (threads), for the former is found to inhere in the latter, as a property of the latter; if the two were

of relation between līṅga and līṅgi. *STV* takes the phrase to mean generated by the consideration of a relation in the nature of a mark and that which bears the mark, thus avoiding the necessity for an implied repetition of "līṅgi" in the text: līṅga-līṅgi-bhāva-sambandhaparāmarśa-janyam.

different, inherence would not be possible, as, for instance, between the cow and the horse; hence cloth and threads (effect and cause) are non-different. The universal major premise is based on co-absence of non-difference and inherence. The co-presence of inherence and non-difference cannot be similarly exemplified except by reference to the causal relation, which is itself the subject of demonstration. The characteristic of this form of inference is, therefore, its dependence on negative instances alone, positive instances not being available, except such as relate to the subject in question. The same inference may be exhibited in the form of a mixed hypothetical syllogism :

If cloth and threads were different there would not be inherence of cloth in the threads, but there is inherence of cloth in the threads, therefore, cloth and threads are not different, *i. e.*, they are non-different.

When one looks beyond the universal premise for its basis, one finds it to be grounded on instances of co-absence alone. The conclusion is not bound to be barely negative. Where the negation occurs within a system, what is not negated is affirmed. Thus, if it is certain that A is B or C or D, the negation of C and D necessitates the conclusion that A is B. In this manner, Avāta inference may lead to an affirmative conclusion. As an inductive method, it is in essence identical with the Method of Elimination.¹



1. The division of Inference into three classes—pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and sāmānyato dṛṣṭa—is common to the Naiyāyikas and the Sāṅkhyas, though there is no consensus of opinion even among the former as to the significance of these terms. A time-honoured interpretation (one of those given by Vātsyāyana in his commentary on *Nyāya Sūtra* I, 1, 5) makes out that pūrvavat is inference from cause to effect, as from gathering rain clouds to impending rain; śeṣavat is inference from effect to cause, as when we infer that it must have rained since the

Valid testimony comprises all knowledge derived from incontrovertible verbal statement;¹ it is not confined to the revealed Scriptures. The Scriptures themselves are valid, for being uncreated, they are free from all defects to which man-made products are liable, but the teaching of sages like Kapila is also valid,

river is over-flowing its banks; *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference is where we infer from analogy, as when we argue that the sun, which occupies different positions during the day, must move, being in this respect like Caitra, who too occupies different positions, but as the result of his motion. It will be noticed that there is little to distinguish the conception of *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* from Vācaspati's; according to the latter, the essential features of this type are the fact that the relation is super-sensible and that the basis of the inference is analogy. Both these are present in the example cited by Vātsyāyana also. As for the *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* types, Vātsyāyana himself offers the alternative interpretation that the former is inference from prior perception and the latter a mode of inference by exclusion. It would thus appear that Vācaspati is not departing from Naiyāyika usage so much as adhering to one particular form of it, ignoring other forms. Gauḍapāda differs from both Vācaspati and Vātsyāyana. According to him, *pūrvavat* is inference based on prior perception, from the cause to the effect, as from rain-clouds to rain; *śeṣavat* is from some observed parts to the rest, as when we infer that the sea is briny, since a drop of sea-water tastes saltish; *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* is inference through analogy, as in the case of the motion of the moon and the stars. There seems to be comparatively little disagreement as to the last type. The author of *Jaya* follows Vātsyāyana's first interpretation in respect of *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat anumāna*, the former being an inference as to the future and the latter as to the past. *Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* is inference as to things present, in the light of what is *ordinarily observed* in experience. This is also the explanation given by *STV*: "this has fire, because it has smoke," relates to things present and is a case of inference *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*, since it is based on the pervasion of smoke *in general* by fire *in general*. The example given of this type is the same as Gauḍapāda's. The discussion in *YD* is long and not very helpful; but the writer stresses the function of elimination (*prasaṅgi-dharmāntara-nivṛtti*) in *śeṣavat* and distinguishes it from *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*, in that the latter relates to generalities, not to particulars; he also distinguishes two varieties of *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* as *vita* and *avita*. On the whole subject see A. B. Dhruva's paper on "Trividham Anumānam" in *POC*, Poona, II, 251-280.

1. The *Jaya* quotes the following definition of *āptatā* :
 Svakarmany abhiyukto yaḥ rāga dveṣa vivarjitatā |
 Nirvairatā pūjitasadbhir āpto jñeyatā sa tādṛśatā ||

He who is devoted to his own duties, devoid of attachment and aversion, free

since such teaching is based on the prior study of the Scriptures in previous births. This prior knowledge exists and is available, since death is but analogous to sleep and birth to waking from sleep. Where so-called Scriptures conflict either among themselves or with knowledge otherwise established, they fail to be valid and cannot be reckoned among means of correct knowledge.

Valid testimony cannot be reduced to a case of inference. for the former depends upon the meaning of words, and it cannot be said that a word is a characteristic mark of a meaning. If such an assertion could be made, then, indeed, an inference would be possible as to the meaning, with the word as the middle term.

The three *pramāṇas* here enumerated exhaust all the means of correct knowledge. *Upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, *abhāva* etc., can be shown to be instances of one or other of the three. Thus, in *upamāna*, a person, who has been told that a certain kind of wild cattle¹ is like a cow, is said to recognise that animal, when he meets it, as denoted by that name, because of the similarity of attributes. He also recognises that the cow he already knows is like the animal which he sees. The former is called *upamāna* by the *Naiyāyika*, while the latter is so called by some *Vedāntins*. In the cognition, inference is at work in the form that a word denotes that in respect of which it is used by persons of experience, and that the present word is of the same kind. In the recognition, perception is at work; though the cow recalled to mind is not present at the moment to the organs of cognition, yet, the attributes common to it and this animal are undoubtedly perceived; and this is what constitutes the knowledge derived by comparison. As for the knowledge conveyed by the statement that the *gavaya* is like the cow, that is a case of valid testimony. Thus, there is nothing distinctive of *upamāna* to justify its recognition as a distinct means of correct knowledge.

from hatred, revered by the good-such a person is to be known to be an *āpta* (i. e., a trustworthy person).

Cp. also *STV*:

āgamo hy āptavacanam āptam doṣakṣayād viduḥ |

kṣīṇa-doṣo 'nṛtam vākyam na brūyād dhettv-asambhavāt ||

1. The *Sāṃskṛt* name is 'gavayaḥ.'

Arthāpatti is recognised by some who imagine that it has the function of effecting a *modus vivendi* as between contradictories. Thus, if of a living person it be said that he is not at home, we conclude that he is out; but *is* and *is not* are contradictories, which cannot subsist² together; hence their discrimination and delimitation, non-existence being restricted to the house, and existence to all localities outside the house. The knowledge gained by such discrimination, is is claimed, is arthāpatti. But the contradiction is erroneously assumed. What is asserted is not bare non-existence along with³ existence, but non-existence in a particular place or time, and this is quite consistent with existence, in the case of any substance which is not all-pervasive. Thus the special function devised for arthāpatti is seen to be illusory; and divested of that function, it is nothing more than inference. The particular example of the man being out, if he is not in, is a case of a Disjunctive Syllogism in *Modus Tollendo Ponens*. There is of course the assumption that the subject belongs to the universe of discourse exhausted by the alternatives, that is to say, in the present case, that the man is alive, as, otherwise, he may be neither in nor out. This presumption, which has always to be verified, is characteristic of all inference, not merely of arthāpatti.

The knowledge of non-existence (privation) is not distinct from perception; it is the perception of a particular modification of the locus, *viz.*, that in which the locus alone exists. Originally the ground was perceived as with a pot, now it is perceived as without a pot. This is but natural as all things are in a state of flux, with the sole exception of the intelligent Puruṣa.¹

The knowledge of probability as of the part from the whole is called sambhava. This is but inference from the well-known principle that the part is included in the whole.

1. YD gives a rather confused account of these extra pramāṇas; the account of abhāva assimilates it to arthāpatti, while arthāpatti in its version, is hardly distinguishable from anumāna, as ordinarily understood. It discusses and dismisses pratibhā (intuition) on the ground that, when it is not invalid, it comes under one of the three—perception etc.; no doubt Kapila had perfect knowledge without the mediation of pratyakṣa etc., but his knowledge was connate, accomplished even from birth, and had no need of even pratibhā as pramāṇa: pp. 37-39.

As for the authority claimed for tradition (aitihyam) it is either well-founded (its originators etc., being known) or it is not. In the former case, it is indistinguishable from valid testimony, in the latter from non-knowledge. It is thus shown that the other so-called means of correct knowledge have no distinctive features and are all comprised in the three means recognised by the Sāṅkhya

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।

तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात्सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

1V. *sāmānyatas tu dr̥ṣṭād*

atīndriyāṇām pratitir¹ anumānāt ।

tasmād api cā 'siddham

parokṣam āptā'gamāt siddham ॥

Knowledge of objects beyond the senses comes from inference based on analogy, what(knowledge)is obscure and not attainable even thereby is gained by valid testimony.

NOTES

The exposition of the means of correct knowledge succeeded a statement of the object of correct knowledge and of the necessity for a special inquiry about those objects. It may, however, be thought that perception and inference based on prior specific perception (pūrvavat anumāna) are modes employed by the man in the street; if what is to be known here can be known by these means, such knowledge does not require a special science. Such a doubt, however, is not well-founded; for, the knowledge we seek is not merely of the evolved which, in part, is the object of prat-
yakṣa and pūrvavat anumāna, but also of the unevolved and the knower, not to mention those aspects of the evolved, like intellect and so on, which are not objects of perception. Hence follows this kārīkā laying special stress on the means of knowledge specially

1. YD: prasiddhiḥ.

suitable to the inquiry on hand. Inference from analogy has a wider range than perception or *pūrvavat anumāna*. But there are obvious cases where such inference is not possible. One set of limiting cases is due to the inability to observe positive concomitance. It has been already noted that in some cases inference known as *Vīta* is not possible at all; here, the *Avīta*, otherwise known as *śeṣavat anumāna*, is of help. But even this may fail, there being knowledge neither of generic nor of specific nature, nor of any characteristic marks wherewith to infer. To this class belong the order of creation of the intellect etc., and the existence of heaven and its denizens. Knowledge of these can be gained only through valid testimony.¹ The possibilities of *śeṣavat anumāna* are not directly mentioned in the verse, but are just indicated by the use of the particle *ca* in *tasmād api ca*.²

But surely, it may be thought, where perception and inference fail, the proper course is to take it that there are no such objects, not to postulate other means of knowing them. A hare is not seen to have horns; we conclude, therefore, that it has none, not that its horns may be known by other modes of proof. Why not then apply the same reasoning to *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, heaven and hell, gods and demons? This procedure, however, would confuse two varieties of non-perception, failure to perceive where perception is possible, and failure where there is no such possibility. Non-existence may justly be inferred from non-perception of the first variety, but not of the second. Perception may be impossible because of any one of the following reasons.

1. Why recognise inference *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*, if it has to be supplemented by *śabda*? Why not *śabda* alone be the *pramāṇa*? Because, in the matter of giving knowledge, inference though inferior to perception is superior to Scripture; thus says *STV*. *YD* discusses at length and refutes the possibility of reducing *śabda* to inference; prominent among the reasons are (1) the applicability of *śabda* only where *pratyakṣa* etc., cannot apply, (2) the local and temporal variations of *śabda*, (3) the dependence of *śabda* on purport, etc.: pp. 53, 54.

2. *Nārāyaṇa*, the author of the *Candrikā* splits the first half of the above *kārikā* into two and explains that the knowledge of the ordinary sensible objects is through perception, while the knowledge of objects beyond the senses comes from inference. According to *Nārāyaṇa*, the *kārikā* refers to

अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौक्ष्म्याद्व्यवधानादभिभवात्समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

VII. *atidūrāt sāmīpyād*
indriyaghātān mano-navasthānāt ।
saukṣmyād vyavadhānād
abhibhavāt samānābhihārāc ca ॥

(Non-perception may be) because of extreme distance, (extreme) proximity, injury to the organs, non-steadiness of the mind, subtlety, veiling, suppression, and blending with what is similar.

NOTES

The word 'non-perception', though not occurring in the present verse, has to be imported here from the succeeding one. The grounds mentioned are self-explanatory. We see neither what is too far off, like a bird that has flown far away, nor what is too near, like the collyrium on the eye-lash. Colour or sound though existent is not perceived by one who is blind or deaf. An object though present and impinging on the senses fails to be perceived by one who is distracted. Atoms because of their subtlety are not perceptible. Those behind a veil can neither see nor be seen, and that which is overshadowed by another does not reveal itself. Even where none of these conditions is present, there is failure to perceive what is mixed with others of its kind. A bean mixed up with a heap of beans is no longer perceptible in its individuality, and the drop of water lost in the ocean is no longer distinguishable therefrom.¹

all three means of knowledge. The more usual interpretation is supported by *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* I, 103: "sāmānyato dṛṣṭād ubhaya-siddhiḥ" commented on by *Vijñāna Bhikṣu*: "tatra sāmānyato dṛṣṭād anumānād dvayoḥ prakṛti-puruṣayoḥ siddhir ity arthaḥ"; this is also adopted by *STV*.

1. *Jaya* classes these defects under four heads: deśadoṣa, indriyadoṣa, viśayadoṣa, and arthāntaradoṣa.

The *ca* at the end suggests other similar reasons, one being non-manifestation, *e.g.*, of the effect in the cause. The curd is not perceived in the milk, yet the latter is the cause of the former (the effect is pre-existent in the cause according to the Sāṅkhya (theory). The failure of perception is, in this case, due to non-manifestation.

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः नाभावात्कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।

महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

VIII. *saukṣmyāt tadanupalabdhiḥ,*
nā'bhāvāt kāryatas tadupalabheḥ¹
mahadādi tac ca kāryam,¹
prakṛtisarūpam virūpaṃ ca² ॥

The non-perception of that (Primal Nature) is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence, since it is cognised from its effects; the Great One (*i.e.*, the intellect) and the rest are its effects, (which are) both like and unlike (their cause)—Nature.

NOTES

The previous verse mentioned in general the causes of failure of perception; the present one mentions the specific cause whereby there is failure to perceive the *pradhāna*, the unevolved cause of this world. Extreme subtlety is the cause in the present case.³ Nor

1. *STV* reads:

.....tadupalabdhiḥ
 mahadādi tasya kāryam..... ॥

2. *YD* reads "virūpam sarūpam ca" and justifies it; p. 65. This reading certainly accords better with the treatment in vv. X and XI.

3. The identical reason is mentioned in *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* I, 109. In commenting on it, *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* makes it clear that subtlety means not atomicity (Nature being pervasive, *vibhu*) but difficulty "to investigate":

may it be thought that such a ground could be set up in every case of non-perception ;¹ for what is here claimed to exist can be established by some other authoritative means of knowledge. We know for certain that the *pradhāna* must exist, because of its effects, the intellect and so on. The effect cannot be either wholly like or wholly unlike the cause ; in the former case, there would be bare identity, in the latter bare difference. Hence of the effects—intellect etc.,—a cause is inferred which is partly like them and partly unlike. This is Primal Nature. Based as it is on this other *pramāṇa* (*viz.*, inference), its failure to be cognised by perception can be due only to its subtlety, not to its non-existence.

The existence of a cause being thus established, it is necessary further to determine its nature. For this, the nature of the effect in relation to the cause must first be known. Some say that only the existent can produce an existent ; others derive the existent from the non-existent (like the Bauddhas) or the non-existent from the existent (like the Naiyāyikas) ; yet others say that the effect is an illusory manifestation of an existent cause. These various possibilities have to be considered ; for our conception of the cause necessarily depends on how we conceive of its relation to the effect. Hence the next verse, which proceeds to establish that both cause and effect are existent and that the effect is not a non-entity, which has become an entity by the operation of the cause.

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात्सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

IX. *asad-akaraṇād upādāna-grahaṇāt, sarva-*
saṁbhavā-'bhāvāt ।

śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt, kāraṇa-bhāvāc ca
sat kāryam ॥

durūhatvam sauksmyam na tv aṇutvam prakṛter vibhutvād iti. While primal atoms are held to be perceptible to Yogins, *prakṛti* cannot be perceived even by sages like Kapila: YD, p. 84.

1, *Eg.*, in respect of the hare's horns, etc. ; YD, p. 55. Non-existence, which is thus contingent is refuted by the words "nā 'bhāvāt," suggestive of the *avita* inference for the same conclusion.

The effect exists (even prior to the operation of the cause) since what is non-existent cannot be brought into existence by the operation of a cause, since there is recourse to the (appropriate) material cause, since there is not production of all (by all), since the potent (cause) effects (only) that of which it is capable, and since (the effect) is non-different from the cause.

NOTES

It is important to note that what is sought to be proved is not the existence of the effect as such, but its existence prior to the causal operation. The former type of existence is admitted even by the Naiyāyika. Though, according to him, the effect "pot" is non-existent in the stage of clay or potsherd, yet, when it is produced, it certainly exists. The distinguishing feature of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, therefore, is the assertion of the existence of the effect even before it is apparently brought into existence by the cause. The first argument in favour of this view is that if the effect were really non-existent, no agency whatever could bring it about, any more than a thousand craftsmen could turn blue into yellow or extract oil from sand. It is also seen that one who wishes to produce a particular effect seeks the appropriate material cause; e.g., one who wants curds seeks milk and not water.¹ Further, if the effect were really non-existent, it is difficult to see what connection there could be between that and its alleged cause. Either the

1. This is the sense in which Gauḍapāda understands upādānagrahānāt. Vācaspati Mīra prefers to interpret it as meaning "because of relatedness to the material cause." It is difficult to choose between the two modes of understanding the text. Gauḍapāda's has the merit of being the simpler and more apparent of the two; but it has the disadvantage that apparently the same idea is repeated in śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt. Vācaspati avoids this difficulty, but the idea he propounds is incidental to and included in the ground sarva-sambhavā-'bhāvāt. The disadvantages being nearly equal, the more obvious interpretation is adopted here. It is also to be noted that while upādāna-grahānāt emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former.

cause does make a difference to the effect or it does not. If it does not, there is no point in thinking of it at all, certainly none in reckoning with it as the cause. If, on the contrary, it does make a difference, it follows that it is connected with the effect; and how can the non-existent be related to the existent? Relationship is indeed conceivable only as between terms which are both existent. Where one or both are non-existent, there can be no connection. The barren woman's son is not related either to the king of the country or the horns of the hare. If, now, it be said that the cause does make a difference to the effect, but without being connected thereto, then, the absence of connection between them is a feature common not merely to that but all causal conditions whatsoever. Such absence being a constant characteristic any effect should result from any cause, a conclusion falsified in experience.

It may still be said that, though there is no connection between the cause and the effect, particular effects are produced only by particular causes, because of the varying potencies of the latter. Here too the question arises whether the potency creates any effect whatsoever or only that of which it is capable. On the former alternative, there is still the absurd possibility of any cause originating any effect; on the latter hypothesis, we have again a relation involved as between the potency and what it is capable of effecting; and, as already stated, neither term of a relation may be non-existent.

If further proof were needed of the existence of the effect prior to the operation of the cause, it is provided by the fact that the effect is non-different from the cause.¹ This non-difference can be proved through a series of *Avita* inferences. Thus, the effect, cloth, is non-different from the threads, since they are neither separated nor brought together; if they were different, they would be conjoined as a pool and a tree on its banks, or dis-

1. "kāraṇa-bhāvāt." *SVT* understands this to refer to the fact that what is an effect is itself a cause in relation to some other effect: *yat kāryam tasyā 'nya-kāryam prati kāraṇatvam drśyate.....kāryam asad eva cet svayam anyeṣāṃ kāraṇam katham bhaviṣyati?* *YD* says: *ihā 'sati kārye kāraṇa-bhāvo nāsti; asti ce'ha kāraṇabhāvaḥ tantu-pañayoḥ; tasmāt sat kāryam.* The "ca" is taken to refute the possibility of the effect being *sadasat*: pp. 64, 65.

joined like the Himalayas and the Vindhya; but between the cloth and the threads there is not such conjunction or disjunction; hence they are not different. Again, cloth and threads would be different, if they differed in such properties as weight, but the weight of the cloth is the same as that of the threads of which it is woven. Hence, cause and effect are non-different. And since the cause is admitted to exist, the effect must also be admitted to exist at the same time. Such co-existence becomes intelligible, if causation is regarded as the process of manifesting in one form what exists in another form, not the bringing into existence of what is non-existent, and destruction viewed as the process of concealing the effected form, not that of bringing about the non-existence of that effect.

The difficulties of the causal concept are not finally surmounted with this. Granted that causation is manifestation, is this existent or not? If it is existent, then, the operation of the cause would seem to be superfluous, if it is not there will have to be a cause (*i.e.*, a manifestation) of the manifestation and thus we have an endless series of causes. The only answer which is attempted by the Sāṅkhya as expounded by Vācaspati Miśra takes the form of a *tu quoque* argument.¹ The person that creates the difficulty is the Naiyāyika, according to whom the effect is non-existent before the operation of the cause. The effect comes into being or is originated. What is this origination? Is it existent or non-existent? If the former, causal operation is needless, if the latter, there has to be another origination there of and so on *ad infinitum*. If origination be said to be identical with the effect,

1. The difficulty about the pre-existence or otherwise of manifestation is noticed in the *Tattvaśuddhi* (Madras University), p. 151; the answer attempted by the satkāryavādin is mentioned on pp. 155, 156; the effect is pre-existent, but not the manifestation; the question how the latter enjoys exemption from existence is misconceived; for, manifestation is of the effect and is not itself an effect. This attempt to escape, though clever, is unsuccessful; for, assuming that manifestation is something other than an effect, there must be some relation between the two; does this relation pre-exist? If not, there is *asat-kārya-vāda*; if it does pre-exist, there is no need for the causal factors to operate. Thus we are faced with the old difficulty in a slightly modified form; see *Tattvaśuddhi* (Madras University), pp. 156, 157.

then the word *effect* itself means *originated*, we can never say *the effect is originated* without being guilty of redundancy, and to say that the effect is destroyed would involve a contradiction in terms. One could at best say that the effect inheres in the cause, in which case what is originated can be but the inherence while what the cause apparently seeks to bring about is the effect itself, not its inherence in the cause. These difficulties at least are avoided in the Sāṅkhya theory which conceives the effect as already existent. It has no greater defects than the doctrine of the effect being *asat*, while it has the positive merit of conceiving the causal operation as relating to an act, *i. e.*, manifestation, and not to a substance, *i. e.*, a previously non-existent effect.

The author next proceed to describe the character of the evolved and the unevolved, in order to help in the discriminative knowledge of them.

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

X. *hetumat, anityam, avyāpi,*
sakriyam, anekam, āśritam, liṅgam ।
sāvayavam, paratantram
vvyaktam, viparītam avyaktam ॥

The evolved is caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive, mobile, manifold, dependent, mergent, conjunct and heteronomous; the unevolved is the reverse (of all these)

NOTES

The qualities of the evolved as described above may be deduced from the very fact of their being evolved. What is evolved is necessarily caused. Being originated, it is destructible,¹ and hence

1. *I.e.*, in respect of the manifestation, not in respect of reality; see YD, p. 67.

it is not eternal. What is caused is necessarily limited. It is pervaded by its cause and pervades its own effect; but it is not fully pervasive, in so far as it cannot be said to pervade its own cause (avyakta). It is unstable and constantly changing; hence it is mobile. It is not single, for there are many varieties of the evolved; the intellect varies with different individuals; and even the earth, at the other end of the scale, exists in manifold forms as bodies, jars etc. The first stage in evolution is supported by its cause and each succeeding supports the next one; thus each form of the evolved is dependent on its own cause. Just as the evolved is caused by the unevolved and comes out of it, it is also capable of being merged therein.¹ It is characterised by the conjunction of parts in a whole. This conjunction is not characteristic of the relation of the unevolved to the evolved, these two being identical as cause and effect, while conjunction takes place only between what are otherwise disjoined.

Though, among the intellect and the rest, each is capable of producing its appropriate effect, yet in the last resort, on element of the evolved is independent. It has to draw its sustenance from the unevolved and but for that sustenance it would fail in its function and perish, like a person, who, though relatively independent in his activities is yet dependent on food, for the performance of those activities. Subordination or dependence, in this sense, is fuller and deeper than what is mentioned earlier, as āśritam, being supported.

1. Vācaspati Miśra prefers to take "liṅgam" as "characteristic (of Primal Nature)." The existence of the evolved is the middle term where by we infer the existence of Primal Nature; it is the characteristic mark whereon the inference is based. "Liṅgam" as understood by Gauḍapāda would be really distinctive of the evolved. In the sense of characteristic mark, it is not distinctive, since the unevolved too serves as a liṅga for the inference of the Spirit, as Vācaspati recognises. *Jaya* gives both senses, without deciding between the two. The explanation given by Vācaspati that though the pradhāna is a characteristic mark, it is not its own liṅga, seems hardly adequate to the contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved. *SPB* (I, 24) explains liṅgam, as "kāraṇa-anumāpakatvāl laya-gamanād vā." *STV* says "liṅgam, kāraṇe liyata iti." Paramārtha's original is rendered by Takakusu as "dissoluble" (*BFEO*, IV, 991). *YD* explains "liṅgam" as "tallaksano-'papannam"; but, owing to a lacuna in the printed text (and possibly the Ms.) further elucidation is lacking.

The unevolved is the reverse of all these. It is not caused, it is eternal, pervasive, it is not mobile; though it transforms itself into its evolutes, the mutability and the migration of the evolutes do not belong to its nature; for, unlike the evolutes, it is eternal and pervasive; it supports all and is not supported by any; while the evolved merges in the unevolved, the latter is not itself merged in any thing else; it is not conjunct and it is autonomous. Thus is the unevolved distinguished from the evolved. But they both agree in certain ways, in respect of which they differ from Spirit. These are described in the next verse.

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।

व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

XI. *triguṇam, aviveki viṣayaḥ*

sāmānyam, acetanam, prasavadharmi ।

vyaktam, tathā pradhānam;

tadviparītas tathā ca pumān ॥

The evolved is (composed) of the three constituents, non-discriminated, objective, general, non-intelligent and productive; so is the unevolved; the Spirit, though similar, is (yet) the reverse of these.

NOTES

The three constituents (guṇas) with their functions will be described in the next two verses. They are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. These experiences, thus, are characteristic not of the soul, but of matter—evolved and unevolved.

The evolved is non-discriminated from Primal Nature; for the latter is of its essence. That Primal Nature is not distinguished from itself goes without saying. There is also another reason for holding the evolved and the pradhāna (Primal Nature) to be non-discriminated. Neither of these effects anything by itself. Everything that is evolved functions as the cause and in so functioning is

dependent throughout on the unevolved for sustenance, as noted in the tenth kārīkā. In production, therefore, no evolute functions by itself; and this is marked by the use of the word *aviveki*, non-discriminated. Both the interpretations sound strained and would not be availed of, but for the difficulty that the apparent sense, "lacking discrimination," is indistinguishable from the other characteristic, "non-intelligent," which is also mentioned in this verse.¹

Matter, evolved or unevolved, is objective. Cognition is of something other than the process and this something is either the evolved or the unevolved. What is thus cognised is also general. It is not confined to the individual cognitions, but enters into the knowledge of all.

Intelligence is characteristic only of the Spirit. Matter at every stage is non-conscious. Since intellect is an evolute of matter, it cannot claim Intelligence as a property.²

Matter is productive. It is ever undergoing change into forms similar and dissimilar. In all these respects Primal Nature agrees with the evolved. The Spirit is different from Matter *i.e.*, Primal Nature, in these very respects, though it agrees with the unevolved in certain other respects, like uncausedness, eternality etc., and with the evolved in others, like plurality etc. This similarity is indicated by the words "*tathā ca*" in the kārīkā, where *ca* has the force of *though*.

We next pass to an enumeration and description of the three constituents.

1. *STV* explains this attribute as "*avivekā-dhāratva*," being the basis of lack of discrimination.

2. This may become clearer if it is remembered that for the Sāṅkhya, Intelligence is pure, uniform, unaffected by change and so on, while the intellect is but a material instrument for discriminating among the manifold presentations of matter. It is to be feared that the elements of identity and difference characteristic of all life and certainly of rational life have been sundered, the element of identity being hypostatized as Spirit and that of difference as Matter. The result is that the discriminative activity and the instrument thereof become material, while the self-luminous Reason to which both the activity and its objects present themselves remains pure Spirit. Hence the difference between intellect and Intelligence.

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषदात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।

अन्योन्याभिभवश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

XII. *prīty-aprīti-viṣādā-'tmakāḥ,*
*prakāśa-pravṛtti-niyamārthakāḥ*¹
anyonyā-'bhibhavā-'śraya-
janana-mithuna-vṛttayaś ca guṇāḥ ॥

The constituents are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference; they serve to illumine, to actuate and to restrain; each of these functions through suppression, co-operation, transformation and intimate intercourse with and by the rest.¹

NOTES

The expression "guṇāḥ" is likely to be understood to mean attributes as contrasted with substance. This confusion should be avoided, since the guṇas of the Sāṅkhya system are not attributes of a substance other than themselves, but are rather themselves constitutive of the substance, i.e., Primal Nature. Hence it is that they are rendered here as "constituents," not as "attributes"². The

1. Māṭhara, Gauḍapāda, and Paramārtha take "anyonya-vṛttayaḥ" as one more property of the guṇas, like "anyonya-abhibhavāḥ" etc. It is explained by Takakusu (translating Paramārtha) as mutual intervention, i.e., each producing the effects of the other, e.g., a beautiful woman who is an object of pleasure to her husband (and is hence sāttvika) causes pain to her co-wives, and mere indifference and depression to her slaves (thus producing the effects of rajas and tamas). See *BFEO*, IV, 995-996. *STV* does not treat anyonya-vṛtti as a separate function.

2. According to the Śaiva Siddhānta, substance is nothing more than an assemblage of qualities viewed collectively; in support of this doctrine, the system appeals to the evolution of what we call substances from the three guṇas, taking guṇa in the sense of quality. In view of the many points of affiliation between the Sāṅkhya and the Śaiva Siddhānta one wonders if in the former too guṇa, at one time, meant only quality and subsequently meant constituent, because of the metaphysical position that

word "guṇāḥ" means, according to Vācaspati, what subserve the interests of another, i.e., in this case, the Spirit.

The characteristics and functions mentioned in this verse are to be understood in the order in which the constituents are mentioned in the next kārīkā, i.e., in the order, Sattva, Rajas, Tamas. Sattva (Goodness) is of the nature of pleasure; Rajas (Passion) is of the nature of pain; Tamas (Darkness) is of the nature of indifference. Sattva serves to illumine, Rajas to actuate, and Tamas to restrain. These results follow not from individual, but co-operative activity. Thus, illumination results through Sattva, as actuated by Rajas and not restrained by Tamas. It is not Sattva alone that is active in enlightenment, but Sattva as dominating Rajas and Tamas. Similarly, the other two dominate each in turn, with corresponding variations in the result. Each is the cause of transformations in the rest; hence no external cause is needed to account for their changes; and not being caused from without, they are not liable to destruction either. They are intimately conjoined in their activity: each in turn is the consort of the others as it were. In the words of the *Devī Bhāgavata*, III, viii, 50: "In the mating of Rajas, Sattva (is recessive); in the mating of Sattva, Rajas (is recessive); the two, Sattva and Rajas are known (to play in turn the dominant and recessive) in (their) consorting each with Tamas."

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टम्, उपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

XIII. *sattvam laghu prakāśakam*

iṣṭam upaṣṭambhakam calam ca rajah ।

guru varanākam eva tamaḥ,

pradīpavac cā 'rthato vṛttiḥ ॥

there are no constituents of substance other than qualities. See an article by the present editor on *Substance and Attribute in the Śaiva Sādhānta*, JORM, VIII, 97-103, also PQ, X, 127. On the relation of Śāṅkhya guṇa to Buddhist dharma, see Stcherbatsky, IHQ, X, iv, 737-760,

Sattva (alone) is considered to be buoyant and illuminating, Rajas (alone) to be stimulating and mobile; Tamas alone is heavy and enveloping; their functioning for the goal (of the Spirit) is like (the action of) a lamp.

NOTES

Sattva is responsible for the lightness in things, the upward movement of the burning fire or the blowing across of the wind. Tamas weighs down things and renders them inactive. Neither of these would have the energy to fulfil its proper functions but for the stimulating activity of Rajas. The functions assigned in each case are appropriate only to the particular constituent; hence, the word "alone" occurring in "Tamas alone" should be understood after Sattva and Rajas also.

These three constituents of Primal Nature are said to co-operate for the *summum bonum* of the Spirit. From their contrariety this seems impossible. The author shows, however, the intelligibility of the conception, through the analogy of a lamp. The wick and the oil and the flame are substances which are opposed in nature; and yet they co-operate in the lamp in giving light.¹ The

1. The question would arise, "are the wick and the oil and the flame really contraries in the same sense as the three constituents are said to be?" The answer is that though they are not so fundamentally opposed as to rule out all possibility of co-operation, yet in their nature, they exhibit such antagonism as to allow the effect coming into being only under certain conditions. The wick and the oil in respect of their solid and liquid nature would tend to put out the flame. Fire, again, in certain cases, would merely burn the wick and the oil, without giving any light, as in the case of a smouldering fire. When, however, there is a due relation of superordination and subordination, there is no conflict. *Guṇabhūto hi pratiyogi pradhānabhūtena tadupakāraḥ na virudhyate*: YD, p. 72. It may be observed that while *STK* and *Jaya* understand by "arthataḥ" 'puruṣārthataḥ,' i.e., for the goal of the spirit, *SKG* takes it to mean "sādhana," i.e., "purposive" or "aiming to achieve a common end." *STV* understands by "vṛtti" neither existence nor functioning in general, but psychosis i.e., a modification of the sense-organs; in the last resort, this is a modification of the *guṇas*, since the organs are transformations of the *guṇas*; *taila-vartivahnibhir yathā dipo jvalati tathā triguṇair antar-bāhīḥ-karāṇāni jvalantī*

combination of the three constituents of Primal Nature is of the same kind.

Since pleasure, pain and indifference are diverse in nature they must result from causes appropriate to each, not from a cause of uniform nature. Hence the triple constitution of Primal Nature, as comprising Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. It hardly needs to be proved that Sattva cannot be the cause of excitement or Tamas of enlightenment. The co-existence of the three constituents is observed even in everyday experience, as seen from an example well-known in the exposition of the Sāṅkhya. A's wife is beautiful, young and well-endowed with all the qualities of head and heart that are requisite in the ideal wife. These constitute the Sattva element in her; because of that she causes A, her husband, to rejoice. She is, however, the cause of jealousy in her co-wives B and C and despair to a neighbour D who has not had the good fortune to be married to her. Jealousy is rājasa and despair is tāmasa; they are due to the elements of Rajas and Tamas in A's wife, these becoming active only in respect of the co-wives or the neighbour, as the case may be.

अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धस्त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।

कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

XIV *avivekṣādīḥ siddhaḥ¹ traiguṇyāt tad-
viparyayā-'bhāvāt ।*

*kāraṇa-guṇā-'tmakatvāt kāryasyā 'vyak-
tam api siddham ॥*

'ti bhāvaḥ. anena viśaya-prakāśanam vṛttir iti phalitam. guṇaiḥ karaṇa-jvālā-niṣpattaṭau taddvārā viśaya-prakāśanam bhavati 'ti. guṇānām ananubhavāt karaṇānām eva vṛttayo vyavahriyante. uktam ca mūla-tantre "bhāga-guṇābhyām arthāntaram vṛttiḥ" iti. karaṇānām eva 'yam na bhāgo na guṇaś ca param tu tato 'rthāntaram prakāśana-mātrām vṛttir ucyate, iyam karaṇānām pariṇāma-viśeṣa eva 'ti sampradāyaḥ; vastuto guṇa-gatai 've 'yam bhavati, karaṇānām tatpariṇāmatvāt.

1. Vācaspati and Gauḍapāda (in some editions) read "avivekṣādeḥ siddhiḥ." STV and YD adopt the reading of the present text.

The qualities of non-discriminatedness and the rest result (for the constituents Sattva etc.,) from their being of the triple nature (of pleasure, pain and indifference), also from the non-existence (of this triple nature), in the absence (of the qualities of non-discrimination etc., that is to say, in Spirit). The unevolved too results from the effect being of the same nature as the cause.

NOTES

Non-discriminatedness, objectivity etc., are observed in the case of the evolved, why assume them in the case of the unevolved and its constituents? The answer is that whatever is of the nature of pleasure, pain etc., necessarily possesses the qualities in question (enumerated in verse XI). This conjunction is observed in every-body's experience. The argument is strengthened by a negative instance. When non-discriminatedness etc., are absent, i.e., in the case of the Spirit, there is not the experience of pleasure, pain or indifference. On this interpretation, *traiguṇyāt* provides the argument and *tadviparyayā-bhāvāt* the negative instance in support of it, the positive instance, being patent, is not mentioned. It is also possible to take this as a negative argument of the Avita type, if the unevolved and the evolved together be taken to be the subject of the conclusion; for, in such a case there is nothing else left to be cited as a positive instance of the conjunction of the middle term (*triguṇatva*) and the major (*avivekitva*).¹

1. Gauḍapāda understands *tadviparyayā-bhāvāt* differently. The evolved is known to possess these qualities; the unevolved cannot be the reverse of the evolved, since the two are related as cause and effect. Thread and cloth are not different in quality; from black threads you can get only black cloth. Hence, it follows that the qualities of non-discriminatedness, etc., attach to the unevolved as well. The argument so stated is very simple. It is stated even more clearly by *STV*: *traiguṇyāt, vyakte; tadviparyayā-bhāvāt, avyakte traiguṇya-viparyayasyā bhāvāt*. Vācaspati's interpretation (adopted in this translation) has the merit of exhibiting the argument syllogistically; on Gauḍapāda's interpretation, this clause would have little to distinguish it from what follows in the next line about the effect being of the same nature as the cause. It is not conceivable that in

If the unevolved were proved to exist, its possession of the qualities of non-discriminatedness etc., might be admitted. But what of the demonstration of its existence? For one thing it is clear that since the effects are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, the cause must also be of triple nature.¹ It should comprise, in other words, the three constituents Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Further demonstration of the existence of Primal Nature follows:

भेदानां परिमाणात् , समन्वयात् , शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥

कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं , प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।

परिणामतः सलिलवत् , प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

XV&XVI. *bhedānām parimāṇāt,*
samanvayāt, śaktiṭaḥ pravṛtteś ca
kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgād
avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya॥

kāraṇam asty avyaktam;
pravartate triguṇataḥ samudayāc ca
pariṇāmataḥ salilavat,
pratipratiguṇāśrayaviśeṣāt॥

a condensed exposition the same idea was repeated in the course of a single verse. Wilson in his comment on the present verse (see *SKG*, p. 58) has mis-read Vācaspati's words as *sphuṭatvād anvayenoktam*, and understood them to mean "It is first plainly or affirmatively expressed in the natural order." The correct reading is *anvayo noktaḥ*, meaning that the *anvaya*, i.e., the positive instance is not mentioned, that being patent (*sphuṭatvāt*).

1. If the cause must be similar to the effect, should that too not be a product? No, since the cause, in any ultimate sense, cannot be what is itself an effect; else it would be limited and cease to be the cause; see *YD*,

The unevolved exists as the cause of the diverse, because of the finitude, and homogeneous nature (of the latter), because of its proceeding from the potentiality (of the cause), and because of there being in respect of the variegated world both the emergence of effect from cause as also their merger;¹ it (the unevolved) functions through (each one of its) three constituents as also through their combination, being modified like water, by the specific nature abiding in the respective constituents.

NOTES

Even among the evolved, we are familiar with causation, the emergence of effect from cause and the resolution of effect into cause. Thus the Great One or intellect gives rise to individuation to the subtle elements and the subtle elements to the gross elements. At the time of periodical destruction, again, the gross elements are resolved into the subtle elements and so on. The process is comparable to that of a tortoise extending and retracting its limbs.² The effect, as has been attempted to be shown, is not

p. 74; also *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās*, IV, 11-13; but is there an ultimate cause? This question is answered by the next two verses.

1. *Jaya* interprets *avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya* to mean "because of the relation of the manifold to what is non-differentiated," an illustration being provided by the relation of curds, butter, etc., to milk. Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati understand dissolution or merger by *avibhāga*, while this is offered as an alternative interpretation by *Jaya*. *STV* construes it to refer to the undifferentiatedness of the generic character of reality belonging to the world, *viśvarūpam eva vaiśvarūpam*; *tasyā 'vibhāgāt, sattā-sāmānya-rūpe vibhāga-bhāvāt; guṇa-sāmānyam prakṛtir iti jñāyate*. It will be seen that this argument is linked with a peculiar interpretation of *guṇa-sāmānya* (the equilibrium of the *guṇas*) as *guṇa-sāmānya* (the state where *guṇas* exist in their generic condition, without being differentiated into *Sattva*, *Rajas* or *Tamas*.) The equation here of *sāmānya* with *sāmānya* would appear to be sound, since the particularisation of the *guṇas* can come about only after the disturbance of the equilibrium.

2. Cf. *Mahābhārata*, XII, Ch. 253; *prasārya iha yathā 'ṅgāni kūrmāḥ saṃharate punaḥ*.

non-existent prior to causal operation, but only non-manifest, like the limbs of a tortoise withdrawn into the shell. Thus, in every case of causation we have, not the creation of something entirely new, but the manifestation of something already existent. The cause in every case is unevolved and the effect evolved. The latter proceeds from the former and merges into it. Since causation is characteristic of our world and the process has to be understood, in every case, as the evolution of the unevolved, it follows that whatever is evolved is caused in its entirety by what is unevolved.

This consideration is re-inforced by another well-known feature of causation, *viz.*, that the functioning of a cause is dependent on its potentiality. It produces only what it is capable of producing. The cause of the evolved must contain the potentiality of the evolved and this can be only as unevolved. So far, however, there does not seem to be any justification to go beyond mahat, the intellect, which contains within itself the unevolved potentialities of all the other diverse effects in our world. Where, then, is the necessity for postulating Primal Nature as the ultimate unevolved cause? The answer is that even mahat is finite; whatever is finite is itself caused, like a pitcher and so on. Hence, mahat too is caused by that which has the unevolved potentiality of mahat, that is to say, by the *pradhāna*.¹

1. Whatever is finite is caused, e.g., pot, etc.; hence, even mahat is caused; and its cause must be the infinite, unmanifest, *prakṛti*. Have we here the conclusion of a causal argument or the presupposition of all causal arguments? We see phenomena succeeding one another in time; we see oil where we saw sesamum before; we treat the oil as the product of the sesamum; since oil comes from sesamum grains alone, not from grain-of sand, we ascribe potentiality to the former; the potent is the cause; when the potentiality is manifested, we have the effect. What we have here is a phase of the Law of Identity at Work. Oil cannot be not-oil too; though sesamum is apparently not-oil, the appearance is got over by postulating a latent identity, through oil potentiality. It is the identity-seeking that postulates causation, not observed causation that prompts the search for identity; and this is at least as true as the statement that causation is a postulate of induction, and is not itself established by induction. The search for identity cannot stop short of an entity that can preserve its own identity; and this is possible only in the case of the infinite, as whatever is finite is liable to be disrupted by the others which limit it. The infinite

Yet another consideration to determine the nature of the First Cause is the homogeneity of the effects. They all partake of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. The cause must also be of the same nature, i.e., constituted of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. The equipoise of these constituents is the *pradhāna*.¹

The state of equipoise is characteristic of Primal Nature both before creation and after destruction. The variegated world does not then exist. It must not, however, be thought that the period is one of non-activity. The *pradhāna* still functions, in the sense that each constituent is ceaselessly active within itself. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas do not blend as they do at creation.² Hence, two kinds of activity have to be recognised—that where each constituent functions in and by itself, and that where they combine in varying degrees of super-ordination and subordination.

The effects of this ceaseless modification are diverse. The diversity is due to varying relations of the respective constituents. The diversification is analogous to the process by which the water, which comes down as rain, becomes, in combination with different soils etc., the juice of the cocoanut, the myrobalan and so on, and acquires a variety of tastes, such as sweet, sour, etc., though this diversity was not present in it as rain-water.

The author next proceeds to demonstrate the existence of Spirit.

however, is the *ground* of the finite, not the *cause* thereof, arrived at inductively. The basing of the finite on the infinite follows as an inevitable postulate of reason, not as the conclusion of a reasoning process. Hence, in the last resort the Sāṅkhya demonstration here set forth partakes in a measure of the defects of Mill's famous attempt to establish inductively the postulate of induction.

1. Mahat is essentially *sāttvika*, though in any individual, it is *tāmāsa* or *rājasa*, until discriminative knowledge supervenes.

2. According to the interpretation of *STV* mentioned earlier, they do not exist even as Sattva, etc., but only as *guṇa-sāmyā-vasthā*, *guṇatvamātreṇa* 'vasthānam, na tu sāttvādi-viśeṣa-rūpeṇa (commentary on *kārikā* III).

सङ्घातपरार्थत्वात् , त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।

पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

XVII. *saṅghātaparārthatvāt,*

triguṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt ।

puruṣo 'sti, bhoktrbhāvāt,

kaivalyārtham pravṛtteś ca ॥

Spirit exists (as distinct from matter), since collocations serve a purpose of some (being) other than themselves, since this other must be the reverse of (what is composed of) the three constituents and so on, since there must be control (of the collocations), since there must be an enjoyer, and since there is activity for the purpose of release (from three-fold misery).

NOTES

It has been shown in *kārikā* XI that Primal Nature and its evolutes are composite in character, being of the nature of pleasure pain and indifference. Now, whatever is composite serves a purpose of some being other than itself, as, for instance, a bed or a seat. The grouping of the elements, here, is purposive, and the purpose is not that of the aggregate, but of another being. This being is Spirit. But a collocation may conceivably serve the purpose of another collocation. It need not be that this other is a simple spiritual entity. Any such supposition, however, leads to an infinite regress; for, that other collocation would itself serve the purpose of another, and so on endlessly. This other being cannot itself be an aggregate. Further, since all *Prakṛti* and its evolutes subserve that being, the latter must differ in essence from the former, that is to say, it cannot be composed of the three consti-

tuenents, it cannot be an object of experience and so on. This kind of being is called Spirit.¹

What is composed of the three constituents requires a controller, as the chariot requires a charioteer.² Hence, the existence of Spirit follows.

Again, pleasure and pain must affect a subject who feels them. They cannot affect intellect which, as an evolute of Prakṛti, is itself of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. Hence, Spirit must be recognised to exist as other than these and experiencing these. Indeed for any experience whatsoever, there must be an experiencing subject; and this is Spirit.³ Intellect etc., cannot function as the subject, they being objects, like other objects which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference.

1. "Triguṇādi-viparyayāt" is treated as an independent reason by Gauḍapāda, who explains it with reference to the statement in kārīkā XI, that Spirit is different from the unevolved, though yet like it. The interpretation suffers from this defect. The earlier statement is a bare description of the spirit. It is not an authoritative pronouncement nor is it a demonstration; and an appeal thereto in the present kārīkā would be futile. Vācaspati's way of taking it would thus seem to be preferable, and has been adopted in the translation and notes. According to this, we have here not an independent ground, but one which explicates and complements the conclusion drawn from "saṅghāta-parārthatvāt." The author of the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* has two separate sūtras "saṅghāta-parārthatvāt" and "triguṇādi-viparyayāt". This would appear to support Gauḍapāda's interpretation, which is also that of *Jaya*, and of *STV*; but the explanation given by *STV* is better; the denotation of the word "I" is not the body, since it is devoid of the three constituents, non-intelligence, etc.; aham-artha na dehaḥ, triguṇa-cetanatvādi-rahitatvāt.

2. The control is figurative, as otherwise agency would result for puruṣa who is claimed to be non-active; yathā puruṣārthaḥ siddhyati, tathā guṇaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvena vyūhyanta ity atastatpāratantryād eteṣāṃ adhiṣṭhitatvam upapadyate, puruṣasya cā 'dhiṣṭhātṛtvam; *YD*, p. 94.

3. Cf. Yadyapi duḥkha-yoga-rūpo bandho vṛtti-rūpau ca vivekā-vivekau cittasyaiva, tathāpi puruṣe duḥkha-pratibimba eva bhoga ity avastutve'pi tad-dhānam puruṣārthaḥ (*SPB*, I, 58). "Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not (really) an experiencer, still the assertion (in the aphorism) is made, because of the fact that the reflection of the Intellect befalls it" (*Ballantyne*, I, 143). It will be noted that

Further, Scripture promises release from misery and enjoins activity to that end. Sages following Scripture engage in such activity. All this would be fruitless if there were not a subject isolable from Primal Nature. The latter being essentially of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference cannot jump out of its own skin. The release promised and striven for must, if true, relate to an entity other than Nature, i.e., Spirit.¹

The next question is whether there is one Spirit or a plurality of them:

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

XVIII. *janana-maraṇa-karaṇānām*
pratiniyamād ayugapat-pravṛttes ca ।
puruṣa-bahutvam siddham,
traiguṇya-viparyayāc caiva ॥

The plurality of Spirits certainly follows from the distributive (nature of the) incidence of birth and death and of (the endowment of) the instruments (of cognition and action), from (bodies) engaging in action, not all at the same time, and also from differences in (the proportion of) the three constituents (in different entities, like sages, ordinary mortals and beast).²

all the proofs apply properly only to the empirical self, not to the Pure Spirit.

1. The pravṛtti is taken by *Jaya* and *YD* to be the functioning of Prakṛti towards liberation; such functioning would be obviously futile, if there were no Puruṣa. *STV* agrees with Vācaspati's interpretation adopted here.

2. Says *YD*: for each body, which is composed of three guṇas. etc., there is apprehended a counter-correlate puruṣa, free from the three guṇas, etc.; since the counter-correlate varies with the correlate, there must be as

NOTES

If there were only one Spirit, birth and death should be one for the whole universe. So too, if one person be blind or deaf, all others should be blind or deaf, and when one engages in activity, all others should engage in the same activity at the same time. We do see, however, that people are born and die at different times, are variously endowed and vary in their modes of activity. Hence, there must be a plurality of spirits. It must be noted that by birth and death we do not mean the coming into being or the destruction of Spirit itself, for that, being non-composite, is not subject to change. Birth is the association of spirits with bodies, death is their dissociation. It may be suggested that Spirit is one and that bodily changes alone constitute birth and death. This, however, will not hold water; for, then, we should have to say of a person who lost his hand that he is dead or of a girl physically maturing into womanhood that she is then born, as we have a loss of a physical form in the former case and the creation of one in the latter. Hence, birth and death consist in association with and dissociation from Spirit. Since they occur at different times in different places, there must be a plurality of spirits.¹

The properties of Spirit are next set forth:

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

XIX. *tasmāc ca viparyāsāt*

siddham, sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya ।

kaivalyam, mādhyaस्थ्यam,

draṣṭṛtvam, akartṛbhāvaś ca ॥

many puruṣas as there are bodies: p. 99. This has the merit of interpreting "viparyaya" in the same sense as in the vv. XIV, XVII, XIX (viparyāsa) etc.

1. The *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* make out that the Scriptural texts about the one Spirit refer to the class and not to the individuals, *nā'dvaitaśrutivirodho*

And from the contrast with that (which is composed of the three constituents etc.) there follows for the Spirit, the character of being a witness, freedom (from misery), neutrality, percipience and non-agency.

NOTES

The contrast is with the qualities enumerated in *kārikā* XI, as characteristic of the evolved and the unevolved.¹ All action belongs to these two. Spirit in itself is non-active. Being a disinterested by-stander, as it were, it is a witness like the arbitrator called upon to decide a dispute. *Kaivalya* is freedom from the three-fold misery; this is characteristic of Spirit, since it is not of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, *i.e.*, not composed of the three constituents. For this reason too, Spirit is neither elated nor depressed, but neutral. It is not an agent, since it is discriminated and non-productive unlike *Prakṛti* and its evolutes.

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

XX. *tasmāt tatsaṁyogād acetanam cetanāvad
iva liṅgam ।*

*guṇakartṛtve'pi² tathā karte' va bhavaty
udāsīnaḥ ॥*

jātiparatvāt (I, 154). Gauḍapāda, YD and Māṭhara read "janma" for "janana"; the former two take it in the same sense as "janana," while Māṭhara understands by it "caste or class of birth." Thus, if one were born a brahmin, all would be brahmins and so on. Paramārtha seems to read "janana" and this is how he explains it; (if the soul were but one) all the women in different countries would become pregnant at the same time; they would be confined at the same time; they would all have boys or all girls: *BFEO*, IV, 1004.

1. Because of that *viparyaya* mentioned in the preceding verse (*traiguṇya-viparyaya*), it follows that the various *guṇas* cannot be natural to Spirit; hence there is only *sākṣitva*; thus says *STV*.

2. "Ca": *STV*, YD.

Hence, from their association, the non-intelligent *līṅga* (comprising the intellect, individuation etc.) becomes intelligent, as it were; and so too, though agency is of the constituents, the indifferent one (the Spirit) becomes agent, as it were.

NOTES

The present verse seeks to explain the common appearance of the union of intelligence and activity in a single entity. This union cannot but be illusory, since the two belong to distinct entities, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. The illusory appearance is due to the association of the two. Such association is, of course, not a conjunction or intermingling of parts, the Spirit being impartible; it consists in the presence of the Spirit and the presentation of Nature to Spirit.¹

But if Spirit and Nature thus come together, it must be for the realisation of some purpose common to one or both of them. How this happens is stated in the next verse.

1. So says Vācaspati. But if mere presence can induce misconception, there would seem to be no possibility of release, since even on the attainment of what is called release, the *fitness* of *Puruṣa* to be affected by *Prakṛti* cannot cease; and, because of this fitness, *Puruṣa* will continue to be an agent and an enjoyer. Thus argues *Vijñānabhikṣu*, who contends that there is a real contact between *Puruṣa* and the modifications of *buddhi*, though the contact is such as does not induce any change in the *Puruṣa*. This hypothesis is not any more intelligible, for a relation that makes no change is a relation which does not relate. See further, Radhakrishnan, *IP*, II. 296-297, and Das Gupta, *HIP*, I, 224-225. *YD* distinguishes various kinds of *samyoga*, e.g. what results from the activity of one or both conjuncts, what comes from bare presence (as of *ākāśa* with other entities) and what is intended here, the purpose being explained in the next verse: pp. 105, 106.

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्गवन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥

XXI. *puruṣasya darśanārtham*¹
*kaivalyārtham*¹ *tathā pradhānasya* ।
paṅgav-andhavad ubhayor
api saṁyogas tatkrtaḥ sargaḥ ॥

The association of the two, which is like that of a lame man and a blind one, is for the (dual) purpose of Primal Nature being contemplated by the Spirit, and the release of the Spirit (from three-fold misery),² from this)association) creation proceeds.

1. YD: darśanārthaḥ kaivalyārthaḥ.

2. The text as it stands would seem to justify the translation "for the liberation of the pradhāna (from three-fold misery)." This is how Vijñāna Bhikṣu interprets the svārtham ca of *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* II, 1; *svasya pāramārthika-duḥkha-mokṣārtham* (for release from its own real misery; *real* as opposed to the misery of the Spirit which is but *reflected*). Ballantyne translates it thus: for the sake of removing the actually real pain (which consists) of itself. The words within brackets are not justified by the words of the commentator, though it is difficult to make the doctrine intelligible except by some such interpolation. The commentary of *STV* on this verse is extracted here in some detail.

puruṣasya prakṛti-vistāra-darśana-rūpa-bhogārtham, pradhānasya svaśodhanena tasyai 'va kaivalya-prāpanārtham ca paṅgav-andhavad ubhayor ubhayor api saṁyogaḥ, sammelanam bhavati.....andhasya gati-rodha-vyathā, paṅgoḥ dūrā 'darśana-vyathā ca nivṛttā. tathā andhā prakṛtiḥ dṛṣṭy-apekṣiṇī, paṅguḥ puruṣaḥ dūra-gaty-apekṣi; ubhayai-'ki-bhāvāt ubhaya-lopo 'pi gataḥ. gatiḥ-svabhāvā prakṛtiḥ yathe 'ṣṭam pariṇāmini sat gacchati; darśanaḥ-svabhāvaḥ pumān purā ātmānam ekam eva paśyan nitya-darśanād ātmani viraktaḥ ātmānam upekṣya prakṛti-darśitam indra-jālam paśyati. etad darśanam eva tasya bhogaḥ. oiro 'pekṣitam vismarann evā 'tma-rūpam pumān prakṛtyai 'ki-bhūya kartā svakṛta-karma-phalam anubhavati. evam anubhavan sadā 'pi bhukta eva punaḥ bhuñjānaḥ āvṛtṭya-virāma-nirviṇṇaḥ pumān sādhu-saṅgād utpanna-janma-kathantā-sambodho bhavati. tadanu guru-lābhādinaḥ utpannavivekaḥ

NOTES

Once Primal Nature is seen and realised as such by the Spirit, Nature's purpose ceases. This purpose is effected by making the Spirit enjoy. Thus, Nature is primarily an object of enjoyment for the Spirit. But at a later stage, when, through enjoyment, discriminative knowledge arises, Nature serves also to bring about the release of the Spirit from suffering.

The analogy employed—the partnership of the lame man and the blind one—is one of the most famous in Sāṅkhya literature. The lame man is of course, the Spirit, which can see, but cannot act of itself; the blind one is Nature, which can act, but cannot see, being non-intelligent (acetana).

This partnership between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is of itself the cause of the evolution of intellect, individuation etc., for, apart from such evolution, there can be neither enjoyment nor release.

The stages of this evolution are next described.

प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।

तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

XXII. *prakṛter mahāms tato 'haṅkāras tasmād
gaṇaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ ।
tasmād api ṣoḍaśakāt pañcabhyaḥ pañca-
bhūtāni ॥*

From Primal Nature proceeds the Great One (intellect), thence individuation, thence the aggregate of the sixteen and from five out of these sixteen, the five gross elements.

bhava-vaitaraṇim nistarati. yathā paṅgvor anya-dīrḡkṣā nivṛttāv-andha-skandhād avaruhya kevalī bhavati evaṃ puruṣasya bubhukṣā-nivṛttāu vivekāṭ kevalī bhavati ity etāvad api pratiyate. YD says: so yam puruṣasya dīrḡkṣā-nimittāḥ pradhānasya ca kaivalyāvādhi-paricchinnaḥ puruṣārthaḥ.

NOTES

The sixteen comprise the eleven indriyas (*i.e.*, the five organs of cognition, the five of action and the mind), and the five subtle elements (*tanmātras*). These subtle elements, in turn, produce the gross elements. Thus the subtle element of sound produces ether, in conjunction with the subtle element of touch it produces air. The former two *tanmātras* along with that of sight produce fire; the production of water and the earth are similarly explained. Each succeeding gross element has more properties than the preceding one, because of the larger number of *tanmātras* causing it.

Next comes a definition of intellect.

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

XXIII. *adhyavasāyo buddhir*
dharmo jñānam virāga aiśvaryam ।
sāttvikam etad-rūpam,
tāmasam asmād viparyastam ॥

Intellect is determinative. Virtue, wisdom, non-attachment, and the possession of lordly powers constitute its *sāttvika* form (*i.e.*, its form when the constituent *Sattva*, goodness, predominates); the reverse of these are of its *tāmasa* form (*i.e.*, of its nature, when *Tamas*, darkness, preponderates).

NOTES

The faculty that resolves upon a course of action is the intellect.¹ This it does, not in the light of its own intelligence, for it has none, but because of the proximity of intelligence, *i.e.* Spirit. In its *sāttvika* form, virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and power characterise it.

1. YD interprets "adhyavasāya" as ascertainment.

Virtue is that which leads to success in the world or prosperity hereafter. Wisdom is the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as other than the intellect. Non-attachment is of various grades. It may be at the rudimentary level of willing to control all desires or it may have advanced to the stage where some at least are controlled, while others yet distract the mind and delude the senses. A third stage is when the senses are controlled, but the mind alone continues to long for this or that. When desire completely ceases for the things whether of this world or of the next, then non-attachment is perfect. These four levels are called *yatamāna-saṃjñā*, *vyatireka-saṃjñā*, *ekendriya-saṃjñā*, and *vaśīkāra-saṃjñā* respectively.

Power such as that exercised by a superior being is of eight kinds: (1) *aṇimā*, the capacity to penetrate all things like an atom; (2) *laghimā*, lightness, such as will enable one to rise up on the rays of the sun; (3) *garimā*, extreme heaviness; (4) *mahimā*, extensive magnitude; (5) *prāptiḥ*, reach such that one can touch the moon with one's finger tip; (6) *prākāmyam*, obtaining all the objects of one's desire; (7) *vaśītvam*, subjugation of all elemental forces; (8) *yatra kāmāvasāyitvam*, infallibility of purpose, such as entertaining desires and purposes which come to be realised invariably.

To buddhi, in its *tāmāsa* aspect, pertain the reverse of the four dispositions, i.e., vice, ignorance, attachment, and absence of lordly powers.

The definition of individuation follows:

अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।

एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥

XXIV. *abhimāno' haṅkāraḥ,*
tasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ ।
ekādaśakaś ca gaṇaḥ,
tanmātraḥ pañcakaś caiva ॥

1. This reading follows the text of Gauḍapāda in preference to that of Vācaspati, which in some editions "tanmātrā" and in others "tanmātra".

Individuation is conceit (in the ego). Therefrom, creation proceeds in two ways, as the eleven-fold aggregate, and as the five-fold subtle elements.

NOTES

Conceit in the ego, of the from "I exist," "I know," "I have this or that duty to perform or abstain from," precedes determination and is the ground on which determination is based.

The eleven-fold aggregate is the set of eleven organs of cognition and action, including the mind. The tanmātras have already been referred to.

The precise stages of evolution from buddhi to the elements vary in different systems; and as will be seen from the tabular statements, they seem to vary even in different accounts of the Sāṅkhya system itself. The followers of the Yoga school would seem to hold that individuation and the subtle elements are co-ordinate evolutes from the intellect.¹

The former is difficult to construe and the latter is metrically defective. "Tanmātraḥ" should be understood in apposition with "gaṇaḥ", to be carried on from the third quarter of this kārīkā; tanmātraḥ pañcako gaṇaś ce 'ti: *STV*. It is worth noting that in almost every other context, *STV* uses the feminine form "tanmātrā". *YD* reads:

"aīndriya ekādaśakas

tanmātrapañcakaś caiva || "

1. See further *YD* (p. 103), Das Gupta, *HIP*, I. 225-226; *YS*, II, 19; *Tak. Tr.*, pp. 5, 6; *STV*, vv. xxii, xxv; the last named would derive karmendriyas from rājasā-ahāṅkāra, on the authority of the Bhāgavata, though in the other purāṇas, that mode of ahāṅkāra is said to be but an auxiliary to the two other modes: taijasād ubhayam.....tathā 'sti purāṇeṣu; bhāgavate tu rājasāt karmendriyāṇi 'ty asti; cf. also *The Maṇimēkalai account of the Sāṅkhya, Journal of Indian History*, Vol. VIII, part 3.

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः, स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

XXV *sāttvika ekādaśakah*
pravartate vaikṛtād ahaṅkārat ।
bhūtādes tanmātrah,¹ *sa*
tāmasah taijasād ubhayam ॥

From that form of individuation (which is known as) Vaikṛta proceeds the eleven-fold aggregate (of indriyas) characterised by Sattva, the subtle elements (proceed) from (that form known as) Bhūtādi; it is of the nature of Tamas (darkness); both (proceed) from (that form of individuation known as) Taijasa.

NOTES

Though individuation is a single principle, it gives rise to different kinds of evolutes, according to the domination of Sattva or Tamas. There is a certain degree of dominance of Rajas in either case, as there can be no activity otherwise. Once the activity is thus originated, the form of the evolute is dependent on the dominant constituent. When Sattva predominates the eleven organs appear; the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) when Tamas predominates. It must not be thought that the constituent Rajas has no function, since no specific result follows from its dominance; for, it is the root of the origination of the *sāttvika* and *tāmasa* evolutes. If Sattva and Tamas are the material causes of these evolutes, Rajas is their efficient cause.²

The names Vaikṛta, Bhūtāli and Taijasa are suggestive. The first means the basis of the evolutes, the second the originatory of

1. YD: *tānmātrah*.

2. In the evolution of the vaikṛta, the tāmasa functions as the factor of differentiation; so does the sāttvika in the evolution of the bhūtādi; for, each by itself, even when aided by taijasa, cannot differentiate itself, any more than water mixed with water or fire with fire; YD, p. 116.

the elements, the third that which is bright and fiery. The qualities and functions of the different modes are thus indicated by their names. It is interesting to note the suggestion of Gauḍa-pāda in his commentary that the first of all the elements is darkness; it is thus fitting that individuation as characterised by darkness should be the cause of the tanmātras. The notion of primal darkness prior to creation is, of course, common to the Upaniṣads; cf., the Śvetāśvatara hymn "yadā tamas tan na divā na rātriḥ, na san na cāsat, śiva eva kevalaḥ (Śvet., IV, 18) when there was primal darkness, there was neither day nor night, neither existence nor non-existence, but the pure Śiva alone."

The ten organs of sense and action are next enumerated

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुः श्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान् कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

XXVI. *buddhī-'ndriyāṇi cakṣuḥ*
śrotra-ghrāṇa-rasana-tvag-ākhyāni ¹
vāk-pāṇi-pāda-pāyū
'pasthān karme-'ndriyāṇy āhuḥ ॥

Eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin are called organs of cognition, voice, hands, feet, and the organs of excretion and generation are said to be the organs of action.

NOTES

The verse is self-explanatory. The common feature of these organs is that individuation as characterised by Sattva is their material cause. They have also another common feature in that they serve as marks wherewith to infer the percipient subject (the soul), who is referred to as Indra; the mark (or liṅga) of the presence of Indra (the soul) is Indriya.

The nature of the mind is next described.

1. For 'tvag ākhyāni', Gauḍapāda and *STV* read "sparśanakāni"; *YD* reads "kaṇṇa-tvak-cakṣu-rasana-nāsikākhyāni" and "upasthāṇi."

उभयात्मकमत्र मनः सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ॥ १७ ॥

XXVII. *ubhayātmakam atra manah,
saṅkalpakam indriyam ca sādharmyāt ।
guṇapariṇāmaviśeṣān
nānātvam bāhyabhedāś ca¹ ॥*

Among these, the mind is of the nature of both (organs, cognitive and active); it is explicative, it is also an indriya because of community of nature (with other indriyas); from specific modifications of the constituents proceed diversity, (as do) differences of external form.

NOTES

The mind (*manas*) is an organ both of cognition and action, as seen from its function. *Saṅkalpa* has been differently understood by the commentators *Gauḍapāda* and *Vācaspati Mīśra*. The former takes it that the mind intends the functioning of both sets of organs, that this intention is *saṅkalpa* and that thus mind has a function common to both sets of organs. *Vācaspati*'s interpretation is more interesting. He contends that the senses of cognition of themselves apprehend objects vaguely and indefinitely. This apprehension is called *ālocana* or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The mind supervenes on this, analyses it, explicates what is implied,

1. *Mādhara* reads "grāhyabhedāc ca, and because of differences in what is apprehended." This makes better sense. The same sense seems to be conveyed by the Chinese translation: see *BFEO* IV, 1012. *M. Takakusu* takes *Gauḍapāda* to read "bāhya bhedāc ca." The following is the explanation of the second line, according to *STV*: *guṇānām puruṣārtha-kṛta-pariṇāma-viśeṣāt nānātvam.....yathā yathā pariṇāme puruṣasyā 'rthaḥ sādhitō bhavati, tathā tathā guṇāḥ pariṇāmam bhajante; tena etāvanto vikṛti-bhedā jātāḥ*. *YD* (p. 118) adopts the same reading as *Bhaṭṭotpala* (see Appendix), but explains "saṅkalpa" as "desire (*icchā*)", which cannot be a function of the other indriyas, individually or collectively.

distinguishes between substance and attribute, the *that* and the *what* and makes clear what was before vague. This is also perception. In support of this theory he cites some purāṇic texts. The theory is attractive; and as Vācaspati's commentary has been relied on for the most part in the present translation, the word *saṅkalpaka* has been rendered as explicative, not merely reflective; the latter rendering does not bring out the full force of the word, as understood by Vācaspati. Wilson in his comment on this *kārikā*, notes Vācaspati's remarks, but fails to note the difference between his interpretation and Gauḍapāda's. Nor does Wilson mention the fact that Vijñāna Bhikṣu does not recognise the variety of perception known as *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. One may be permitted to doubt whether the authority cited by Vācaspati supports his own interpretation. According to him the mind explicates what is indeterminate;¹ it does not add to the given material. But the verses cited by Vācaspati would suggest that forms and qualifications are created or added to the original perception by the mind. The two doctrines are distinct and have different implications. It would be interesting to know which is Vācaspati's real understanding of the Sāṅkhya doctrine.

Saṅkalpa, understood in either way, is the differentia of the mind. The mind is also an *indriya* like the ten others, inasmuch as it is also generated by that form of the principle of individuation which is *sāttvika*.

The one principle (*sāttvika ahaṅkāra*) is able to generate such a variety of organs, because of specific variations in the modifications of the constituents—*Sattva* and so on, in dependence on auxiliaries like unseen potentiality etc. Each constituent may predominate or be subordinate and that in varying degrees. Such differences are at the root of differences in the organs just as they are responsible for the diversity of external objects. The clause "also differences of external form" is introduced only to serve as an illustration.²

The distinctive functions of the sense-organs are next enumerated.

1. *Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvena vivecayati*.

2. The second half of the verse thus states what *YD* has introduced into the commentary on v. XXV.

शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।

वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

XXVIII. *śabdādiṣu¹ pañcānām*
ālocana-mātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ ।
vacanā'dāna-viharaṇo-
'tsargā-'nandāś ca pañcānām ॥

Bare awareness, in respect of sound etc., is acknowledged to be the function of five (organs of cognition) while of the five (organs of action, the functions are) speech, grasping, motion, excretion and sexual enjoyment.

NOTES

Determinate perception has been said to be a function of the mind which is the eleventh indriya, hence, the other organs of cognition have only the function of indeterminate awareness. This lack of determinateness is indicated by the word bare (mātra) in bare awareness (ālocana-mātram). Gauḍapāda, however, takes the qualification to show that each organ of cognition functions in respect of only one object; thus the eye can see colour, but cannot hear sounds, and so on. This is rather feeble; a confusion of the kind excluded is hardly likely to arise; and the exclusion is needed, if at all, in the case of the organs of action as well.² In the cir-

1. Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara read "rūpādiṣu" for "śabdādiṣu," see also *YD*, p. 121.

2. The author of *STV*, following Bhikṣu as he does, does not recognise indeterminate perception. His explanation of "mātra" in this verse is original. *Ālocana* means only "seeing" and that is a function of one sense-organ alone; hence in speaking of all the senses, the word "mātra" in the sense of "entirety" is used to signify awareness in general, not merely seeing; *ālocana-mātram*; *loca-darśane, darśanam, jñaptiḥ. mātrapadena pañcā-'nugata-sāmānye rūpa-'ābhaḥ, tenadarśanami ti cākṣuṣa-jñapti-mātra-pracura-prayoga-kṛta-viśeṣa-pratiti-nivṛtiḥ, pañcā-'nugatam ālocanam hi jñapti-mātratva eva siddham bhavati, na tu cākṣuṣatve ata ālocanam iti jñāna-mātra-paratā vivakṣitā.*

cumstances, Vācaspati's interpretation is distinctly superior; and thus, we have an indirect support for his distinction between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception.¹

Intellect, individuation and the mind constitute the internal organs (antaḥ-karāṇa), as compared with the ten indriyas (other than the mind) which are external organs. The distinctive function of each of those three has been already mentioned. The next verse proceeds to state what function is common to them all.

स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

XXIX. *svālakṣaṇyam vṛttis*
trayaśya sai 'śā bhavaty asāmānyā ।
sāmānya-karāṇa-vṛttiḥ
prāṇādyā vāyavaḥ pañca ॥

What is definitive (of each) of the three, is the function (of each);² this is not common (to all); the

1. It may be noted that *Jaya*, which too understands by "ālocanamātram" only "bare awareness," contrasts this with the function, not of *manas* but *buddhi*. *Paramārtha* seems to waver between two senses of "ālocana-mātram." The verse is translated thus: "The function of the five organs of perception is only to perceive objects, colours, etc."; or it may mean "to perceive only (i.e.) uniquely, objects, colours, etc." The commentary runs thus: "The eyes do but see forms and that is the function of the eyes. It is only a perception incapable of discernment or handling. The other organs too act only on their respective objects." In the second of these sentences perception is contrasted with discernment (the function of the *manas*); in the next sentence, however, perceptions are contrasted among themselves in respect of their objects: see *BFEO*, IV, 1014. *YD* distinguishes between "grahāṇa," the function of the senses (consisting in taking on the form of the object in contact), and "pratyaya," the cognitive function of the *antaḥkarāṇa*, expressed in such forms as "This is a cow"; sense-cognition is not determinative (*vyavasāyaka*) and cannot be treated as of the specific alone or the generic alone: pp 121, 122.

2. Since a definition through what they are is difficult if not impossible,

(circulation of the) five vital airs, *i e.*, *prāṇa* and the rest is the common function of the (internal) organs.

NOTES

The distinctive functions are determination (for the intellect), self-consciousness (for individuation), and explication (for the mind). The common functions are the circulation of the five forms of vital air—*prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, *udāna*, *samāna* and *vyāna*. They exist when the internal organs exist, and when these cease to be, they also cease to be. The following extract from Gauḍapāda's commentary is very informing, about the nature and the functions of the different vital airs: "The air, for instance, called *prāṇa* is that which is perceptible in the mouth and nostrils, and circulation is the common function of the thirteen kinds (of instruments): that is, where there is breath, the organs acquire (are connected with) soul (they become living). Breath, like a bird in a cage, gives motion (vitality) to the whole. It is called *prāṇa*, 'breath' or 'life' from 'breathing.' From carrying downwards (*apanayana*) the air *apāṇa* is so named; the circulation of which, also, is the common function of the organs. *Samāna* is so named from conducting equally (*samanayana*) the food etc., (through the frame). It is situated in the central part of the body, and its circulation is the common function of the instruments. The air *udāna* is denominated from ascending, or from drawing or guiding best (*un-nayana*). It is perceptible in the space between the navel and the head, and the circulation that it has is the common function of the organs. Lastly the air by which internal division and diffusion through the whole body is effected is called *vyāna* from its pervading (*vyāpti*) the body like the etherial element. The circulation of that also, is the common function of the assemblage of the organs"¹ (*SKG*, Wilson's

in the case of what are extremely subtle, what they do is itself made to serve as definition: *YD*, p. 124.

1. The explanation in *YD* is interesting (a) for its exposition of the superior strength of each succeeding *prāṇa* to its predecessor in the list, and (b) for distinguishing and exemplifying a functioning in the outside world (*bahirvṛtti*) for each vital air; examples of the *bahirvṛtti* of *prāṇa* are sighing with grief, inhaling a delicious fragrance, the contented snort of a buffalo on entering water: pp. 125-127.

Translation, p. 103). As has been noticed by Wilson (*Ibid.*) there is a difference between Gauḍapāda's doctrine and that of the kārīkā as interpreted by Vācaspati. The latter holds that the circulation of the vital airs is the function only of the internal organs, while the former would assign the same function to all the thirteen organs—internal and external—taken collectively. The *Jayamaṅgalā* agrees with Gauḍapāda's view, while Vijñāna Bhikṣu agrees with Vācaspati (*SPB*, II, 31) ¹

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।

दृष्टे तथाप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

XXX. *yugapac catuṣṭayasya tu*
vṛttiḥ kramaśaś ca tasya nirdiṣṭā ।
dr̥ṣṭe. tathā 'py adr̥ṣṭe
trayasya tatpūrvikā vṛttiḥ ॥

In the case of what is present to preception, the functioning of the four (the three internal organs and an organ of the outer sense) is said to be either simultaneous or successive; so too, in the case of what is not present to perception, (where) the functioning of the three (internal organs) is preceded by that (*viz.*, cognition of what is present to perception).

NOTES

An example of simultaneous functioning is the recognition of a tiger or cobra revealed by a flash of lightning and the instantaneous flight consequent thereon. The stages of the indeterminate per-

1. It is curious to note that Mādhava, who holds the circulation of the vital airs to be the function of all the thirteen organs, yet explains "sāmānyakaraṇa" as "samastasya antaḥ-karaṇasya." *STV* follows Bhikṣu: prāṇo nāma nā 'sti karaṇā-'ntaram, api tu buddhy-ahāṅkāra-manasām yā sādharāṇī vṛttiḥ sai 'va prāṇa-saṁcāraḥ.

ception, the explication thereof, the reference of it to the Self and the determination to act in this or that way may be analysed by reflective thought at a later stage, but the situation itself seems to be simple and instantaneous. The frightened man clears off at one bound. The modern psychologist would find it difficult to accept the doctrine that all the processes take place at the same instant of time, though he is bound to recognise their occurring so closely together as to give rise to the impression of simultaneity. However that may be, there is no doubt that for the Sāṅkhya philosopher,¹ the functioning is simultaneous. An instance of successive functioning would be the indistinct perception in twilight of a tall vertical object, the doubt followed by a recognition of that as a human being, the reference of that to the Self, and determination to meet and to talk to the man or to turn and walk away from him. The conditions of perception do not favour instantaneous recognition; hence the successive functioning of the several organs.

Where the cognition is of what is not present to perception, say of the past or the future, only the internal organs function; but their functioning is necessarily on a prior cognition of what is present to perception. The past cannot be cognised except on the basis of what was once perceived as present. Or, as Gauḍapāda says, in the case of the remembered past (as also the inferred future), there is successive functioning of the external organ and the internal organs; "for instance, in respect of colour, the functioning of three (internal organs) is preceded by that of the sense of sight; in respect of touch, it is preceded by the (functioning of intelligent agents. What is distinctive is not the presence of the sense of touch." But at the moment of such cognition the external organ does not function. That is why Vācaspati says "with regard to imperceptible things, on the other hand, the internal organs operate without the aid of the external organ."

1. Not, however, in the view of YD according to which simultaneous functioning is a *prima facie* notion entertained by the inquirer or by earlier teachers of the Sāṅkhya; Īśvara Kṛṣṇa refutes it in "kramaśāś ca," where "ca" has the sense of "eva": p. 130.

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
 पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

XXXI. *svām svām pratipadyante*
parasparā-’ kūta-hetukām vṛttim ।
puruṣārtha eva hetur
na kenacit kāryate karaṇam ॥

(The organs, external and internal) discharge their respective functions, prompted by mutual impulsion; the goal of the Spirit is alone the cause; by nothing else is any instrument actuated.

NOTES

The plurality of the organs might make one doubt whether there is not the need for a directive principle organising and controlling them. The present *kārikā* dispels that doubt.¹ An army of different kinds of units, cavalry, infantry and artillery is actuated by one end, the defeat of the enemy. In working to that end, each unit carries on the fighting in the manner to which it is trained and for which it is fitted. The impulse of each towards the end *fits in*²

1. The subject is treated in *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III, 55-57, where another question is incidentally raised and disposed of. Nature is devoted to the Spirit's *summum bonum* though not otherwise constrained to act. By her activity the Spirit becomes omniscient and omnipotent. If you say these attributes would make a lord (*Īśvara*) of the released Spirit, such an emergent *Īśvara*, we reply, is not unacceptable to us. *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* has an alternative interpretation of *Sūtras* 56 and 57. The *Puruṣa* is omniscient and omnipotent, since he sets Nature in action by his mere presence. Such a being who induces activity by bare presence may be thought to be an *Īśvara*. Such an *Īśvara* is not unacceptable either to the *Sāṅkhya* or to *Scripture*.

2. It is not the case that the purpose of any one determines that of any other. That is why *STV* in explaining “*parasparā-kūta-hetukām*” says “*parasparasya ākūtam, abhiprāyaḥ, hetur iva yasyāḥ, tām.*” Not even the knowledge of the purpose is the determinant, since cognition belongs only to *antaḥkaraṇa* and not to hearing etc.; hence, what know-

with the similar impulse of every other unit and the result is a glorious fight. Nor is such co-operation limited to the case of intelligent agents. What is distinctive is not the presence of intelligence in the units but the impulsion in different ways to a common end. Granted the end, the admission of any other directive or controlling agency is superfluous and ruled out by the law of parsimony (*laghavanyāya*).

The goal of the Spirit is, of course, release from three-fold misery, secured after enjoyment and *viveka*.

करणं त्रयोदशविधम्, तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।

कार्यं च तस्य दशधाहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

XXXII. *karaṇam trayodaśavidham,*

tad-āharaṇa dhāraṇa-prakāśakaram ।

kāryam ca tasya daśadhā

'hāryam dhāryam prakāśyam ca ॥

Instruments are of thirteen varieties; they function by grasping, sustaining and disclosing; their objects (which are of the nature of) what is grasped, sustained or disclosed are ten-fold.

NOTES

The thirteen instruments are the ten external and the three internal organs. Of the former, the organs of cognition disclose objects; those of action grasp them. The internal organs maintain life, because the circulation of the vital airs is their conjoint function. By grasping is meant pervasion, not the act of taking hold

ledge is attributed is only figurative (*upacārāt*); or else, when a sense-organ functions in respect of its own object the *antaḥkaraṇa* cognising thereby desires to cognise another concomitant object as well; because of contact with the mind so desirous, the corresponding sense begins to function in respect of those other objects: *YD*, p. 132.

of the things perceived. Thus speech is pervaded by voice and so on. The objects are ten-fold *in each case*; the objects of the organs of cognition are sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. Each of these has two forms—a divine (*divya*) and a non-divine (*adivya*) form; of these, we have, thus, ten varieties. So too we have ten varieties of the objects of the organs of action, each object having a *divya* and an *adivya* form. In the case of the organs of sustenance, the body so sustained is five-fold being made up of the five elements; since each of these elements has two forms, *divya* and *adivya*, the object sustained is also ten-fold.¹

1. This is not the explanation adopted by Gaudapāda. As Wilson says (*SKG*, Translation, p. 111), this commentator believes the circulation of the vital airs to be the function of all the thirteen organs. He evidently takes the word ten-fold to refer to the ten functions of the organs of cognition and action, no distinction being made between *divya* and *adivya* forms. This has the merit of looking simple and attractive, but it leaves many difficulties unsolved. The ten functions would be grouped under grasping and disclosing; the function of sustenance would count as five if the five-fold air is thought of, or at least as one, if the body as a whole is thought of; the total in either case, would be eleven or fifteen, not ten. This difficulty is ignored by Mādhava and Paramārtha. An esteemed friend sends the following suggestion: "By āharaṇa I would understand collection of the sensations, by dhāraṇa, retention, and by prakāśa interpretation, manifestation of meaning. It may sound a bit Kantian, but the meaning flows so naturally out of the three words!..... According to my interpretation, the three kinds of function would not represent the respective functions of the three kinds of indriyas, but general collective description of the functions of the Indriyas. Again, I would reject the mythical interpretation of the ten objects of the indriyas, as *divya* and *adivya* in favour of a more direct and modern (but not forced) interpretation. I believe that the author of the *kārikā* admitted even the *karmendriyas* to be yielding some experiences (elements of knowledge) also like the *jñānendriyas*. The ten objects are in my view the ten different kinds of sense-experiences obtained by the functioning of the ten indriyas. I believe this is the reason why the author traces the origin of even the *karmendriyas* from the *sāttvika* form of *ahaṅkāra*. If they did not help manifestation or yield any element of knowledge, they would rather be derived from the *rājasa* form, as is done by some. The five kinds of experiences yielded by the movement of the five motor organs, as they perform activities, would come under sensations of the proprioceptive kind (as distinguished from those of the interoceptive and exteroceptive classes)." In the first part of this suggestion there is the difficulty as to what is meant by retention. The retention of what is acquired is surely not explained by any Indian

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधम्, दशधा बाह्यं तस्य विषयाख्यम् ।

साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

XXXIII. *antaḥkaraṇam trividham,*

daśadhā bāhyam trayasya viṣayā-'khyam ।

sāmprata-kālam bāhyam,

trikālam ābhyantaram karaṇam ॥

The internal organ is of three kinds; the external (organs) which make known objects to (those) three, are ten-fold; the external (organ functions) in the present; an internal organ (functions in respect of all) three times.

NOTES

The external senses are the channels whereby enters the material whereon the inner organs work through explication etc. An external organ functions only in respect of time present; by

psychologist as the function of an indriya. Again, the description could not apply as a whole to all the organs, nor could different parts of it apply to different organs; manifestation would be a function of all the organs; collection would describe the function only of the external organs of sense and action; it is not known of what organs retention is a function. The second part of the suggestion is interesting, but hardly definite. What is the object cognised through organs of action? Is it kinaesthesia? The assignment of the organs of action to sāttvika ahaṅkāra no doubt requires explanation, but the present suggestion is not quite convincing. The treatment of the verse by STV is not without interest. Dhāraṇa is not sustaining the body, but fixing, "retaining" what has been grasped; the organs of action both grasp and sustain; harati vacanam vāk, dhārayati ca. The organs of action have five objects, in relation to which they have five kāryas; so have the organs of sense; the internal organs relate to the inner aspect of these ten and thus have ten objects. It will be seen that this does not solve the difficulties noted in Gauḍapāda's commentary. Its value such as it lies in the avoidance of the distinction of divya and adivya, and in the meaning assigned to dhāraṇa, which so closely resembles that mentioned above as the suggestion of a friend. YD understands by 'dhāraṇa' the pervasion of sense-objects by the sense-organs; and it recognises a division of objects into viśeṣa and aviśeṣa, not into divya and adivya, though perhaps aviśeṣa may be assimilated to divya since it can be perceived only by divine beings, sages, etc.

this, of course, is meant not a bare point of time, but the present including a part of the immediately past and the immediately future. A bare *now* can never be comprehended.

The inner senses function even with reference to the past or future, as when we realise that there has been rain, because the river is overflowing, or that there will be rain because the peacocks are seen to get excited and scream; they apply to the present too, whether we see fire or infer it.

Vācaspati explains here why the Sāṅkhya does not recognise time as an independent category. Even if we do recognise it, as the Naiyāyikas do, we have to recognise three varieties of it, past, present and future; and to explain these, we have to look to something other than time itself. It would be simpler to recognise and deal with these defining conditions, instead of postulating a superfluous entity called time.¹

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।

वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ६४ ॥

XXXIV. *buddhī-'ndriyāṇi teṣām*
pañca viśeṣā-'viśeṣa-viṣayāṇi ।
vāg bhavati śabda-viṣayā,
śeṣāṇi tu² pañca-viṣayāṇi ॥

Of these, the five organs of cognition have objects, specific and non-specific (*i.e.*, gross and subtle); speech

1. That is to say, there are *times*, but no *time*; and the *times* like *spaces* are the products of ākāśa, *i.e.*, cosmic ether or space (not the evolute of that name: see Stcherbatsky, *La Theorie de la Connaissance et la Logique chez les Bouddhistes Tardifs* 16). of YD: na hi naḥ kālo nāma kiñcid asti; kim tarhi? kriyamāṇa-kriyāṇām evā 'dityagati-godoha-ghanastanitādinām.

2. YD: api.

has sound (alone) for its object; as for the rest (of the organs of action), they have the five for their objects.

NOTES

The organs of cognition apprehend both the gross and the subtle elements (the mahā-bhūtas and the tanmātras). This does not, however, happen in the case of all, for the senses only of gods and sages can perceive the subtle elements.¹ Our senses help us to cognise the gross elements alone.

The organ of speech has the function of producing sound alone; sound is what is produced thereby. What is referred to here is, of course, gross sound, not the tanmātra which is not the object of an organ of action.

The other organs of action relate to various objects which are compounded out of the five elements in different proportions. The gross elements, ether, air, fire, water, and earth, do not barely corres-

1. This might be the case, says *STV*, if the difference between the tanmātras and mahābhūtas were one of degree alone, not of kind. As it is, no authority can be traced for this position that tanmātras can be perceived by divine beings, etc.; *viśeṣa-viśeṣa-viśayāni* is therefore interpreted as *sāmānya-viśeṣa-viśayāni*. The interpretation of the second line is even more interesting, avoiding, as it does, the difficulties of *pañcīkaraṇa*: the first line having disposed of the organs of sense, the rest, the motor organs are said to have five objects, viz., speech, grasping etc.; of these, speech is mentioned specially since it has apparently the same content as an organ of sense: *śeṣāni, karmendriyāṇi. tu vacanā-dāna-gamano-'tsargā-nanda-rūpa-kriyā-pañcaka-viśayāni; evam sati vāg eva ekā vacana-kriyā-viśayā sati śrotra-viśayam śabdāni viśayi-karoti*. Difference of function dependent on difference of agent is recognised for the buddhindriyas, not for karmendriyas, by *YD* (p. 135); speech manifests sound alone in five ways, *varṇa, pada, vākya, śloka* and *grantha*; the rest operate on forms which are aggregates of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell; but they function even in respect of smaller aggregates, e.g., water, which is an aggregate of four alone; the mention of five is to show the possibility of operating on five, not to exclude aggregates of two, three or four. In the light of this, some statements in earlier editions, about *pañcīkaraṇa*, have had to be changed. This provides also the answer to Prof. Har Dutta Sarma's query in his notes to v. XXXIV (*Tattvakaumudī*, 1934).

pond to the respective tanmātras; as explained earlier, each succeeding gross element in the list is caused by a larger number of tanmātras; earth is caused by all five. Hence, Vācaspati Miśra says: "they have the five for their object, because pitchers, etc., grasped by the hands and so on, are of the nature of the five, i.e., sound and so on."¹ Gauḍapāda's interpretation is not clear. He says "sound and the other four objects of perception belong to all the other organs; for there may be sound, touch, form, taste and smell in the hands; the foot treads upon the earth, of which sound and the rest may be characteristic" and so on (SKG, p. 114). The question is not what the hands have, but what they can grasp; and they certainly do not grasp sound.² If it be said, however, that into whatever is grasped sound (i.e., the gross element, ether) enters as a constituent, then we have the doctrine of quintuplication, according to which every element enters in some measure into everything that is. The explanation given by YD is noteworthy, since it avoids this difficulty: sambhāvanārtham api pañca-viśayāṇy etāni, prāg eva catus-triṣayāṇi 'ti.

It is next shown that some of the thirteen organs are dominant over the others.

1. Wilson both mistranslates and misunderstands the passage. See SKG, p. 115.

2. Māṭhara seems to achieve a little more clarity. He says that the hands are composed of (or endowed with) śabda, sparśa, rasa, rūpa and gandha. The organ of the hand thus possessed of five characteristics, grasps the pitcher which it comes in contact with and which is possessed of the five qualities. How the karmendriya comes to be endowed with the five qualities is a difficult question to answer. Paramārtha who seems to adopt the same view as Māṭhara does not have to meet this difficulty, since for him the jñānendriyas and the karmendriyas evolve out of the subtle elements (BEFO, IV, 933, 939). Such an answer is not available for Māṭhara. One wonders if there was present to the minds of the Sāṅkhya theorists any doctrine of the karmendriyas as composite functions of the jñānendriyas. Such a view seems to be barely countenanced by one interpretation of a phrase in the *Mañimākalai* account of the Sāṅkhya. Further, in commenting on verse 26, Paramārtha says of each of the organs of action that it fulfils its functions united to the organs of sense (BEFO, IV, 1012). This is not very helpful, since the union is mentioned in the case of speech too, though it functions only in respect of sound.

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि , द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

XXXV. *sāntaḥkaraṇā buddhiḥ*
sarvam viṣayam avagāhate yasmāt
tasmāt trividham karaṇam
dvāri dvārāṇi śeṣāṇi ॥

For the reason that the intellect with the (other) internal organs ascertains (the nature of) all objects (of sense), the internal organs are the principal (ones), while the rest (of the organs) are the entrances (thereto).

NOTES

The dvāri is that to which the others are doors; it is the principal to which others are subordinates.¹ The word has been inadequately translated as "warder" by Colebrooke, Wilson, Davies and Jha.²

1. Compare *Jaya*, which says that these have five channels, "dvārāṇy asya santiti." "The three internal organs master the doors, the ten external organs being the doors"; so says Paramārtha (*BFEO*, IV, 1021). There is no necessity to take "śeṣāṇi" to mean the motor organs as well. Such an interpretation, however, seems to have been common. And the *Candrikā* raises the question how the karmendriyas can be channels and answers that they too can be of use, in the functioning of the antaḥkaraṇa, through the buddhindriyas. *YD* stresses the word 'all' and says; anyataviṣayo dvāri, niyata-viṣayāṇi dvārāṇi. The internal organs function in respect of *all* objects, without restriction of gross or subtle, proximate or remote. As those, who can move without restriction, may enter a mansion by any gate, so are the internal organs, dvāri's; the approach of the others is restricted to specific routes and entrances; p. 133.

2. Dr. Har Dutt Sharma considers that rendering adequate, since the internal organ does not retain the percepts for itself, but passes them on to the Spirit; it is really not the principal one. There is some justification for this position. But the word "principal" would appear to have the sanction of Vācaspati, who says: "'dvāri,' pradhānam." This was the real authority for my translation, not the *Jaya*, though its support is also cited. See *HDS*, Notes, p. 37.

The dvāri is that to which channels lead, the principal entity (faculty, in this case) to which all others bring their contributions. The senses perceive objects indeterminately and bring such percepts to the mind, which synthesises them and takes them to individuation; this faculty refers percepts to the Self, and as objects of self-consciousness they come before buddhi which ascertains their nature. The process is compared by Vācaspati to that of the village accountant collecting taxes from the householder and remitting them to the mayor, who in turn remits them to the governor, who looks to their reaching the King's treasury.

Buddhi, as the determinative faculty, is the most important of all these organs, as is made clear in the next two verses.

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।

कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाशय बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

XXXVI. *ete pradīpa-kalpāḥ*

paraspara-vilakṣaṇā guṇa-viśeṣāḥ ।

kṛtsnam puruṣayā 'rtham

prakāśya buddhau prayacchanti ॥

(The external organs, the manas and the ahaṅkāra) these mutually distinct specifications of the (three) constituents, comparable (in their functioning) to a lamp, disclosing the goal of the Spirit in its entirety, present it to the intellect.

NOTES

The manner in which the other organs are subordinate to the intellect has been already illustrated by the analogy of tax-collection.

The lamp analogy is to explain how mutually distinct and conflicting elements may co-operate towards a common end—the goal of the Spirit.

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।

सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

XXXVII. *sarvam praty upabhogam*

yasmāt puruṣasya sādhayati buddhiḥ ।

sai'va ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ

pradhāna-puruṣā-'ntaram sūkṣmam ॥

(The material worked up by the other organs is presented to the intellect) for the reason that the intellect brings about the enjoyment of the Spirit in respect of all (things) and it is that (intellect) itself, which, further, reveals the subtle difference between Primal Nature and Spirit.

NOTES

The above translation follows the commentary of Vācaspati, according to whom the present verse is directed to show the superiority of the intellect over the other internal organs. This superiority is based on two grounds constituting the dual function of the intellect—the provision both of enjoyment and of the means of liberation, for the Spirit. The former is effected through sense-objects, the latter through inculcating the difference between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The difference is not made, but revealed by the intellect. On the former alternative, impermanence of release would result, since whatever is made is impermanent.

When the other organs contribute their own share of work, how can the intellect claim the sole credit for bringing about enjoyment? For answer, Vācaspati refers us to the analogy of the governor, mayor and so on. When the governor goes to war, each village and town sends its quota of men; but they all merge into the governor's army and function as that army. So too the contributions of the other organs merge into that of buddhi.

Gauḍapāda goes in for a simpler explanation of the verse, wherein the first line mentions the ground of the second. Buddhi

is able to reveal the subtle difference, only because it has brought about the enjoyment of the Spirit. Such an interpretation would be quite in consistency with Sāṅkhya doctrine, according to which Prakṛti retires from the stage after fully displaying herself, because she has been seen by Puruṣa and she will no longer expose herself to his view; and this retirement, consequent on the display, is liberation. Such a sense would require a *tasmāt* (therefore) to correspond with the *yasmāt* (for the reason etc.) in the first line; the requisite word is supplied by Gauḍapāda in his commentary. Taking the *kārikā*, as it stands, Gauḍapāda's explanation would seem to be more satisfactory than Vācaspati's.¹

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः, तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चम्यः ।

एते स्मृता विशेषाः, शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

XXXVIII. *tanmātrāṇy² aviśeṣāḥ,*
tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ ।
ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ,
śāntā ghorāś ca mūḍhāś ca ॥

The subtle elements are non-specific; from those five (proceed) the five gross elements; these are known as specific, (being variously) tranquil, terrific and delusive.

NOTES

The subtle elements are not cognisable by us with our limited faculties; their distinctions, thus, not being perceived by us, they

1. YD takes the first line to show the superiority of the intellect, since that alone is definitive, and no enjoyment is possible in the absence of definiteness; the second line answers the doubt whether some other instrument is not needed for the very different function of discriminating spirit from matter.

2. YD explains the term "tanmātra" as signifying absence of species: *tasya tasya guṇasya sāmānyam eva 'tra na viśeṣa iti*.

are non-specific.¹ The gross elements, however, are perceived as distinct being possessed of different qualities, according to the prominent constituent—Sattva, Rajas or Tamas. They are thus specific.

A further division of the specific is now made:

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सहप्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।

सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियताः, मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

XXXIX. *sūkṣmā mātā-pitrjāḥ*
saha prabhūtais tridhā viśeṣāḥ syuḥ ।
sūkṣmās teṣāṃ niyatāḥ,
mātā-pitrjā nivartante ॥

The specific is three-fold, as subtle (bodies), as (gross bodies) born of parents, and as the great elements. Of these, the subtle (bodies) are constant, (while bodies) born of parents perish.

NOTES

Of the non-intelligent universe there are two broad divisions—one proximate to intelligence and appearing like intelligence, the

1. *Aviśeṣāḥ* is thus explained in the *SPB*: “*nāsti viśeṣāḥ śānta-ghora-mūḍhatvādirūpo yatra—sukhādyātmakatā hi śāntādirūpā sthūlabhūteṣv eva tāratamyādibhir abhivyaajyate na sūkṣmeṣu; teṣāṃ śāntaika-rūpatayaiva yogiṣv abhivyakter-iti: ‘(which) has ‘no difference,’ i.e., that in which there exists not a distinction, in the shape of calmness, fierceness, dullness, etc. For, the fact of consisting of pleasure, or the like, in the shape of the calm, and the rest, is manifested, in the degrees of greater and less, etc., in the gross elements only, not in the subtle; because these, since they have but the one form of the calm, are manifest to the concentrated (practitioners of meditation, but to no others).’*” The translation is Ballantyne’s. The same explanation is adopted by the Commentators on the *Kārikās*. Dr. K. T. Behanan uses the equivalents “unspecialised” and “specialised,” and develops a useful analogy, comparing the former to protons and electrons and the latter to atoms (*Yoga*, pp. 76, 77)

other, having nothing in common with it. The gross elements, ether, air, fire, water and the earth, are of the second division; objects like pitcher etc., belong to this class. Bodies, gross and subtle, belong to the first division. Of these, gross bodies are endowed by father and mother. They are composed of the six constituents or sheaths (kośas)¹—hair, blood, flesh, tendon, bone and marrow; the first three come from the mother and the last three from the father. Bodies so constituted perish and are reduced to dust or ashes. What is constant through change is the subtle body. Its constituents, as seen from the next verse, are eighteen—intellect, individuation, the eleven indriyas, and the five subtle elements.

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।

संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

XL. *pūrvotpannam, asaktam,*
niyatam, mahadādi-sūkṣma-paryantam ।
saṁsaratī nirupabhogam
bhāvair adhivāsitam liṅgam ॥

The subtle body, formed primevally, unimpeded, constant, composed of intellect and the rest down to the subtle elements, incapable of enjoyment, migrates, (because of) being endowed with dispositions.

NOTES

The constancy of the subtle body is relative; it is not eternal like Spirit, for it is created; but it lasts from the original creation

1. They are so-called since they fetter the subtle body, as the cocoon (kośa) fetters the silk-worm (kośakāra: DY, p, 143). The prabhūtas, says the same commentary, are not gross elements, but soil-born and sweat-born bodies.

to the final deluge.¹ It is unimpeded in its activities, being subtle, it can enter even into stones. This subtle body is called *līṅga* (literally what is merged), because, being caused, it is bound to be merged in its cause at the deluge. It is no doubt true that in the absence of merit and demerit, there cannot come about material embodiment or enjoyment and sorrow. But the seeds of merit and demerit are already present in the subtle body in the shape of virtue, vice and the other dispositions of the intellect. The subtle body is affected by these, in the same way as a cloth acquires the fragrance of the flowers it contains. Hence comes about migration for the subtle body.

The migrating body is provided by the subtle elements, intellect, individuation and the eleven organs, and as connected with the gross body there is experience of the joys and sorrows of transmigration. Why should we assume the connection of *subtle elements* with intellect and the rest? May not the latter alone constitute what migrates? The next verse provides the answer to this question.

चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा छाया ।
तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

XLI. *citram yathā 'śrayam ṛte,*
sthāṇvādibhyo vinā yathā chāyā ।
tadvad vinā viśeṣair
na tiṣṭhati nirāśrayam līṅgam ॥

1. The words of Vācaspati are "ā cā 'disargād ā ca mahā-praīayāt." This creation, however, is not absolutely the first nor is the deluge absolutely final. What is meant is only the contrast with intermediate creations and dissolutions, wherein there is conjunction and disjunction of the tattvas but not their evolution or absorption. The process wherein the tattvas themselves evolve is the original creation; that wherein they are resolved in prakṛti is the final deluge; the bhūtas and the subtle bodies subsist till this deluge. But the deluge will be followed by a fresh creation, just as the so-called original creation was preceded by a period of deluge, that again by a period of creation, and so on. The subtle body is constant, since its constituents persist through intermediate dissolutions. The *Candrikā* and *DY* take "niya tam" to mean "different for each puruṣa."

Just as a picture does not exist without a substrate, or a shadow without a post or the like, so too the cognitive apparatus (intellect, etc..) does not subsist supportless, without what is specific (*i.e.*, a subtle body).

NOTES

The word "līṅga" in the present verse denotes the thirteen beginning with intellect, they being means of cognition. These are seen in life to be associated with bodies composed of gross element. If there is continuity of the apparatus from life to life, there must be some ground or support for the apparatus between the termination of one life and the commencement of another. For this a subtle body is also required; this relatively subtle body is constituted not of the thirteen only, but of the eighteen; thus alone is migration possible. Vācaspati cites the story of Sāvitrī and Satyavān as purāṇic support for the doctrine of the subtle body. Yama drew forth from Satyavān's body his self of the size of a thumb. The drawing and the size indicate the presence of a corporeal element, in however subtle a form.¹

1. The relevant *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* reads thus; *na svātantryāt tad r̥te chāyāvat citravac ca*; and part of the commentary runs thus; *tal-līṅga-śarīram adhiṣṭhānam vinā svātantryān na tiṣṭhati*; *tathā ca sthūladehān tyaktvā lokāntara-gamanāya-līṅga-dehasya ādhāra-bhūtam śarīrāntaram sidhyatīti bhāvah*. The body which constitutes the substrate for transmigration is described thus; *atra tanmātrakāryam mātā-pitr-ja-śarīra-apekṣaya sūkṣmam yad bhūta pañcakam yāval līṅga-sthāyi proktam, tad eva līṅgādhiṣṭhānam śarīram*. It is thus neither as subtle as the transmigrating līṅga nor as gross as the body born of parents. *Gauḍīpāda* reads *vinā 'viśeṣaiḥ* and understands *tanmātrās* by *aviśeṣa*. This, says *STV*, is unsuitable, since līṅga includes the *tanmātrās*; hence to say that the līṅga is supported by the *tanmātrās* involves self-dependence; and there is no evidence for assuming some *aviśeṣa* not included in the constitution of the līṅga; *tadā aviśeṣāṁśe ātmāśrayah, līṅgāntargatā-'tiriktā-'viśeṣakalpane apramāṇikātā niṣphala-kalpanā ca*. Vācaspati's explanation, though not noticed by *STV*, has the obvious defect that in two consecutive verses, "līṅga" is understood in two different ways, first as including the *tanmātrās*, and then as exclusive of them. The interpretation given by *STV* follows the lead of *SPB* and is distinctly preferable. The līṅga, comprising the eighteen beginning with *mahat* and ending with the *tanmātrās*, does

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।

प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

XLII. *puruṣārtha-hetukam idam*
nimitta-naimittika-prasaṅgena ।
prakṛter vibhutvayogān
naṭavad vyavatiṣṭhate liṅgam ॥

The subtle body prompted by the goal of the Spirit performs (its part) like a player, through (its) connection with means and (their) results, being united to the might¹ of Primal Nature.

migrate, but without the capacity for enjoyment (nirupabhogam); hence the need for a subtle form of gross body composed of the mahābhūtas in an atomic condition; vinā viśeṣaiḥ sūkṣmaiḥ bhūtāṃśaiḥ, kevalam nirāśrayam sat prakṛtam liṅgam na tiṣṭhati, kārya-kāri na bhavati 'ty arthaḥ..... (Again, under v. LII): liṅgam. daśendriyamano-'haṅkāra-taumātrābhīḥ saṃhatā buddhiḥ. idam parama-sūkṣma-pañca-bhūta-saṅghātā-'śritam eva tiṣṭhati; pañca-bhūtānām parama-sūkṣmā-'mśaiḥ paramāṇu-mātrāḥ; tatpañcaka-saṅghātam āśrityai-'va vartate, na svātantrayeṇa.....viśeṣānām api sūkṣmāḥ mātā-pitrjāḥ prabhūtā mahābhūta-paryāyā iti tri-vibhāgo-'kteḥ, tatra liṅgā-'śraya-viśeṣāḥ "sūkṣmāḥ" iti prathama-vibhāgatayā nirdiṣṭāḥ mahābhūta-'ṇava eva grāhyāḥ. Thus *STV* finds authority in verse XXXIX for its recognition of the subtle form of gross matter. The traditional interpretation of Vācaspati having been adopted in the body of the first edition of this book, it is adhered to in this edition too, though in the editor's opinion, the explanation given by *STV* is distinctly superior. *YD* reads "viśeṣaiḥ" and takes it that what is taught is the dependence of the liṅga (indriyas) on a body, albeit in a subtle form; the verse is an answer to those who, like Pātañjalas, hold indriyas to be pervasive (vibhu), pp. 143, 144.

1. The might is really the capacity for manifestation in diverse forms. This is how *STV* understands it: prakṛteḥ, guṇa-sāmānya-rūpāyāḥ mūlaprakṛteḥ; vibhutvam, vibhūtiḥ; tasyā yogāt, sambhavāt; vividhā bhūtiḥ, bhavaḥ; prakṛter anekadhā-bhāva-nisargāc ce 'ti tātparyam; prakṛteḥ prabhutva-yogād ity api dhvanyate. Vibhutva, says *YD*, consists in the abandonment of the original equipoise, and the relative ascendancy of one or two guṇas over the rest: p. 174.

NOTES

The means are the dispositions—virtue, vice and so on; the consequence is the endowment of suitable gross bodies. The subtle body plays its part through its connection with these means and consequences, as an actor takes on different parts, the taking on of each gross body constitutes a different part. The object is the goal of the Spirit, *i.e.*, enjoyment and release. The capacity to play such parts is inherent in Nature; she is mighty enough for the purpose.

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृताश्च धर्माद्याः ।

दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

XLIII. *sāṃsiddhikāś ca bhāvāḥ*
prākṛtikā vaiṣṛtāś ca dharmādyāḥ ।
drṣṭāḥ karaṇā-śrayiṇaḥ,
kāryā-śrayiṇaś ca kalalādyāḥ ॥

Virtue and the rest, both as primary connate dispositions, and as acquired ones, are seen to be dependent on the instruments (*i.e.*, intellect, etc.); (while) the embryo and the rest are dependent on the effected (*i.e.*, the body).

NOTES

The intellect and the rest evolve the body; the former are the means, the latter the effect. Physiological dispositions such as the cell resulting from the combination of the sperm and the ovum, the embryo in the various stages of development and so on, are connected with the effect; virtue, vice and other such dispositions are connected with means, *i.e.*, the organs. So much for acquired disposition. As contrasted with these there are dispositions one is endowed with from the beginning of life, not of this life alone. The four sons of Brahmā created by his will, *viz.*, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana and Sanatkumāra are reputed to have possessed perfect knowledge from the beginning. The same kind of perfec-

tion is claimed for Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya. Gauḍapāda understands the first half differently as referring to the classification of dispositions in a three-fold manner, connate, natural (*i.e.*, arising spontaneously), and acquired through a product (*i.e.*, through an embodied preceptor and so on).¹

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम्, गमनमधस्ताद्वत्यधर्मेण ।

ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

XLIV. *dharmena gamanam ūrdhvam,*
gamanam adhastād bhavaty adharmena ।
jñānena cā 'pavargo
viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ ॥

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।

ऐश्वर्यादविघातः, विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

XLV. *vairāgyat prakṛtilayaḥ,*
samsāro bhavati rajasād rāgāt ।
aiśvaryāt avighātaḥ,
viparyayāt tadviparyāsaḥ ॥

Through virtue (comes about) departure upwards, and through vice departure down below; through wisdom is release (acquired), and bondage through ignorance. From non-attachment (results) merger in Primal

1. To some extent he is followed by *STV*: *tatra samsiddhikāḥ, kevala-sāttvikāḥ, dharma-jñāna-vairāgya-aiśvarya-rūpāḥ, iśvara-tadavatāreṣu ca vartante. bhagavataḥ kapilasya sarge prathamothitasya sahotpannam dharmo jñānam vairāgyam aiśvaryam iti tat tasya samsiddhikam; sanakādiṣu aṣṭa-prakṛtikṛtatvāt prakṛtikam; asmaḍādiṣu mana-indriya-viśiṣṭa-bhautika-śariravatsu ācārya-nimittena sañjātam vaikṛtam.*

Nature, migration from passionate attachment;¹ from power (comes about) non-obstruction, and the opposite thereof, from the contrary.

NOTES

The eight intellectual dispositions have been already said to be virtue, wisdom, non-attachment, lordly power and the opposites of these. The consequences of these dispositions are set forth above. Of bondage said to result from ignorance, three varieties are recognised, *prākṛtika*, *vaikṛtika* and *dākṣiṇaka*.² The last pertains to the individual, who is satisfied with the round of duties and does not seek discriminative knowledge. Next above him comes the one in *vaikṛtika* bondage, who identifies the Spirit with one of the modifications of Primal Nature, with the elements or the intellect and so on. Superior to this condition is *prākṛtika* bondage, where the Spirit is identified with Primal Nature itself, not with any of its modifications. On the principle that one becomes what one contemplates (this principle is known as the *tatkratu-nyāya*), those in *prākṛtika* and *vaikṛtika* bondage become merged either in Primal Nature or its modifications. This merger lasts only for a period, the period being longest in the case of *prākṛtika* bondage. A pre-condition for rising to these higher levels of *bandha* is non-attachment to actions and results. Hence it is that *vairāgya* (non-attachment) leads to merger in Primal Nature; hence, also, the man in *dākṣiṇaka* bondage who centres his faith in duties and sacrifices, passes only from death to death. It will be noticed that even he who has been merged in *Prākṛti* is still bound, for he has not attained discriminative knowledge of the Spirit, which alone³ leads to release.

1. Though all attachment springs from *Rajas*, what is meant here is the attachment to *rājasa* objects, not the ascetic's attachment to *yama*, *niyama*, etc.; YD, p. 151.

2. These three are rendered respectively as natural, incidental and persona by Prof. S. Radhakrishnan. See IP, II, 310. For a further account of these bonds see Vācaspati's *Tattva-vaiśārādī* on YS, I, 24.

3. The "ca," says YD, in *jñānena ca* has the sense of restriction (*avadhāraṇa*); release comes neither from *vairāgya* alone, nor from its combination with *jñāna*: p. 149.

Non-obstruction of desires results from the possession of lordly power ; with the failure of power, there comes about the opposite, *viz.*, obstruction.

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्याः ।

गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्, तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

XLVI. *eṣa pratyayasargaḥ, viparyayā-
'śakti-tuṣṭi-siddhyākhyāḥ ।
guṇa-vaiṣamya-vimardāt
tasya ca bhedās tu pañcāśat ॥*

This (aggregate of sixteen—eight causes and eight effects, mentioned in the last two verses) is a creation of the intellect,¹ and is distinguished as Ignorance, Infirmary, Complacency, and Attainment. (Their) varieties due to the suppression of one or more of the constituents, because of their relative inequalities (in strengtn), are fifty in number.

NOTES

Of the eight dispositions already mentioned, all except wisdom will be seen to be cases of Ignorance, Infirmary or Complacency. Wisdom belongs to Siddhi.² The fifty varieties of these are due

1. *YD* mentions several possible senses of "pratyaya-sargaḥ"; it may be creation of things or their characters; it may be creation by the intellect; it may be creation preceded by intellect : p. 152.

2. *Tuṣṭi* has been rendered as Complacency and *Siddhi* as Attainment. The more usual renderings are respectively Contentment or Satisfaction and Power or Perfection. These have the disadvantage of signifying what we usually associate with the state of release. The contentment here spoken of is material, and so too is perfection; for, it must be remembered that they are all creations of the intellect—the first evolute of Primal Nature. They are valuable relatively, but should by no means be confounded with the state of release (*kaivalya*). The equivalents adopted in the present translation have been chosen with a view to avoid any such associations,

to differences in the proportion of the constituents resulting from the strength or weakness of one or two out of the three. The divisions and sub-divisions of these can best be seen from the tabular statement appended to the Introduction.

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।

अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

XLVII. *pañca viparyaya-bhedā*

bhavanty aśaktiś ca karaṇa-vaikalyāt ।

aṣṭāviṁśati-bhedā

tuṣṭir navadhā 'ṣṭadhā siddhiḥ ॥

Five are the varieties of Ignorance; the varieties of Infirmary due to organic defect are twenty-eight; Complacency is nine-fold, (and) Attainment eight-fold.

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधः, मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः ।

तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

XLVIII. *bhedas tamaso 'ṣṭavidhaḥ,*

mohasya ca, daśavidho mahāmohaḥ ।

tāmisro 'ṣṭādaśadhā,

tathā bhavaty andhatāmisraḥ ॥

The varieties of obscurity are eight-fold, as also of delusion; those of extreme delusion are of ten kinds; gloom is eighteen-fold, (and) so is utter darkness.

NOTES

The varieties of Ignorance are known in the Sāṅkhya as Tamas, Moha, Mahāmoha, Tāmisra and Andhatāmisra; the Yoga

system recognises these under a different nomenclature, the names used being Avidyā, Asmitā, Rāga, Dveṣa, and Abhiniveśa respectively.

Of these Tamas is of eight kinds and consists in identifying the Self with one or other of the principles—intellect, individuation, the mind and the five subtle elements (the tanmātras).

Moha is also of eight kinds and is characterised by love of the eight attainments (siddhis) such as aṇimā (becoming atomic in size), mahimā (becoming exceedingly large in size), laghimā (becoming buoyant) and so on.¹ Mahāmoha is attachment to the objects of sense; these are five in number, and since each object of enjoyment may be divine or human,² we have ten objects and ten varieties of this form of Ignorance. Tāmisra is eighteen-fold, relating as it does to the ten objects of sense and the eight attainments, which we dislike because of their mutual opposition and impermanence. Andhatāmisra is also eighteen-fold and relates to the same objects as Tāmisra, the difference being that Andhatāmisra is characterised by the fear that loss of the objects of sense etc. may be brought about by external agencies; thus the gods fear the demons and man fears death.

एकादशोन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।

सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

XLIX. *ekādaśe 'ndriya-vadhāḥ*

saha buddhivadhair aśaktir uddiṣṭā ।

saptadaśa vadhā buddher

viparyayāt tuṣṭisiddhīnām ॥

1. See, further, Notes to Kārikā XXIII.

2. *Jaya* would distinguish the objects of enjoyment into two groups of five according as they are subtle or gross: *YD* mentions this as an alternative explanation, its own interpretation of Mahāmoha being attachment to family members like father, mother, son, sister, wife, daughter, preceptor, friend, and servant: p. 154.

Injuries to the eleven organs along with the injuries to the intellect are declared to constitute Infirmary; the injuries to the intellect are seventeen resulting from the failure of (the nine-fold) Complacency and (the eight-fold) Attainment.

NOTES

Each of the eleven organs may fail in its function; since these are but channels to the intellect their failure is also the failure of the intellect. Infirmary of these indriyas hardly needs to be exemplified; deafness and blindness are instances of infirmity of the organs of cognition; paralysis or constipation is an instance of incapacity in the organs of action; idiocy is the infirmity of the mind.

Infirmary of buddhi, which comes about directly and not through the failure of the organs, is seventeen-fold. These have to be understood in the light of the varieties of Complacency and Attainment. The failure of each of these gives rise to a corresponding Infirmary.

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालमाग्याख्याः ।

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च, नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥

L *ādhyātmikāś catasrah,*
prakṛty-upādāna-kāla-bhāgyā-'khyāḥ
bāhyā viṣayoparamāt
pañca, nava tuṣṭayo 'bhimatāḥ ॥

The four concerning self—termed Nature, Means, Time and Luck,—and the five external (ones) due to turning away from the objects of sense—(these) are considered to be the nine (forms of) Complacency.¹

1. Gauḍapāda reads "ādhyātmikyāḥ," though Vācaspati and YD read "ādhyātmikāḥ." The term "ādhyātmika" has been rendered as "concerning the self" in accordance with Vācaspati's Commentary, which assigns the rela-

NOTES

Complacency concerning the self is that form of it which, knowing of the self as different from the Non-self, yet makes no attempt to release the former. Of this, there are four varieties, based on a belief in Nature, Means, Time or Luck. The first of these relies on the working of Nature itself to bring about discriminative knowledge.¹ The second would not rest on such simple faith, but would enjoin renunciation, the practice of austerity and so on. The third holds that, irrespective of Nature and Means, discriminative knowledge will come in its own time; the fourth disregards all these, since discrimination and release depend on luck alone, coming early or late, with or without effort, according to the luck of each individual. These four forms of Complacency are known as *Am̐bhas*, *Salila*, *Ogha*, and *Vṛṣṭi*² respectively; the failure of each gives rise to a corresponding Infirmary.

External Complacency is due to abstinence from the five-fold objects of sense. Though due to non-attachment or perception of

tion to the self, as distinct from Nature, to be the basis for the designation "ādhyātmikā" (*prakṛti-vyatiriktaṃ ātmānam adhiḥkṛtya yasmāt tāḥ tuṣṭayaḥ tasmāt ādhyātmikāḥ*); cf. also *YD*: *śarirā-śarirīṇor viśeṣam upalipsamānena yoginā yad anātmāny ātmabuddhir avasthāpyate, sā khalv ādhyātmikā*; p. 155. Perhaps this is far-fetched and Gauḍapāda's explanation which leads to the rendering of the word as "internal" may be preferable. *STV* understands the word in the same way: *ādhyātmikāḥ, ātmani bhavāḥ, abhyantarya ity evā 'rthaḥ*. The contrast with the external *tuṣṭis* mentioned later in the verse would also favour this interpretation. The present translation, however, follows *Vācaspati*, as it does even elsewhere, for the most part.

It is not clear if the word "ākhyāḥ" should be rendered as "termed" or as "relating to." The latter is *Wilson's* rendering and apparently makes better sense. But *Vācaspati's* commentary, again, would seem to make out that the *tuṣṭis* themselves are termed *prakṛti upādāna*, etc., because of their relation to the latter. *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* would seem to support *Vācaspati* in both cases. See *SPB*, III, 43, esp., the following: *ātmānam tuṣṭimataḥ saṅghātam adhiḥkṛtya vartanta ity ādhyātmikās tuṣṭayaś catasraḥ*, *STV* too takes *prakṛti*, etc., to be names of the *tuṣṭis*.

1. While *tamas* (a from of error) distinguishes Nature from Spirit but ranks Nature higher, the *tuṣṭi* known as *prakṛti* is content with the knowledge of Nature and seeks nothing else; *YD*, p. 156.

2. *YD* gives interesting explanations of the terminology in a passage too long to be extracted; see pp. 156, 157.

defects in sense-objects, this is yet no discriminative knowledge, for, the Spirit is not realised as other than Nature, having nothing in common with it. The five-fold division of this is based on the five-fold nature of sense-objects. There is also another division into five which is based on the realisation of defects in objects of sense in respect of their (1) acquisition, (2) preservation, (3) waste (4) enjoyment, and (5) the injury caused to others. These varieties are respectively called Pāra, Supāra, Pārāpāra, Anuttamāmbhas and Uttamāmbhas.¹ Wealth is acquired with trouble; it causes anxiety as to its protection, and fear as to its waste; in its enjoyment it leads to ever new desires, and enjoyment itself is not possible without cruelty to some being or other. The relation of each of these defects gives rise to a variety of external Complacency, and the failure of each variety to a corresponding Infirmary.

उहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।

दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ, सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

LI. *ūhaḥ, śabda 'dhyayanam,*
dūḥkha-vighātās trayāḥ suhṛtprāptiḥ ।
dānam ca siddhayo 'ṣṭau,
siddheḥ pūrvō'ṅkuśas trividhaḥ ॥

The eight attainments are the (proper) use of reasoning, oral instruction (from a teacher), study, the three-fold suppression of (the three kinds of) misery, the intercourse of friends and purity; those (mentioned) before (*viz.*, Ignorance, Infirmary and Complacency) are the three-fold curb on Attainment.

NOTES

The attainments fall broadly into two classes, the principal and the subsidiary. The former are the three-fold suppression of

1. The names vary in different lists; YD gives *sutāram, supāram, sunetram, sumāricam, uttamābhayam,*


the three kinds of misery. They are known as *pramoda*, *mudita* and *modamāna*. The suppression results from the acquisition of the other *siddhis*; hence these are but effects; the others are causes and effects in the order to be mentioned; but study (*adhyayana*) is cause alone, not the effect of another attainment.

Study consists in acquiring the knowledge of the text of ancient lore. This leads to the understanding of their significance as traditionally expounded by a teacher. This is *śabda*.

The knowledge so acquired requires to be reflected upon. This is reasoning. But reason is not free to fly unrestrained; it must respect revelation. Hence the proper use of reason is the next attainment after *śabda*,

The exercise of intellect tends to be confusing and inconclusive; one has to discuss as well as meditate. And discussion implies the presence of a friendly atmosphere provided by one's preceptor or pupils or friends. The acquisition of this atmosphere is *suhṛt-prāpti*.

Purity and maturity of knowledge are essential to release from misery. And these are what is meant by *dāna*, the last of the secondary attainments. On this exposition of *Vācaspati Miśra* we have something like the following scheme of *siddhis*.



Principal attainments leading to Suppression of Misery.

A different interpretation is also offered where these are not causally related. *Uha* is the knowledge derived by independent reasoning. *Śabda* is knowledge derived from hearing the exposition of Śāṅkhya doctrines. *Adhyayana* is the proper study of Śāṅkhya texts and their significance under a teacher. *Suhr̥tprāpti* is knowledge derived from a friend who has understood the truth. *Dāna* is the making of gifts, which serves as a means of acquiring knowledge. *Vācaspati* refuses to discuss the relative merits of the two schemes, leaving that to the reader; nor does he mention the other commentator by name. But it seems fairly clear that the author of the *Jayamaṅgalā* is meant, since the latter's exposition is very similar both in thought and word¹. He does not take the attainments to be connected as cause and effect; and he takes *dāna* to mean charity, not purity. The modern reader will find it very difficult to assess the two interpretations; for, while the *Jayamaṅgalā* sounds more natural, the *Kaumudī* is more logical. If we remember that we are dealing with a digest of a highly rational science, we cannot help a feeling of partiality for *Vācaspati*'s view.

Ignorance, Infirmary and Complacency are checks on attainment. They are as the goad (*aṅkuṣa*) wherewith the elephant is controlled. The attainments, since they lead to the suppression of misery, are to be courted; the other three should be avoided, as hindrances to attainment.

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।

लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यः तस्माद्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥ ५२ ॥

LII. *na vinā bhavair liṅgam,*

*na vinā liṅgena bhāva-nirvṛttiḥ*² ।

liṅgākhyo bhāvākhyah

tasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ ॥

1. See art; "Jayamaṅgala and Other Commentaries, etc.," *IHQ*, V, iii, 429. The explanation in *YD* is similar to that of *Jaya*.

2. *YD*: *bhāva-saṃsiddhiḥ*

Without dispositions (there would be) no subtle elements, without the subtle elements (there would be) no development of dispositions. Hence, creation proceeds in two ways—elemental and intellectual.

NOTES

The present verse tries to explain why creation proceeds in two ways, since the development of the dispositions up to the stage of Attainment seems to be complete in itself. This completeness is only apparent. The dispositions stand in need of the subtle elements (the *tanmātras*), for, there can be no enjoyment in the absence of objects to be enjoyed and a body to enjoy with; nor can the objects provide enjoyment of themselves, in the absence of senses and so on. The two aspects of enjoyer and what is enjoyed have both to be developed. And since release comes as the result of enjoyment, the necessity for the two-fold creation is apparent, even in respect of release.

Nor can it be objected (says Vācaspati) that the argument moves in a vicious circle, basing dispositions on the elements and *vice versa*; for, each may well be the cause of the other, in succession, as the seed is of the tree and the tree of the seed. Even if one pushes the argument up to the so-called first creation, we can go further back and trace the causes in the impressions of dispositions or elements, left over from a prior creation. There is no real difficulty, as we do not admit the world to have had an absolute beginning.¹

1. In this verse again, *liṅga* has to be taken to mean something other than its usual sense of subtle body. *STV* understands the usual sense and takes the present *kārikā* to follow from *kārikā* XLI; a good part of that commentary is extracted here because of its interest; “*liṅgasya sthiti-pravṛttyoḥ bhūta-sūkṣmair avinā-bhāvo na cet dharmādi-bhāvānām śarīra-bhūtāmśa-mukhenai 'va jananāt, bhūtāmśasthā eva te dharmādi-bhāvāḥ liṅgam na saṅkrāmanty eva. tena vijātiya-sthūla-dehā-'ṅkuraṇasya nā 'sty avakāśaḥ. aṣaḥ mahadādi-tanmātrāntam liṅgam sāmānya-śakti-mātra-ghaṭitam mahā-bhūtaśūkṣmā-'śritam eva tiṣṭhati pravartate ca. tena bhūtastha-bhāva-viśeṣānām liṅge saṅkrāntir bhavati; tena bhinna-bhinnā-'kāraiḥ śarīrā-'ṅkuro bhavati 'ti tadrahasyam.....sarge tanmātrā-'vady*

It is worth noting that Colebrooke in his translation of the *kārikā* and Wilson in his translation of Gauḍapāda's *Bhāṣya* seem to have understood *nirvṛtti* in the sense of *nivṛtti*. They thus speak of the pause of the dispositions, not of their development. This interpretation makes little sense.

अष्टविकल्पो दैवसैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।

मानुषकश्चैकविधः समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥ ५३ ॥

LIII. *aṣṭa-vikalpo daivas*

tairyagyonaś ca pañcadhā bhavati

mānuṣakaś¹ cai 'kavidhaḥ

saṁāsato bhautikas sargaḥ॥

The divine (order) is of eight kinds; the sub-human creation is five-fold; the human order is of one variety; such, in brief, is the elemental creation.

eva sṛṣṭam; sṛṣṭa-mātreṇa tena sthitaye gataye ca bhūta-sūkṣmā āśritāḥ. sargaśyā 'nāditvād āśrayaṇam api prāktana-bhāva-vāsanā-dhīnam eva. nirnimittam āśrayaṇe sati prathamam dehasyai 'vā 'bhāvena tanmūla-dharmā-'oharmādi-bhāvā-'lābhāt, yadṛcchayā śuddha-bhūta-sūkṣma-saṁ-śraye 'pi tanmukhena dharmā-'dharmādi-vāsanāyā slābhāt tadadhi-vāsitatvena vijātiya-sthūla-dehā-'rambhā-'sambhavāt prāṇi-sarga eva na syāt. ataḥ anādiḥ sargaḥ, tadgatāni cā 'vidyā-karmādini cā 'nādinī. līṅgānām api tadgata-bhāvā-dhivāsanam anādi 'ty aṅgikaraṇīyam. prāksargiya-bhāva-vāsitāny eva sṛjyante purastāt līṅgāni, tadbhāva-vāsanayai 'va tadanugūṇa-sūkṣmāny āśrayante. āśritya nānā-vidha-sthūla-dehān rohayanti, punar api tadbhāvā-'dhivāsitāni bhavanti, sthūla-śarīra-tyāge sati tadbhāvā-vāsanā-'nurodhena punar bhūta-sūkṣmāny āśrayante, ity evam avīśāraṇai 'va līṅga-pracāro bhavati." The purport of the whole verse is thus the declaration of the beginninglessness of the world.

1. *YD*; mānuṣyaḥ.

NOTES

The eight varieties of the divine order of beings are Brāhma, Prajāpatya, Aindra, Paitrī, Gāndharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, and Piśāca.

The sub-human creation is said to be non-erect because of the horizontality of most members of the class, as contrasted with the uprightness of man. It is not properly rendered as the "animal creations" for, immovable objects are also included among the five varieties. The varieties are cattle, wild beasts, birds, reptiles and immovable objects, such as vegetables and minerals.

The human order is one species, as the sub-classes, e. g., the castes, do not differ in respect of physical conformation, which is the basis of classification here.

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।

मध्ये रजोविशालो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४ ॥

LIV. *ūrdhvam sattva-viśālah,*
tamo viśālaś ca¹ mūlataḥ sargaḥ
madhye rajo-viśālo
brahmādi-stamba-paryantaḥ ॥²

In the worlds above, there is predominance of Sattva (goodness);³ in (the sphere of) the lower order of creation Tamas (darkness) predominates; in the middle, Rajas (passion) predominates; (this is so) from Brahmā down to a blade of grass.

1. "tu": STV, YD.

2. "brahmādi-stamba-paryantam": STV.

3. Though Sattva predominates in the worlds above, life there is not equivalent to release, since there is a return even thence. See SPB, III, 52.

NOTES

By the worlds above are meant the divine inhabitants of the heavenly worlds from Dyuloka to Satyaloka. Here Sattva prevails. Tamas predominates among the lower orders of creation from cattle to immovable objects. The middle space is the world of human beings pursuing virtue and vice and experiencing happiness and misery. Here Rajas prevails.

तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।

लिङ्गस्या विनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद्दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥ ५५ ॥

LV. *tatra jarā-marana-kṛtam*
duḥkham prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ ।
lingasyā 'vinivṛtteh,
*tasmād duḥkham svabhāvena*² ॥

The intelligent being, the dweller in the (subtle) body, attains there the misery consequent on decay and death, until his deliverance from the (subtle) body ; hence misery is of the nature of things.

NOTES

Creation brought about in the manner indicated above is here shown to be the cause of misery. The Spirit realising this is to cultivate non-attachment to the world and thus obtain release. Bodies though they appear to be abodes of enjoyment are yet the seats of misery; for, they inevitably age and die and in these changes there is misery. No living being wants to die, not even a worm.³ Though these changes take place only in non-intelligent

1. Mātharācārya reads "atra" and explains "atra" as "triṣu lokṣu."

2. Mātharācārya reads "samāśena" and explains it as "samkṣepaṇa"; YD too reads "samāśena" explaining it as equivalent to "in brief," the idea being to allow for the presence, in some measure, of happiness and delusion, their existence not being wholly ruled out.

3. The pangs of birth are not mentioned, as they do not apply to devas; YD, p. 167.

matter, yet they affect the Spirit, because of the presence of the latter in the body; Spirit is puruṣa, that which rests in the subtle body (puri, śete); and what is connected primarily with the body is thus related to Spirit also. Thus, misery continues for the latter so long as the connection with the subtle body lasts.

Another interpretation of "līṅgasya a vinivṛtteḥ," is "because of non-discrimination of the subtle body as different from the Spirit." This interpretation gives the reason for the experience of misery; the other sense puts a period to that experience.

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।

प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

LVI. *ity eṣa prakṛti-kṛto*
mahadādi-viśeṣa¹-bhūta-paryantaḥ
prati-puruṣa-vimokṣārtham
svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ ॥

This creation, from intellect down to the gross elements is brought about by Primal Nature, to the end of the release of each Spirit; (this is done) for another's benefit, as if it were for her own (benefit).

NOTES

The present verse explains the *raison d'être* of creation¹ and serves to set aside rival views of the same. There is a purpose in creation; if there were none, what is will continue to be, and what is not will never be manifested. The purpose is the liberation of each Spirit. The cause itself is non-intelligent Primal Nature.²

1. Māṭharācārya reads "viśaya," YD: pravartate tattvabhūtabhāvākhyāḥ

2. YD mentions and refutes an ancient Sāṅkhya view advocating a plurality of pradhānas: p. 169, See also Johnston, p. 17.

The supposition of an intelligent being as material or efficient cause is excluded, for, intelligence cannot transform itself into the world; and if a non-intelligent material cause capable of such transformation be admitted, a further cause of an intelligent nature seems to be otiose. Nor can it be objected that in the case of non-intelligent Primal Nature, creation once begun will not automatically come to an end with the release of the Spirit; for creation is controlled by the interest of the Spirit, and proceeds, as it would, if controlled by self-interest. And no one continues to engage in a particular form of action, when the interest in that is satisfied. The cook turns away from the oven once the food is cooked. A difficulty with such analogies is that the cook etc. are intelligent beings. Had Vācaspati been alive to-day (the illustration is given by him, as also by the author of the *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* III, 63) he would probably have cited automatic electric kettles, which cease to function the moment the water fully boils. As it is, however, an objection is urged making out the necessity for an intelligent controller, as the expression "interest" would have significance only for him. Nor can intelligent control come from the plurality of Spirits, for they do not yet know the nature of Prakṛti. The answer to this objection is provided by the next verse.

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।

पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

LVII. *vatsa-vivṛddhi-nimittam*
kṣīrasya¹ yathā pravṛttir ajñasya ।
puruṣa-vimokṣa-nimittam
tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya ॥

As non-intelligent milk functions for the nourishment of the calf, even so does Primal Nature function for the liberation of the Spirit.

1. "dugdhasya"; *STV*.

NOTES

The functioning of non-intelligent beings towards a purpose is well-known from experience. Milk is non-intelligent, and it serves to nourish the calf. It is not clear if the flow of the milk from the cow is meant here or the nutritious functioning of the milk. Vācaspati's comment seems to require only the latter interpretation.¹

Since non-intelligent functioning has been thus shown to be possible, the doctrine of an intelligent creator is left without any basis. Vācaspati devotes some space to an examination of creation by Īśvara.² Granted the existence and functioning of Īśvara, creation must have been due either to self-interest or compassion. Obviously it cannot be the former, since the Lord can neither be selfish nor lack anything, the accomplishment or acquisition of which is desired. Nor does compassion furnish a sufficient reason, for, prior to creation of the senses and the objects of sense, there could not have been any misery; and creation, in the circumstances, would appear an act of cruelty rather than of compassion. Compassion can be evoked only by the suffering consequent on creation, and thus we are left with a logical see-saw, that compassion is dependent on creation and creation on compassion. Further if the Lord were really compassionate, he would have produced happy creatures alone, and warded off misery altogether. If misery in its various grades be said to depend on individual merit and de-

1. Gaudapāda and Māthara understand the secretion of milk by the cow. The former says "As grass and water taken by the cow become eliminated into milk, and nourish the calf; and as (the secretion ceases) when the calf is grown; so nature (acts spontaneously) for the liberation of soul" (*SKG*, Wilson's Translation, p. 169). This interpretation has the advantage of applying both to the commencement and the cessation of this function of Prakṛti. It has to be noted that the analogy is thus understood in the Vedāntin's criticism too (See *Ved. Su. Śāṅkara Bhāṣya*, II, 2 3 and 5). The illustration is, of course, common to the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, where, however, it is not clearer. From its insistence on the concomitance of the growth of the calf with the pravṛtti of milk, YD too seems to understand the cow's secretion of milk, by the term "pravṛtti": see p. 170.

2. The *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I, 92-95 treat the topic in almost the same manner as Vācaspati.

merit, then this merit and demerit (karma) would itself be the cause of creation, the Lord being supernumerary. It may still be said that even karma requires intelligent supervision. If this be the case, in the absence of supervision, creation would not have taken place and all misery could have been avoided. Hence, the best way in which the Lord could have shown his compassion would have been to refrain from directing the creation of the world by karma. Intelligent direction is thus either unnecessary or not a sign of compassion. Since compassion and self-interest are both ruled out, creation by Īśvara is wholly unintelligible.

In the case of creation by non-intelligent matter, there are no such difficulties. It is always subservient to the interests of another—the Spirit, and the functioning is analogous to that of milk in nourishing the calf.

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

LVIII. *autsukya-nivṛtṭy-artham*
yathā kriyāsu pravartate lokaḥ ।
puruṣasya vimokṣārtham
pravartate tadvad avyaktam ॥

Just as (in) the world (one) undertakes action in order to be rid of desire (by satisfying it), even so does the unevolved function for the release of the Spirit.

NOTES

This verse illustrates what was said earlier (v. LVI) about Nature functioning in the interests of another, as if in its own interest. The satisfaction of desire is one's own interest; and the evolution of Nature is comparable to that process, though the end of evolution is the interest of another, viz., Spirit.

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।

पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

LIX. *raṅgasya darśayitvā*

nivartate nartakī yathā nr̥tyāt 1

puruṣasya tathā 'tmānam

prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ ॥

As a dancer desists from dancing, having exhibited herself to the audience, so does Primal Nature desist, having exhibited herself to the Spirit.

NOTES

The goal of the Spirit may explain evolution, but not the cessation thereof. The present verse tells us why at a certain stage the course of evolution seems to cease for the Spirit. If it did not cease, but continued to be perceived by the Spirit, there would be no release. When Nature has been realised to be different from Spirit, when discriminative knowledge has been attained, there is nothing else to prompt Nature to evolve. Its purpose has been fulfilled like that of the *danseuse* who has exhibited her dancing; hence it desists from further activity.¹

नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।

गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकं चरति ॥ ६० ॥

LX. *nānā-vidhair upāyair*

upakāriṇy anupakāriṇaḥ puṃsaḥ 1

guṇavatya guṇasya sataś

tasyārtham apārthakam carati ॥

1. This is how YD. links up the present verse with the last; if the object of the evolution is the vimokṣa of puruṣa, why does it not cease with the release of any one puruṣa? Not so, says v. LIX; for prakṛti is like a *danseuse*, whose exhibition is to be enjoyed by the public; though some,

She, who, being endowed with the constituents (Sattva etc.), helps in manifold ways the Spirit, that, being without the constituents, does not requite her, functions for the latter, without any benefit (to herself.)

NOTES

Nature is here, as elsewhere, spoken of in the feminine, but in the present verse there is a comparison to a woman servant who being herself good, serves faithfully a master, who is ungrateful, being devoid of good qualities. The object of the analogy is to show that Nature stands to gain in no way by the process of evolution. The present translation has followed the model of other translations, but following the commentaries, one is inclined to think that the following may be a better version. "Like a servant that helps, in manifold ways, the master that does not requite her, even so does she, who is endowed with the constituents, function for the benefit of him, who is devoid of the constituents, without any benefit (to herself)."

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।

या दृष्टास्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

LXI. *prakṛteḥ su Kumārataram*

na kiñcid astīti me matir bhavati ।

yā dr̥ṣṭāsmi 'ti punar

na darśanam upaiti puruṣasya ॥

It is my belief that there is not any other being more bashful than Primal Nature, who because (of the realisation) "I have been seen" never again comes into the view of the Spirit.

persons have already seen her, e.g., the dancing master, the actors, etc she has yet to go on the stage and perform till the entire audience is satisfied; then alone may she desist.

NOTES

The analogy of the dancer mentioned earlier has an obvious disadvantage. The dancing may cease for the day or for the moment, but will re-commence if required by an enthusiastic audience. The cessation of the activities of Nature must, however, be final, as, otherwise, there is no possibility of release. For the purpose of illustrating this, a fresh analogy is introduced, that of a modest, bashful lady who having accidentally exposed herself to the stranger's gaze takes special precautions never again to come within his view. It goes without saying that the analogy is imperfect in many ways. The bashful lady protects herself not merely against that stranger, but against all strangers, whereas the cessation of Nature's activity relates only to that Spirit who has seen her. Further, the idea of the modest lady does not combine very well with that of the dancer who exhibits herself on the stage. But the comparisons are not offered as proofs and should not be pressed beyond those aspects to which they are intended to apply.¹

तस्मान्न बध्यतेऽद्धा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।

संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

LXII. *tasmān na badhyate 'ddhā na mucyate² nā 'pi*
saṁsarati kaścit ।
saṁsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānā-'śrayā
prakṛtiḥ ॥

1. According to *Jaya*, no analogy is intended at all, the expression "sukamārataram" meaning "sūkṣmataram itarasmāt," i.e., subtler than all else; (Cp. *BFEO*, IV, 1050). Further, the opinion of sukumāratatva is said to be held not by the author of *Kārikā* (as understood by Gaudapāda and Vācaspati) but by Prakṛti. The *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* uses the illustration kulavadhūvat, like a lady of good family. The commentator explains it thus; as a lady of good family approaches her lord no more, ashamed at the realisation that her faults have been discovered by her lord, so too does Nature desist from evolving. To make the meaning clearer, Ballantyne qualifies vadhū by the word 'frail' within brackets. On such an interpretation we seem to have little to do with sukumāra-taratva interpreted whether as bashfulness or as subhogyā-taratva; the illustration would seem to be only a variant of the analogy of the *danseuse*. See *SPB*; III, 70.

2. "tasmān na badhyate nā 'pi mucyate": *TSV*.

Of a certainty, therefore, not any (Spirit) is bound, or liberated, nor (does any) migrate; it is Primal Nature abiding in manifold forms, that is bound, is liberated and migrates.

NOTES

It has been taught throughout that change is in Nature alone that it is the body which grows old and dies, that re-birth is of the body, as conditioned by dispositions which belong to Nature. The Spirit is other than Nature. How then can there be either bondage or liberation for the Spirit? There certainly is neither, says the author of the *Kārikā*; the processes of bondage and liberation really belong to Nature; but they are attributed to Spirit. The attribution is comparable, according to Vācaspati, to the process whereby an army's success or defeat is attributed to the king whose army it is.¹ The army gains victory or suffers defeat; but the king is said to have won or lost. Similarly Spirit, because of the presence of Nature to it, is said to be bound or liberated. The former experience is attributed when Nature evolves, the latter when it desists. The phrase "abiding in manifold form (*nānāśrayā*)" is thus explained by Gauḍapāda: "in relation (or connection) with celestial, human, or brute forms, in the character of intellect, egotism, the rudimentary senses and gross elements" (*SKG*, Wilson's Translation, p. 175).

By what means, then, does Nature bind and release herself? The answer is given in the next verse.

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।

सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

LXIII. *rūpaiḥ saptabhir eva tu*
badhnāty² ātmānam ātmanā prakṛtiḥ
sai 'va ca puruṣārtham
prati vimocayaty ekarūpeṇa ॥

1. The analogy occurs in the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on *YS*, I, 24, wherefrom in all probability Vācaspati has derived it.

2. *STV* reads "evam badhnāti" and explains "evam" as "asmad-anubhūyamāna-prakāreṇa."

Primal Nature binds herself by herself through the seven forms (*i.e.*, dispositions); she herself through one form (*i.e.*, disposition) releases herself for the benefit of the Spirit.

NOTES

Bondage and release are effected with the help of the dispositions—Virtue and Vice, Wisdom and Ignorance, Non-attachment and Attachment, Power and its reverse. Of these, the seven excluding Wisdom serve to bind; Wisdom releases. It will be noted that while the verse seems to imply that the dispositions are means external to Prakṛti wherewith she binds herself, they, in fact, are themselves evolutes of Prakṛti.¹ They are products of the very process of evolution, which results in bondage and later in release.

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

LXIV. *evam tattvā-'bhyāsān*

nā 'smi na me nā 'ham ity aparīśeṣam ॥

aviparyayād viśuddham

kevalam utpadyate jñānam ॥

Thus, from the repeated study of the truth, there results that wisdom “I do not exist, naught is mine, I am not” which leaves no residue (to be known), is pure, being free from Ignorance, and is absolute

NOTES

Gauḍapāda and the author of the *Jayamaṅgalā* understand “tattva” to denote the principles or the categories of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Vācaspati's understanding of it (as adopted here) is

1. This is made quite clear by the illustration used in the *Sāṅkhya Sūtra*: kośakāravat, like the silk-worm (SPB, III; 73).

preferable, since it is by repeated study not of the categories but of the difference between the Spirit and the categories of Nature that wisdom results.¹ Repeated study means concentrated and uninterrupted study continued with faith for a long period. A casual apprehension of the truth will not suffice; for it must be made to take root. Once this happens, however, there is no fear of wisdom being driven out afresh by ignorance. For, the mind has always a decided leaning to truth; when truth has been firmly grasped and fully apprehended as such, it will not give place to error. Hence it is that the wisdom thus acquired is said to be absolute,

This discriminative wisdom leaves nothing else to be known; hence it is residueless (*aparīṣeṣa*). It is pure, since it is free from ignorance, whether in the form of doubt or error.

The three forms of this negative knowledge are thus explained: "I do not exist" means "I do not act," all functions like perception, self-consciousness, determination and so on being functions of Nature; or it may mean "I exist as the Spirit, not as the evolving principle." "I am not" means "I am not the agent," since activity does not belong to the Spirit. Agency being denied there

1. Cp. *SPB*, III, 75; the *Sūtra* reads, "tattvābhyāsān neti-netitī tyāgād viveka-siddhiḥ." Ballantyne in his translation takes the first word to mean "through the study of the (twenty-five) Principles." But neither here nor elsewhere does Bhikṣu's commentary require *tattvābhyāsa* to be taken in any sense other than that of repeated contemplation of the truth. The contemplation of the Principles would not of itself lead to their being discarded one by one (*neti-netitī tyāgaḥ*). It is worth noting that the *Sūtras* make the need for *abhyāsa* clear in that mere hearing is not adequate to bring about release, which can be brought about only by intuition (*sākṣātkāra*) and this is hindered by traces of the beginningless taint of ignorance; the hindrances have to be overcome by *tattvābhyāsa*. See *SPB*, II, 3. Another point of interest is that the *sūtrakāra* like Advaitin insists on wisdom alone as bringing about release, action being neither a substitute nor a co-eval auxiliary. Release does not result either from karma or from *jñāna-karma-samuccaya*. See *SPB*, III, 25. This, of course, cannot provide a justification for the statement often made that Śvara Kṛpā inveighed against ritual. In this aspect as well as in its atheism and pessimism, the *Sūtras* distinctly go beyond the *Kārikās*.

cannot be possessorship either; hence the statement "naught is mine."¹

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।

प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वच्छः ॥ ६५ ॥

LXV. *tena nivṛtta-prasavām*
arthavaśāt sapta-rūpa-vinivṛttām ।
prakṛtim paśyati puruṣaḥ,
prekṣakavad avasthitaḥ svacchaḥ ॥²

Thereby does the pure Spirit, resting like a spectator, perceive Primal Nature which has ceased to be productive, and, because of the power of discriminative knowledge, has turned back from the seven forms (dispositions).

NOTES

The productivity of Nature had but two objects--enjoyment by Puruṣa and his final release. These having been accomplished, she ceases to be productive. And since discriminative wisdom is opposed to virtue, vice, ignorance and so on, these cease to be, as such, and get merged in the unevolved. But Nature does not cease to exist. It continues to be perceived. Spirit is not affected by

1. The explanation given by *STV* is interesting: *evam pūrvokta-gatyā tattvānām pañca-vimśatir gana iti-sūtrita-pañca-vimśati-tattvānām abhyāsāt, vivekā-vṛtteḥ nā 'smi, prakṛti-mahadādi-bhautikānta-rūpo nā 'sti (nā 'smi?)*; *tac ca na me, na madiyam bhavati nā 'ham, etāvad api sthūlo 'ham brāhmaṇa iti piṇḍā-vivikta-rūpo 'ham idānim nā 'sty eva; iti niṣedhāt; apariseṣam, viśayatayā nākhila-prakṛti-prākṛta-vikāra-viśeṣa-sūnyam; aviparyayāt, viparyayā-bhāvāt, tamo-moha-mahāmohā-tāmisra-'ndhatāmisra-vināśāt; athavā viparyayo mithyā-jñānam atadrūpa-pratiṣṭhitam ity ukta-mithyā-jñāna-nāśāt; viśuddham, punaḥ samśayādi-doṣa-praveśā-'sahamkevala-puruṣa-gocaratayā kevalam; jñānam, prakṛti-vivikta-puruṣa-sākṣātkārā-'tmakam jñānam utpadyate.*

2. *SKG* and *Jaya* read "svasthaḥ" meaning "resting in himself and not in Prakṛti"; *STV* reads "susthaḥ" and explains it as "nirasta-prāktana-dauḥhyatayā prasannaḥ san."

intellect in so far as it is constituted of Rajas and Tamas; but through intellect that is sāttvika, Nature continues to be perceived. Thus is reconciled the perception of Nature with the purity and inactivity of Spirit.

दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एकः, दृष्टाहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।

सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

LXVI. *dr̥ṣṭā maye 'ty upekṣaka*
ekah,¹ dr̥ṣṭā 'ham ity uparamaty anyā
sati samyoge'pi tayoh
prayojanam nā'sti sargasya ॥

"She has been seen by me," (says) one (and is) indifferent; "I have been seen," (says) the other (and desists (from evolution); though there be conjunction of these, there is no prompting to (further) creation.

NOTES

After the *danseuse* and the bashful lady, we get here a different analogy, that of the *blāṣe* couple, who in the knowledge of their prior intimacy, have ceased to care for each other. They may live together, each being present to the other constantly; but there is no impulse to create. Such is the co-presence of Puruṣa and Prakṛti; once discriminative wisdom has been attained, Māṭhara illustrates this by the unproductive union of an elderly couple.

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमाद् धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।

तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्, चक्रभ्रमिवद् धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

LXVII. *samyag-jñānā 'dhigamād*
dharmādīnām akāraṇa-prāptau
tiṣṭhati saṁskāra-vaśāt
cakra-bhramivad² dhṛta śarīrah ॥

1. YD. uparatai 'kā (p. 106)

2: YD, bhramavat.

Virtue and the rest having ceased to function as causes, because of the attainment of perfect wisdom, (the Spirit) remains invested with the body, because of the force of past impressions, like the whirl of the (potter's) wheel (which persists for a while by virtue of the momentum imparted by a prior impulse.)

NOTES

Though discriminative wisdom is reached, the body continues to exist, and in that condition Nature continues to be perceived through intellect that is *śāttvika*. If, thus, final release is delayed even after the acquisition of wisdom, what is the value of the latter? It may be said that the body persists because of karma; but if wisdom cannot destroy karma, what can? Even if some other mode of destruction be admitted, as, for instance, enjoyment, *this* would be the cause of release, not wisdom. And to wait for the final destruction of karma by enjoyment through successive births is a hopeless task. The present verse answers such objections. The moment wisdom supervenes, all the seeds of karma become incapable of sprouting, for, the ground is rendered barren, deprived of all moisture of the nature of ignorance.¹ Yet the body continues

1. The five *viparyayas* (modes of ignorance) are known as Yoga philosophy as the five *kleśas*, they are *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣā*, and *abhiniveśa*. According to Vācaspati, these water the ground and make sprouting possible. Deprived of the moisture provided by these forms of ignorance the ground becomes barren. The deprivation of dampness is due to wisdom. The word "*kleśa*" primarily means pain or sorrow; and it is rendered as "pain" by Dr. Jha. But this does not bring out the full force of the contrast between that and wisdom. Where the word occurs in the *Yoga Sūtras*, it is rendered as "hindrance" by Woods (*The Yoga System of Patanjali*, p. 106). It has been thought preferable to use the term "ignorance" in the present work, especially in view of Vācaspati's identification of the five *kleśas* with the five *viparyayas*. *STV* takes "*akāraṇa-prāpti*" to mean the attachment of the dispositions, in the absence of their material cause, i.e., merely because of *saṃskāras*; the explanation given there is worth noting; *puruṣaḥ saṃyag-jñānasyā 'dhigamāt, prāpter hetoh-dharmādīnām bhāvanām akāraṇam svakāraṇabhūta-vidyām vinai 'va prāptau*

for a time, because of the force of past impressions, as the potter's wheel continues to whirl for a time with the original momentum, even after the potter has ceased to make it go round. These past impressions are of prior karma which has begun to take effect. That wisdom has the capacity to destroy all karma except that which has begun to take effect, and that, when this too is worked out by enjoyment, release comes on is attested by the Scriptures: thus the *Chāndogya* (VI, 14, 2) says "For him there is delay only so long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be perfect" (the translation is Max Müller's).¹

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।

ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमामोति ॥ ६८ ॥

LXVIII. *prāpte śarīra-bhede*

caritārthatvāt pradhāna-vinivṛttau ।

aikāntikam ātyantikam

ubhayam² kaivalyam āpnoti ॥

satyām, prārabdha-śiṣṭā-'nubhavāyai 'va tattatbhāva-prāptau satyām api 'ty arthaḥ; saṃskāra-vaśāt, pūrva-saṃskāra-nimittāt; cakrasya kulālena sakṛd-bhramita-viśṣṭa-cakrasya saṃskāra-mātra-pravṛtta-bhramavat, dhṛta-śarīras tiṣṭhati.

1. Curiously enough, Paramārtha seems to understand this verse without importing any notion of jīvanmukti. His rendering runs thus: Because of full and perfect knowledge, dharma, etc., have no longer any influence; transmigration is arrested, like the body (or force) of the potter's wheel, whose motion one interrupts: see *BFEQ*, IV, 1056. This is, of course, hardly satisfactory. Mr. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, a Chinese and Tibetan scholar, writes thus: "According to the Chinese, the verse in question would be like this in Sanskrit: samyag jñānād dharmādīni karanāni na siddhyanti, saṃsāraḥ śāmyati śarīram (tu) dhāyate cakravat." Here we have the reading in some editions 'nigṛhyate' for 'dhṛiyate' on which Takaku's translation is based. But his translation 'like the body of the wheel, etc.,' is certainly incorrect."

2. *STV* reads "abhayam" and explains it as "abhaya-rūkam."

Primal Nature, her object accomplished, ceasing to be active, (the Spirit) on obtaining separation from the body, attains release (which is) both certain and final.

NOTES

When the karma which has begun to take effect (prārabdha karma) is fully worked out, the body is destroyed; and with the destruction of the body there is release. This is certain and final; for there is no further hindrance, in the way of release, nor any possible danger of that release being terminated; virtue and vice and the rest which are the cause of bondage have already been deprived of their potency. Thus, the author reaches the object, with the quest of which he started the inquiry.¹ All perceptible and revealed modes of getting over misery lack certainty and finality; discriminative wisdom alone provides release that is certain and final. In the succeeding verses, Īśvara Kṛṣṇa seeks to inspire faith in the teaching, by showing the weight of tradition behind it; and the concluding verses state that his own work is a complete treatise, not one confined to the exposition of some particular part or aspect of the Sāṅkhya doctrine.

पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।

स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

LXIX. *puruṣārtha²-jñānam idam*

guhyam paramarṣiṇā samākhyātam ।

sthity-utpatti-pralayāś

cintyante yatra bhūtānām ॥

This abstruse doctrine (which is) accessory to the attainment of the goal of the Spirit, (and) wherein are

1. Cp. YD: yatrai 'vo 'tthānam śāstrasya tatrai 'vo 'pasphāra ācāryeṇa kṛtaḥ; p. 173.

2. YD: puruṣārtham,

considered the existence, origin, and dissolution of beings, has been fully expounded by the Great Sage (Kapila).

NOTES

Vācaepati explains "where in" as equivalent to "for the sake of which knowledge,"¹

1. Verse LXIX is the last verse commented on by Gauḍapāda. This makes it exceedingly probable that the succeeding kārīkās are later interpolations. The difficulty, however, is that the work is said to contain seventy verses, while on Gauḍapāda's reckoning we have only sixty-nine. It is surmised from Gauḍapāda's commentary on kārīka LXI that there was possibly a verse between that and what we now read as LXII. Gauḍapāda discusses the suitability of the causal agency of īśvara, time, the nature of things and so on, and comes to the conclusion that pradhāna alone can function adequately as the cause of the world. Kārīka LXI cannot of itself give rise to this discussion. B. G. Tilak attempted to re-construct the missing verse thus:—

Kāraṇam īśvaram eke puruṣam kālam pare svabhāvam vā,

Prajāḥ katham nirgunato vyaktaḥ kālas svabhāvaś ca.

Some say īśvara is the cause, others that spirit or time or nature of things (is the cause). How can beings (endowed with qualities come) out of the non-qualified? (As for) time and the nature of things, (they) are discrete principles (and hence, require the undiscete as their cause).

Apart from the merits of this conjectural verse, there is one difficulty to be considered. At the close of the commentary on verse LXI, Gauḍapāda and Māthara hark back to the word sukumārataram, the former apparently paraphrasing it by the word subhogyataram, more enjoyable. This makes it rather unlikely that any verse was commented on other than verse LXI. Further, it is difficult to believe that three commentators missed out the suggested kārīka but went on faithfully copying the commentary thereon. If there was a motive for omitting the kārīka (as Tilak suggests) it may have operated equally in the case of the commentary. That the kārīka was left out even before A. D. 500, that is to say, within a century or two of īśvara Kṛṣṇa's date also sounds improbable. Tilak himself admits that the commentary given by Paramārtha is more complete than the comments of Gauḍapāda or Māthara. It certainly is more coherent and one can understand how (even without positing a lost kārīka) the discussion of īśvara, etc., comes in, as part of the notion of sukumārataratva. The argument that the denial of God, etc. is an essential part of Sāṅkhya doctrine and should, therefore, find place in the

एतत् पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।

आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

LXX. *etat pavitram agryam*

munir āsuraye 'nukampayā pradadau ।

āsurir api pañcaśikhāya,

tena ca bahudhā kṛtam tantram ॥

This supreme purifying (knowledge), the sage first handed on, in compassion.¹ to Āsuri; Āsuri (passed it on) to Pañcaśikha; by him the doctrine was elaborated.

Kārikās will not hold water. For, it would be to beg the question to assert that the *Kārikās* are as atheistic as the *Sūtras*; further, the neighbourhood of verse LXI seems hardly the most suitable place for discussing the origin of the world. From verse LVI, we seem to have a continuous line of argument proceeding on the basis of Primal Nature alone being the creator of the universe. A discussion of God, etc., would have come more appropriately before verse LVI. YD introduces a discussion of primal atoms, *Īvara*, etc., in commenting on vv. XV and XVI; and it seems to have no difficulty in disposing of these notions, even on the basis of the *kārikās* we have; see pp. 82-89; the folio relating to v, LXI seems unfortunately to be missing.

It is worth noting that Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha, the author of several works and commentaries on Śaivism (circa, 550 A.D.) quotes in his commentary on verse 45 of the *Mokṣa Kārikā*, a verse in Āryā metre, purporting to be from a Sāṅkhya work. It runs thus:—

Samsarati bhogya-bhāvāt, tadvinivṛttyā tu mokṣadā prakṛtiḥ ।

Svātmana eva na puṁso lopo'sau na svayam veda ॥

If missing *kārikās* are to be supplied, one wonders whether this may not fill the bill. But on the question of making up the *Kārikās* to seventy, see note to verse LXXIII.

1. Not promoted by motives of dharma, kāma, all these being unintelligible, in the case of the connately Kapila; nor by chance: YD, p. 175.

शिष्यपरम्परयागतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

LXXI. *śiṣya-paramparayā 'gatam īśvarakṛṣṇena caitatad
āryābhiḥ ।
saṁkṣiptam āryamatinā samyag vijñāya
siddhāntam ॥*

This which was handed down through a succession of pupils has been compendiously set down in Āryā mentre, (after) fully comprehending the final doctrine, by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, whose intellect had approximated to the truth.

NOTES

Ārya-mati is explained by Vācaspati to mean one whose intellect has moved close to the truth.

सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थस्तिऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्णिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

LXXII. *saptatyām kila ye'rthās
te'rthāḥ kṛtsnasya ṣaṣṭitantrasya ।
ākhyāyikā-virahitāḥ,
paravāda-vivarjitās cā 'pi ॥*

The subjects of the seventy verses, are verily, those of the entire science of sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales and omitting also the discussion of rival views.

NOTES

What these sixty topics are is not clear. Vācaspati, quoting from the *Rājavārtika*, gives the following list.—

1. the existence of the *pradhāna*,
2. its one-ness,
3. its objectivity.¹
4. its difference from Spirit,
5. its subservience of Spirit,
6. the manifoldness of Spirit,
7. disjunction of Spirit and Nature,
8. conjunction of Spirit and Nature,
9. continuance of embodiment and activity after the attainment of wisdom,
10. non-activity of Spirit;

these are the principal topics. The other fifty are the five modes of Ignorance, the nine forms of Complacency, the twenty-eight forms of Infirmary, and the eight Attainments.

The Ākhyāyikās are parables. Some of the analogies like that of the lame man and the blind one are really tales of this kind. The whole of Book IV of the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* attributed to Kapila is taken up with these tales. The first of these (as narrated in that work) may be of some interest. A prince was carried away in early life by hunters and, living amidst them, he grew up in the belief that he too was a huntsman. When recovered subsequently and apprised of his true status, he ceases to look upon himself as an outcaste, and betakes himself to his royal status. The onset of discriminative wisdom is analogous to the process of being apprised of one's true status. This idea is found in the *Sivajñānabodha* too, where the five senses are said to be the hunters in whose company, the soul has been brought up in ignorance of its true princely nature.

It is not known definitely whether the *Śaṣṭitantra* refers to sixty topics or to a work of that name. The latter appears probable because of more than one reference to it in the *Jayamaṅgālā*.² The

1. YD mentions *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ*.

2. These are noted by Mr. M. Hiriyanna; see his *Śaṣṭi-tantra and Vārṣaganya*, JORM, III, ii, 107-112.

work is also referred to in the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on Yoga Sūtra IV, 13. The *Jayamaṅgalā* ascribes the authorship to Pañcaśikha, and a rather successful attempt has been made to show that the ascription is worthy of credence, in spite of the apparent conflict with Vācaspati's reference in the *Bhāmatī* on Vedānta Sūtra II, i, 3.1 The mention of sixty topics in the *Ahīrbudhnyā Samhitā*, chapter I2, is interesting, but of little value, in this connection; for, that work mentions Brahman, Kāla, Niyati etc., among the accepted categories,² while these find no mention in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* (except in Tilak's conjectural verse). Some Āgamas (e.g., the Śaiva Āgamas) have, indeed, prided themselves on the recognition of these very categories, which were not within the ken of inferior systems like the Sāṅkhya. It is not likely that Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, who says that he has treated *all* the topics of the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra, had in his mind anything like the sixty topics of the *Ahīrbudhnyā Samhitā*.

It has been suggested that Kapila's own work was possibly named the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra and that Pañcaśikha's work, being but an amplification bore the same name.³

तस्मात्समासदृष्टं शास्त्रमिदं नार्थतश्च परिहीनम् ।

तन्त्रस्य च बृहन्मूर्तेर्दोषसंक्रान्तमिव बिम्बम् ॥ ७३ ॥

LXXIII. *tasmāt samāsa-dr̥ṣṭam*

śāstram idam nā 'rthataś ca parihīnam 1

tantrasya ca br̥hanmūrter

darpaṇa-saṅkrāntam iva bimbam ॥

Hence this briefly expounded śāstra is not defective in respect of content, and is, as it were, an image, reflected in a mirror, of the huge proportions of the (Ṣaṣṭi-) tantra.

1. JORM, III, ii, 107-112.

2. *Ah. sam.*, I, 108, 109; Schrader, *Int. Ah. Sam.*, 110, 111.

3. JORM, III, ii, 110. See also *Ved. Su.* II, i, 1, *Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya*.

NOTES

The verse is found in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, only as commented on by Māṭhara. It seems to draw (rather unnecessarily) the logical conclusion of what is stated in the previous verse and contains no element of value except the rather pretty simile in the second line. Its authenticity is, therefore, very questionable.

It seems reasonable to hold that both verses LXXI and LXXIII were tacked on at some later date by some person or persons who felt it necessary to repel the charge that the *Kārikās* constituted only a prakaraṇa and not an entire śāstra. The original work, then, would have ended with verse LXXI, which, according to the Chinese version is verse LXX. It may be legitimately conjectured that that was the last verse of the *Saptati* proper, and that verse LXIII, not found in the Chinese version, was probably interpolated at a later date. It should be noted that that verse adds very little to our knowledge, and that the transition from verse LXII to verse LXIV would be unbroken, even if we left out LXIII. Tilak following Takakusu holds the omission of this verse in the Chinese version to be "evidently an error," as that verse is found in *Sāṅkhyā Sūtra*, III, 73, and also in Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya. The testimony of Gauḍapāda is, however, of little value, in the absence of definite information as to his identity and date. Practically the same objection applies to the *Sūtras*. In the absence of very much fuller information about them than we possess at present, it is exceedingly unsafe to try to fill up gaps in the *Kārikās* in the light of the *Sūtras*, now known to us under that name.¹ The inquiry "which is the interpolated verse?" would seem to be at least as fruitful as the inquiry into a missing verse.

1. YD does not help us since the relevant portion of the Ms. is missing. See further an article by the present editor on "The Missing Kārikā in the Sāṅkhyasaptai" in the *Poona Orientalist*, 11, 65.

APPENDIX

Verses from the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* quoted in

Bhaṭṭotpala's commentary on the

Bṛhatsamhitā.

prakṛter mahāṃś tato'haṅkaraḥ tasmād gaṇas ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ ।
tasmād api ṣoḍaśakat pañcabhyaḥ pañca-bhūtāni ॥

(22 : all texts agree).

adhyavasāyo dharmo jñānam vairāgyam aiśvaryam ।
sāttvikam etad rūpam tāmasam asmād viparyastam ॥

(23 : Vācaspati reads "adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ, dharmo
jñānam viraga aiśvaryam "; this is also the reading
of Maṭhara and Gauḍapada).

abhimāno'haṅkaraḥ, tasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ ।
āindriyam ekādaśakam tanmatrapañcakaś caiva ॥

(24 : Vācaspati reads "ekādaśakaś ca gaṇas tanmatra-
pañcakaś caiva "; this is also the reading of Gauḍa-
pada; but Maṭhara gives the same reading as Bhaṭṭot-
pala, with the modification "āindriya ekādaśakaḥ").

sāttvika ekādaśakaḥ pravartate vaikṛtad ahaṅkarat ।
bhūtādes tanmātraḥ sa tāmasas taijasaś ubhayam ॥

(25 : all texts agree).

buddhindriyaṇi karṇa-tvak-cakṣu-rasana-nāsikā-'khyani
vāk-paṇi-pada-payū-'pastham karmendriyaṇy aha ॥

(26 : Vācaspati reads "Buddhindriyaṇi cakṣuḥ-śrotra-
ghrāṇa-rasana-tvag-akhyani । Vakpaṇi-pada-payū-
'pasthāḥ karmendriyaṇy ahuḥ "; Maṭhara reads
like Bhaṭṭotpala but "śrotra" for "karṇa," "upas-
thaṇ" for "upastham" and "ahuḥ" for "aha";

Gauḍapāda reads the second line like Māṭhara and the first like Vācaspati, but the first line ends with "sparśanakāni" instead of "tvag-akhyāni").

saṅkalpakam atra manah tac ce 'ndriyam ubhayathā samakh-
yātam ।

antas trikalaviṣayam tasmād ubhayapracāram tat ॥

(27: Vācaspati reads "ubhayātmakam atra manah, saṅkalpakam indriyam ca sādharmyat ।

guṇapariṇamaviśeṣaṇaṇatvam bahyabhedas ca ॥";
Māṭhara reads like Vācaspati, but "grāhyabhedas
ca "

Gauḍapāda reads like Vācaspati).

rūpādiṣu pañcāṇaṁ ālocanamātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ ।

vacanā-'dana-viharaṇo-'tsarga-'nandas tu pañcāṇaṁ ॥

(28: Vācaspati reads "śabdādiṣu pañcāṇaṁ", etc.;

Māṭhara gives Bhaṭṭotpala's reading; so does one printed text of Gauḍapāda).

svalakṣaṇyam vṛttis trayasya saṁśa bhavaty asaṁnya ।
saṁnyakaraṇavṛttiḥ prāṇādya vāyavaḥ pañca ॥

(29: All texts agree, but Māṭhara reads "svalakṣaṇyā").

yugapac catuṣṭayasya tu vṛttiḥ kramaśīś ca tasya nirdiṣṭa ।
drṣṭe tathā 'py adṛṣṭe trayasya tatpūrvikā vṛttiḥ ॥

(30: Vācaspati gives the same reading; Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda read "catuṣṭayasya hi", etc.).

The extracts are taken from pp. 7 and 8 of Vol. I of the *Bṛhatsamhitā* (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series). On p. 6 Bhaṭṭotpala explains "saṅkalpa" of verse 27 as desire, abhilāṣaḥ, spṛhā. The close parallelism of Māṭhara's reading (esp. Nos. 24 and 26) would suggest proximity to him in time and possibly priority even to Gauḍapāda. It is, however, said that Bhaṭṭotpala belongs to the tenth century A.D. The totally different reading of verse 27 is very intriguing. The quotation is said to be from Kapila-

cāryaḥ, Reference is made to Bhaṭṭotpala's reading, especially of the verse " saṅkalpakam atra manah " etc., in the Introduction to the Māṭhara Vṛtti, by the editor of that work in the Chowkhamba Series.

It is worth noting that the Chinese *Suvarṇa Saptati* seems to follow the reading of Māṭhara and Bhaṭṭotpala in many places. Thus, verse 24 speaks of the eleven organs (les onze organes) making it possible that the Saṃskṛt reading was 'aīndriyam ekādaśakam' rather than 'ekādaśakaś ca gaṇaḥ'. In the enumeration of sense-organs in verse 26, the ears are mentioned first, not the eye, and the skin, the eyes, the tongue and the nose are mentioned in the same order as by Māṭhara and Bhaṭṭotpala. The translation of the first portion of verse 27 reads thus: " The manas is that which discerns. One says that that organ is of two (i. e., both) kinds (karmendriya and jñānendriya)." This is closer to the reading of Bhaṭṭotpala than to the reading of any known Indian commentator. In the second part, the similarity is to Māṭhara in treating the differences of external objects (grāhya or bahya) as accounting for the diversity (nānātvaṃ). The Saṃskṛt original translated by Paramārtha should certainly have belonged to some period prior to A. D. 500. Why an author who came some five centuries later should have quoted from this text rather than from what must have been more familiar to him in his own day is a mystery. One would expect Bhaṭṭotpala to have used the same text as his contemporary Vācaspati Miśra. There is so much uncertainty about all the related questions that no chronological conclusion based on textual evidence wholly or even principally has any chance of survival.¹

1. For the reference to Bhaṭṭotpala's commentary, I am indebted to Prof. Bhagavad Datta, B.A., of the D.A.V. College; Lahore.

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7.

Buddhist Ideal of Life

1. Knowledge as a means to final release is Upanishadic ideal.

